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SECTION ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
') 
<- • 
This study was undertaken at a time when a shortage of 
skilled White manpower, accentuated by the pressure of economic 
development during the 1960's, is reqarded as one of the major 
obstacles in the way of- continued and balanced future growth of the 
South African economy. It is commonly understood, too, that one 
important conseqcence of these shortages has been the movement of 
Black workers into skilled jobs previously held by Whites. 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
The first aim of this study is to describe a process cf 
change in the labour market structure of one specific industry 
and to describe the dynamics of adjustments resulting from the 
shortages of White ~rtisan labour. Attention is to be given to the 
strains in the labour market and the resultant ~recess of adjust-
ment through government intervention or industrial council negot-
iations, as well as the ramifications for the market participants 
and the pattern of earnings. 
It was decided to study only one industry since available 
data on Black oc~upational advancement was insufficiently detailed 
on a macro-basis to test any but the most superficiaJ hypotheses. 
One more specific objective following from this aim is 
to test the relevance of the nee-classical labour market theori~s 
as described by authors like Rothschild. 
Such a focus on the micro-perspective of one industry is 
important to obtain a clearer and more accurate represenbation of 
the facts, causes and consequences of the shifting colour bar in 
South Africa. There still seems to be much scope for such studies, 
which theorise and try to explain present labour market develop-
ments. Hopefully, such investigations might lead to the amelioration 
of some of these strains. 
The second major aim of this study is to assess critically \Yi the costs and benefits that have accrued to the various interested 
parties - the Master Builders Asso~iations, the registered trade 
unions and Black workers (Coloured, Asian and African) following 
the l~fting of certain statutory barriers to Black occupational 
advancement in one industry. In a~dition we want to assess the terms 
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under which Black workers have been admitted to the skilled trades. 
In this regard it may be mentioned that the official 
policy objective of narrowing the wage gap js apparently to be 
achieved by the more productive utilisation of Black labour. In_ 
July 1973 the Economic Adviser tc the Prime Minister stated th~t 
''the government has accepted in principle, that it is desirable to 
narrow the disparity between the levels of living of the various 
population groups". This is to be achieved by Black incomes "rising 
at a somewhat faster rate than those of Whites to the extent that 
this can be justified on the basis of their changing position in the 
( 1) labour pattern". 
1.2 Choice of the Building Industry 
The decision to study the building industry in particular 
was taken for two reasons : Firstly! the sector is relatively im-
portant within the national economy, accounting (together with 
civil engineering) for almost one-tenth of all non-agric~ltural 
employment. Secondly, during the early 1970's the e.mphasis in the 
industry was falling heavily on the need for new recruits as well 
as the provision of improved training facilities, the introduction 
of nE.'J techniques and the more productive utilisation of a\railable 
labour resources. These changes were seen as significan~ indications 
of major structural changes taking place in the employment pattern 
of this sector. 
1.3 Regional Delimitation 
The study was further narrowed down to two regions, i.e. 
those falling within the jurisdictions of the industrial councils 
of the Witwatersrand and Cape Peninsula. Research results are in 
most cases confined to these two regions. The building industry 
as a whole has fourteen industrial councils covering all the regions 
where the size of the industry justj_fies industrial council machinery 
It would have been practically impossible to study all the regions 
and arrive at a relevant and practical set of explanatory tools 
in a study of this scope. Thus, the results cannot be regarded as 
generally valid, e\ren though some of them seem to be applicable to 
other areas as well. · 
The contrast between the two areas highlights the 
different patterns of occupational advance experienced by Coloured, 
AsiCl_n and African workers. T·he Wi ti_,1atersra.nd industry strictly 
controlled the entry of African workers to skilled trades by way of 
fragmentation agreements negotiated with the registered unions, 
while strict statutory barriers still control further advancement 
(e.g. their exclusion from the ranks of artL3c.ns). Coloured people 
are well represented in the artisan ranks, but there remain sig-
nificant informal barriers, such as discrimic-1atory hiring practices. 
In the concluding section these patterns of entry and advancement 
will be contrasted using the empirical analysis. 
1.4 Period covered 'qy the St_udy 
The delineat;on of the time period presented some 
difficulty, since the occupational mobility of African workers in !} 
the industry began with their movement iEi:o certain lower-level ff 
semi-skilled jobs in the 1930's. Once again, however, the choice j 
of too wide an arec for study was impractical and would have 
limited in-depth analysis. Moreover, the choice of a shorter and 
more recent period made it possible to consult industrial council 
officials, employers and tradr unionists about the pattern of 
~hange • The period chosen stretches from the introduction of job 
reservation Determinations No. 6 (in the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State) and 13 (in the Cape and Natal), i.e. roughly from 1962 1 to 
the more recent past (1975). The most far-reaching changes in the 
labour structure of the Witwatersrand industry have taken place 
during this period, even though important legislatio!1 prior to 
this period has to be taken into account as well. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This study falls within the scope of applied labour 
economics, being largely a descriptive and empirical study of the 
dynamics of the adjustment process of one particular industry. As 
such it is distinguishable from macro-studies on labour and from 
more theoretical studies on, inter alia, human capital. 
In doing th~ r~search special emphasis was placed in the 
initial stage on the literature on racial stratification in the 
labour market. This constituted the basis for the hypotheses under-
c:: 
_, . 
lying the empirical research. Close personal contact was estab-
lished with officials from the relevant industrial councils, trade 
unions, government departments and leading employers as well as 
employers' organisations. Information was also collected with the 
help of a loosely-structured questionnaire. 
It was or~ginally intended to study the labour practices 
of several firms in depth, using statistical data from their records 
as a basis for the analysis of wage discrimination, the attitudes 
of White staff to Black advancement, and the experience with the 
illegal use of African labour in skilled positions. However, this 
proved too difficult due to the complexity of the questions which 
would have had to be asked within the context of the day~to-day 
running of the firm. All except the largest firms did not have 
staff dealing specifically with labour practicPs, or the present 
staff had not been with the firm long enough to provide detailed 
information of the kind sought. 
1.6 Seauence of the Study 
The study consists of two major parts, a theoretical 
and more generally descriptive part, including sections 2 - 4, and 
an analytical part containing sections 5 - 8, follow,,,d by a con-
cluding section. While the first part covers the industry as a 
whole, the second part concentrates on the two specific areas. 
Section 2 deals with models concerning the labour market 
adjustment proc~ss. Attention is first given to the neoclassical 
theory of labour market adjustment, and the role which interest 
groups like trade unions play in facilitating such adjustment •. 
There is also an analysis of the various forces which influence 
employers to admit workers to occupational categories previously 
closed to them. The second part of this section deals with labour 
rationalisation schemes and the precondition for their success. 
In Section 3 labour utilisation and labour market ad-
justment in South Africa is briefly reviewed. It was included to 
outline the institutional setting ~ithin which Black occupatiohal 
mobility is occurring. Consideration is given to the role played 
by labour legislation in the control of vertical mobility and to 
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the flexibility it permits for such advancement. This is followed 
by a brief resume of the historical evolution of the industrial 
colour bar. Certain hypotheses relevant to later sections emerge 
from studies of Black occupational mobility since 1960. 
The structure of the South African building sector is 
outlined in Section 4, with emphasis on its relative significance 
as well as the organisational structure and regional distribution 
of the industry. Some attention is also gi\re~ to trends in output 
and employment during the 1960's and to the industry's most im-
portant technological characteristics. 
Section 5 looks at the supply and demand relationships 
of the labour market in the Witwatersrand building industry. It may 
also be seen as a st~dy of general labour and recruitment problems 
experienced in the building labour market. The information presented 
in this section s~rves as background to Section 6, which deals with 
the lifting of legal barriers to the advancement of Black workers. 
Sections 6 and 7 constitute the main body of this study. 
Section 6 deals with attempts to rationalise the labour structure 
f 
of the Witwatersrand industry through the reclassification of work 
by va~ious institutional means. The process bega:1 as early as 1951 
with the passing of the Bantu Building Workers' Act. The ~ost im-
portant changes considered in this section are those which were 
brought about in the private building industry as a result of 
agreements between the parties to the b1llding industrial council. 
The section also deals with the entry of Coloured artisans into the 
industry, as brought about by exemptions from and, finally, the 
reversal of, job reservation Determination No. 6 and its replacement 
by Determination No. 28. In the discussion an attempt is made to 
assess critically the bargaining structure during industrial council 
negotiations and the implications of these changes for the unions. 
The trends in the earnings pattern resulting from the 
process of work reclassification is the subject of Section 7. It 
looks at the implications for Black and White earnings of the 
shifting colour bar, applying some of the conclusions arrived at 
in the previous section. The section analyses and tries to explain 
the respective trends in White and Black wages and fringe benefits 
in the Witwatersrand. 
7. 
In Section 8 the focus is on the occupational mobility 
of Coloured building workers in the Western Cape. Their advance-
ment has taken a completely different form to that of the African 
and Coloured worker in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, since in 
the former case, including also Indian and Coloured building workers 
in Natal, there have only been minor legal harriers to their entry 
into the skilled trades. The major barriers have been of a con-
ventional nature, and consideration is given to the extent to which 
they are being overcome. 
Finally, Section 9 contains a brief resume of the hy-
potheses developed in earlier sections and presents major conclusions 
drawn from the field wo~. Special consideration is given to the 
contrasting patterns of entry to the skille~ trades of the Coloured 
people in the Western c·~pe and the African worker on the Witwaters-
rand respectively. 
8. 
FOOTNOTES SECTION 1 
(1) G. Leistner ~d W. Breytenbach, The Black Worker of South 
Africa, p.38. 
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SECTION TWO 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
10. 
Section 2 deals with theoretical models designed to 
analyse (1) the dynamics of labour market adjustment in a perfectly 
adjusting neoclassical labour market model as opposed to markets 
with some form of administrative (institutional) adjustment super-
imposed, e.g. unions with restrictive practices, (2) the market 
forces affecting the bargaining position of trade unions in their 
.resistance to change, e.g. the elasticii:y of demand for tmion labour, 
(3) employers' decisions to increase wages in certain job categories 
(as a method of keeping the occupation closed to certain groups), or 
to alter hiring standards and admit races previously excluded, (4) 
the proper criteria (in an economically optimal sense) by which to 
judge labour rationalisation (or job fragmentation) schem~s. 
Important hypotheses fer the study emerge from these 
models concerning (1) union attitudes to changing the labour 
structure in industries with high employment fluctuations, (2) the 
different attitudes of craft as opposed to industrial unions, (3) 
protectionism and the demand for job security among union members 
as a quid pro quo for fragmentation of artisan skills, (4) the 
characteristics in the labour market influencing unions and em-
ployers to alter the labour structure. 
2.1 Labour Market Adjustment 
In economics there are many viewpoints as to \vhich fo.rces 
are the most important in the determination of the wage structure 
Whilst there may be large differences in opinion amongst economists 
about which theory fits the facts, there is agreement that the ex-
! tent of occupational mobility will be a crucial factor determining the shape of the occupational wage structure. Changes in relative wages induce mobility, thereby distributing labour among various 
occupations. In a perfectly competitive labour market, the occu-
pational wage structure is determined by supply and demill1d. In an 
imperfectly competitive situation other forces must be specified 
which cause the occupational wage structure to deviate from the 
norm, i.e. there exist obstacles to mobility and institutional 
requirements which limit mobility and modify its form. 
In this sub-section we will look briefly at two theories 
of labour market adjustment - those at either end of the spectrum 
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when it comes to assumptions about occupational mobility. The first 
is commonly known as the marginaJ productivity theciry of wages, and j 
the second group of theories broadly known as "pow.er" theories. At 
a simplified level, one cou~d view the distinction as that between 
"competitive market forces" and interference with such forces by 
labour market pressure groups. 
2.1.1 Neoclassical Theory 
For several decades prior to the 1930's traditional 
economic doctrine had been based upon the view that the wage rates 
in particular occupations or in particular localities were determined 
by the free operation of competitive forces within each relevant 
labour market. The demand curve for labour wouJd be determined in 
the following way : given a rational producer ht the firm 1 s level 
and assuming diminishing returns from hiring an additional worker, 
workers will be employed up to that point where the marginal product 
of the last worker is equal to the wage. The wage is a given par-
ameter to the single employer under perfect competition but for an 
industry or occupation it may be positively sloping. At this point 
profits are maximised and the marginal revenue product schedule is 
thus the demand curve for labour at the firm 1 s level. 
This demand is integrated with the product market, be-
cause the marginal revenue product is derived from the demand curve 
for the final product, as well as from the firm's physical pro-
ductivity schedule. For each occupation there would thus be a demand 
curve for labour, determined by worker productivity, the technical 
conditions of production and the product market. Together with a 
particular supply curve, this would determine the wage rate. 
12. 
·This neoclassical view of lhe oco1pational wage struc-
ture is summarised as follows by Rothschild : 
"the general truth will be that in a perfectly 
competitive system there will be a tendency for 
all wages to become equal (allowing for net ad-
vantages and differences in efficiency). For if 
wages rose in one occupation, the workers in other 
occupations would move to the higher-paid trade 
until the wages there had returned to the general 
level. Even if such a movement could not be carried 
out on a large scale in view of the difficulties of 
re-training, the tendency towards wage equalization 
would still work in the long run, because new en-
trants would mainly turn towards the high-paid 
occupations, increasing the labour force there and 
bringing wages down, while the dearth of recruits 
would reduce the labour force and improve wages in 
the low-paid occupations". (1) 
In other words, wage differentials in the laboui· market should al-
ways be equalising. 
In their attempts to maximise profits, employers are 
assumed to substitute one .factor of production for others in order 
to achieve the most efficient combination of factors. Labour and 
capital are to some extent substitutes, and the relative amounts 
that have to be used in a certain process of production can usually 
be varied to some extent. What is economically the most efficient 
combination will depend on the relative prices of labour and capital. 
Thus equilibrium in the factor markets will only be 
reached when all units of labour and capital offered are employed 
and no entrepeneur can increase his profits by substituting labour 
for capital or vice versa at existing prices. This is the same thing 
as saying that the returns on each factor must be proportional to 
their prices. The equilibrium condition is specified below, where 
MP is the marginal revenue product of a factor, A and B are any two 
factors and PA and PB are the factor prices .-
MPA 
PA 
= 
It should make no di ffer·ence to entrepeneurs whether they 
invest a rand in labour or capital. The return must be the same in 
both cases or else it would be worth their while to take more of 
the factor which yields a higher return and less of the other 
( 
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factor. This would increase the price (ceteris paribus) of the first 
factor, and decrease the price of the second one, and the process 
would continue until the return in both cases were the same. 
The same two-factor analysis can be extended to any 
number of factors of production and in fast also to different kinds 
of labour and the situation of labour market intervention • An 
occupational colour bar, both legal and conventional:may for example 
restrict skilled jobs to occupancy by (say) Whites only. Yet, those 
members excluded by legal prohibitions may be willing and able to 
do the same work at a lower wage, e.g •. non-union labour in a closed 
shop industry and the pressures for substitution on the employer 
would be the same as under any other conditions of factor substitutior 
2.1.2 Barriers to Occupational Mobility 
The 'power' doctrine focuses on interference or neutral-
isation of the market forces outlined above, so that the source of 
wage determination is sought elsewhere. E.g. by introducing trad~ 
unions into the picture, one leaves the determination of wages to 
a continuing struggle between unions and management, in which the 
wage level is a priori indeterminate. In particular~ exponents of 
this view point to the power of unions in pushing up (s~me) wages 
beyond levels suggested by marginal principles without directly 
causing significant unemployment. 
Rothschild puts it as follow~ 
11 The fact is that there is not just one labour market 
but a number of labour markets which are fairly sep-
arated from each other by economic barriers, social 
prejudice and snobbery. Sometimes there may be a 
certain fluidity at the fringes, such as the occasional 
rise of skilled workers to high administrative positions, 
while in other cases, such as a colour bar, the division 
may be absolutely rigid; but in all these examples we 
are faced with, what Cairnes called, 'non-competing 
groups', within each of which there will be a certain 
tendency towards wage equalization subject to the im-
pediments mentioned in previous sections, but between 
which there. wi 11 be very little come and go, t"hus 
maintaining permanently the uneven distribution of wage 
incomes and advantages". (2) 
Power theoiies usually imply union control over the 
supply of workers av~ilable for certain jobs, i.e. the exertion 
of some form of political power. Thus unions can influence wages 
by manipulating the actual supply and demand conditions prevailing. 
They can do this by shifting the supply curve of union labour left-
wards and/or expanding the demand for union services. Some authors 
regard these two strategies as the primary function of union 
leadership. 
In the So11th African context one important feature of 
the labour market behaviour of registerec trade unions is that if 
unions control the supply of workers into an occupation, thereby 
pushing up wages, to protect these gains they must also prevent 
employers ~rom working through the capital-labour substitution 
process. Attempts by unions to push wages above the general level 
must ultimately set up forces leading to substitution by cheaper 
factors of production. Unions must also be able to prevent existing 
employers from undercut~ing the union wage rate, and prevent the 
entry of new employers into the industry who would do so. Some 
authors have therefore argued that oligopolistic markets, charac-
terised by entry barriers imposed by the nature of the industry, 
are conducive to high wage settlements.< 3 > 
One could view market forces as indicating the market 
constraints 0ithin which the lJehaviour of economic units is con-
strained. Granting the obvious limitations of the static theory 
it does indicate the direction of adjustment that will take place 
even in a dynamic situation. It could be argued that in the long 
run any large discrepancy between marginal produ~tivity and wage~ 
will become untenable, either as competition f9rces wages up and 
labour becomes scarce, or there is a cutback in employment when 
wages are con~istently forced above marginal productivity. 
In the context of a situation where this imbalance is 
brought about by restrictive union practices, such as a closed 
shop and union control over the hiring of other factors of pro-
duction, the alteration is normally brought about by easing the 
controls on the entry of workers to ~killed trades. Thomas has said 
in this respect 
''White labour has to realise that it cannot have its 
cake and eat it : if a wage level surpassing prod-
uctivity levels is to be maintained within inflexible 
occupational patterns, which no longer meet the actual 
work requirements, then irresistable pressure will build 
up to dilut~ and fragment the job content''· (4) 
15 • 
. It is of course possible that unions may admit workers 
excluded so far,by way of an administrative adjustment to an im-
balance between the demand for and supply of labour in a particular 
tr2.de. The adjustment may still be such chat the unions effectively 
control entry. This can happen, for example, by setting a maximum 
] 
permissible ratio of semi-skilled workers to artisans, and the 
impact this has on the skilled wage rate, or its growth may be 
negligible. Virtually no detailed theoretical or empirical work 
has been done on this issue, even though it is extremely important 
in the context of the South African situation at this stage, and 
for this study in particular. 
2.1.3 The Wage-Employment Trade-Off 
The emphasis on economic pressures setting limits to 
the unrestricted power of unions to raise wages, is widely ack~ow-
1 d - . . h l' t +- ( S) A d . th . e.ged int e i era~ure. s regar s unions, e consensus in 
the literature appears to be that trade unions do have the ability 
to raise the wages of their members but that in the long run their 
bargaining power will be strictly limited by the economic environ-
ment in which they operate. 
Thus unions must take into account the amount of em-
ployment associated with various possible wage rates. A union might 
have in mind several alternative feasible wage-employment objectives 
in formulating its wage policy. This, of course, does not apply in 
the limiting case of maximising simply the money wage rate irre~-
( 6) . pective of the volume of employment. Dunlop therefore stressed 
that a union's desire to press for increased wages would be tem-
pered by the elasticity of demand for the services of its member~, 
and that it would make some estimate of it if it were to attempt 
to maximise any wage-employment objective. 
Periods of rising demand and e::mployment offer unions 
the greatest freedom from economic restraints; a union situated in 
a surplus labour market, with a highly competitive industry in 
which demand has become stabilised and productivity does not in-
c~ease, will not have big economic returns. What is more, unions 
may desire to augment the advantage of industrial progressiveness 
\ 
.16. 
(i.e. a rightward shift in the MRP) to themselves and attempt to 
capture technological gains before they are passed onto consumers. 
Differences in bargaining power of unions will to some.extent in-
fluence the extent to which productivity gains are correlated with 
wage rate changes. 
The point is put slightly differently by Friedman 
"In a dynamic world, economic forces are always arising 
that tend tc change relative wage rates. Shifts in de-
mand for final products, changes in techniques, discovery 
of new resources, and so on, all produce changes in the 
demand for and supply of labor of various grades, and· 
hence changes in wage rates. In the absence of unionsi 
these forces will operate more or less directly on wage 
rates. Given unions, the same forces will be present but 
they will ODerc. te indirectl ·,,- on v\;ac;~e ra T:es throuoh the 
mediation of fh2 union. For example, a-change in demand-
that would have led to an increased wage ~ate in the 
absence of the union is likely to do so in the presence 
of the union on~y through the intervention of the union. 
Strikes may be required to produce wage rises that would 
have occurred in the absence of the union. This change 
in the process whereby the underlying forces work them-
selves out leads to ·unions being regarded as causes of 
changes rather than as intermediaries. In many cases, so 
l to speak, unions are simply thermometers registering the heat rather than furnaces producing the heat. This is particularly obvious during periods of inflatiorary pressure. It clearly must be significant at other times 
as well, and a number of examples illustrating this point 
have already been given1t. (7) 
2.1.4 Trade unions and Occupational Mcbility 
The focus now falls upon forces in the labour market that 
will bring about adjustments in the restrictive practices encouraged 
by trade unionism. This is analysed primarily within the framework 
of Marshall's joint-demand analysis. 
Consideration is first given to the merits cf a much 
b d '- d . t d b L . ( S) H tt t d roa er approac11 as propose in a s u y . y evinson. e a emp-e 
to explain differences in the wage gains of trade unions in six 
different industries in the United States, trying to show that 
greater wage gains could be explained by greater .unionisation in 
the industry, higher profit rates e~c. These environmental forces 
he divided into three groups : the first group includes economic 
variables, i.e. those reflecting demand and supply conditions in 
the product and labour markets, for exillnple chang2s in unemployment 
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and the effect on the bargaining position of the union.'Political' 
variables - the second group, - are defined as those applying 
pressure on union leadership to match or exceed the wage-fringe 
benefit improvements negotiated by other unions in order to maintain 
or extend the strength of the union. Thirdly, 'pure power' variables 
are those that affect the strength and stability of the bargaining 
institutions themselves (the employers' association and the unions). 
The factors in the last category include primarily those that affect 
the union's ability to undertake strikes and the employers' ability 
to resist strike action measured inter alia by factors such BS the 
financial resources of employers and unions. 
The inclusion of the last two categories in Levinson's 
study apparently contradicts the argument that non-economic forces 
do not help unions to capture wage gains and th~t unions are strictly 
limited by the economic environment in which they operate. 
Even more striking about the study is the premise that 
certain non-economic forces may have just as great an impact on 
wage increases as, say, rapid produc.ti vi ty increases. Applying this 
reasoning to the South African situation one can postulate that the 
same three forces - economic, ·political and pure powe~ - determine 
the propensity of registered unions to bargain over jobs. For 
example, economic forces may be interpreted ~s the critical short-
age of Whites in certain trades and the rapid rise in labour costs 
per unit output, while political forces can be interpreted as the 
militancy of the unions and their reluctance to reclassify certain 
jobs~ In Wilson's study of the South African gold mines, part of 
the blame for a rigid colour bar and a wide wage gap is put on the 
conservative bargaining position of the White miners.Cg) 'Pure' 
power variables, however, can be applied more directly, i.e. well-
organised employers may coerce the unions into job fragmentation 
notwithstanding the 'normal' conditions in the labour market. 
For the purpose of this study it was decided that, 
whilst the latter two forces may be important determinants of the 
rapidity of change in the occupati0nal structure in South Afri~a, 
it was beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the part these 
factors play. It was reasoned that to draw any meaningful conclusions 
several industries would have to be studied. Thus while it is ack-
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nowledged that in a dynamic world, 'political' and 'pure power' 
variables are important factors, the approach was limited to an 
analysis of 'economic' factors with only indirect attention to the 
other two forces where they seemed to be of special importance. It 
is contended here that trade unions must respond to these 'economic' 
forces, or in the context of this study, to imbalances in the 12bour 
market. Some comments on this choice are made in the concluding 
section. 
The gist of Sections 4 and 5 is thus a close consideration 
of these 'economic' forces, such as :- the rate of growth of the 
industry in the period studied and its projected future growth, the 
relationship between the rate of growth of the industry and its de-
mand for White artisan labour, and the average age of the White 
artisan labour force ar1j projected requirements for such labour. 
M h 1 - I • • J d d . 1 • ( lO) • f • d tl-ars .. a .L s Join c- eman ana ys:1s speci ie !le con-
ditions in the product and labour market which would tend to make 
this demand curve either elastic or ineJ.astic. These included the 
essentiality of union labour in the production of the final product, 
the inelasticity of demand for the final product, the proportion 
that th~ cost of union labour bears to total costs and the elas- '-
ticity bf supply of other factors of production. 
Thus, the demand curve would be more inelastic the more 
essential it was to the production of the final product. In the 
short run this means that ·firms cannot replace union members wi l...~1 
non-union members. In the long run, possibilities f6r labour saving 
techniques are an important element in the essentiality of union 
labour. A factor is likely to be far more essential in the short 
run than in the long run, because over a longer time span it is 
possible to make fuller adjustment to changes in the wage rate. 
Secondly, the demand for union labour will be more in-
elastic the more inelastic the demand for the final product is. It 
is clearly an advantage to the union if its members produce a 
product for which there are no good substitutes. In the building 
industry, it is clearly an advantage to the unions that firms from 
other areas cannot enter the local market in a short period and 
compete with local fi~ms. 
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Thirdly, the smaller the cost of union labour to the 
total costs of production the smaller wiJl be the elasticity of 
demand - "the importance of being unir'.'lportant". Union wages have 
at times been up to two-thirds of total costs,~ e.g. in coal mining, 
and less than 1%, eq. as in pattern--making.(ll) The point here is 
simply that if the cost element is insignificant wage concessions 
hardly affect the overall cost structure. 
Finally, if the supply of other factors of production 
is elastic then the demand for union services will also be mare 
elastic. For. example, if the employer tries to economise on union 
labour by using relatively more of the other factors of production, 
the price of the latter factors should not rise appreciably in 
response to their increased use. This last interaction is of par-
ticular importance for this study and will be c0nsidered further in 
Section 5.3. 
This Marshallian analysis can be used to explain the 
dynamics of labour market· adjustment in the Witwatersrand building 
industry. All four of Marshall's conditions concern the essentiality 
or inessentiality of union labour. The analysis implies that if 
demand for union services is elastic, rapid wage incr8ases resulting 
from supply shortages will put pressure on employers e~ther to cut 
back on union emp laymen t _or, in the context of the particular in-
dustry, region and period studied, to substitute non--unionised 
(i.e. African) Jabour. This basically is the framework for the 
analysis used in Sectiori 5, which deals with the stresses in the 
industry's labour market in the 1960's. 
The de facto use of non-union workers to do skilled work 
on the shop floor could be added here as a fifth 'economic' force 
initiating change. Where work rules are widely t~ansgressed, one 
would expect a weakening of union demands to maintain the status 
quo. Thus the existence of strong market forces weakens the 
credibility of the union and the changing de facto position on the 
shop floor results in de jure changes by means of negotiations. 
In South African labour history, however> the employment 
of (especially) Black workers in skilled work categories has usually 
led to increasing demands for protectionism. As Robertson says : 
I 
I 
I 
Yet, 
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"1'here are S<.Jrne grounds for believing that the a.ddi tion 
of formal prohibitions through the authority of the 
state ought to be regarded as a probable indication 
that existing informal sanctions are showing signs of 
weakening - that the (minority) group have found it 
necessary to reinforce traditional informal sanctions 
with the penal power exercised by the state". (12) 
( 1 3) . 
as Lever ~ has noted, the particular response will depend on 
whether White workers are being displaced or whether they are 
moving into other jobs as the economy's labour structure changes. 
Thus the task of the researcher is to look at the overall picture 
- the state of the labour market, White unemployment, the prefer-
ences of Whites for other avenues of employment etc. Large-scale 
illegal work may therefore act as an indication that changes are 
reql1ired rather than that barriers need strengthening. 
2.1.5 Adjustments by Employers 
Reder's theoretical model of occupational wage differ-
. ( 14) 
entials focuses on the employer's decision-making process 
during periods of labour shortage and with respect to particular 
. 
labour categories. This micro-perspective of change in the labour 
market starts from the vantage point of the single emnloyer and his 
decision to alleviate labour shortages in tight labour markets. 
Variations in the scarcity of applicants for a particular job, 
according to Reder, can be met by either of two m~chanisms: varying 
wages, or varying hiring standards, or some combinatton of both. He 
addresses.himse1~ to the question of which will be used. 
He argues that 11 the skill and other characteristics of 
.~ workers who apply for a given job vary with the state cf the labour 
market, and the wage rates paid on given jobs are therefore affected 
. ( 15) by 'quality' variations in the job applicants''· Quality varia-
tions in labour markets arise through the upgrading or downgrading 
of members of the labour force relative to the jobs they have to 
fi 11. When app}~ican ts are scarce, emp layers_ lower the minimim hi.;._~i.!l9_ 
standards they usually insist on, and vice versa when job applicants 
"') are abundant. These hiring standard,s explicitly are age, sex, 
education, race and other prerequisites that must be satisfied as a 
precondition of hiring. Jobs where this selection is absent are those 
there is no guarantee of minimum earnings for the job. 
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Whether the employer will increase wages in a particular 
category or lower the .hiring standards normally insisted on for 
entrants to that job category will, according to Reder, depend on 
four factors. Firstly, where agreements ~1rnong employers against 
"labour piracy" are operative, the employer will be more likely to 
expand his labour force by quality adjustments than by wage in-
creases. There is good reason for employers to adhere to these 
agreements in a tight labour market. If firms try to increase wages 
in such a market, competing employers will match it. And since the 
knowledge of the wage increase is likely to reach other employers 
before it reaches many prospective job applicants, it is unlikely 
to give the aggressive firm even a temporary advantage. Unions in 
highly competitive industries,especially those for which wages are 
a large part of total costs, almost always pursue a standard wage 
polj_cy within a given product market. rrhey set uniform time rates 
or piece rates for all firms so as to "take labour out of compe-
tition". 
Secondly, employers will be particularly concerned wi~h 
maintaining hiring standards and rather adjusting wages where there 
is a danger of property loss from hiring incompetent workmen, as 
e.g. in the use of expensive machinery. 
Thirdly, where the needed skill ca.n be acquired in a 
short time by a new worker and the margin for skill is large, the 
tendency will be to recruit by changing hiring standards. The 
portion of a particular job that can be performed by a worker from 
another job, i.e. the extent of overlap, will be the area of po-
tential flexibility for productivity bargaining. Where the reverse 
is true, wage_ increases play a more important role. 
The costs and yields of training relative to the existing 
wage differentials between grades of labour is an important factor 
in determining the employer's choice between the two options .. Since 
workers are under no obligation to remain with the employer who 
bore the training cost, the employer will not normally invest unless 
the prospective net gain from hiring untrained instead of trained 
workers can be quickly realised. Thus .the tendency to undertake 
training and lower hiring standards will occur only when labour is 
in extremely short supply 21nd the demand for output is very strong. 
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Finally, instead of raising wages the single firm can 
promote its own lower graded workers and have them getting slightly 
lower pay than its more efficient skilled workers. Promoting spe-
cific employees is cheaper than raising wages for a whole category 
since the increased compensation is only paid to the promoted 
workers, i.e. no recourse is needed to the external labour market. 
Therefore internal promotion has the advantage of not bidding up 
the wage rate. 
Reder uses flexible hiring standards to mean two things 
(assuming a constan~ wage) - 1) workers excluded from a particular 
skill level are now used there and are paid the going rate, i.e. 
their productivity isn't lower and they were excluded for discrim--
inatory reasons and 2) less skilled workers are used by lowering 
hiring standards (e.g. poorer quality of White artisans) or by 
fragmenting the job. In both cases these workers are less productive 
and may therefore be paid less. 
This decision to lower hiring standards when applicants 
are scarce is an important aspect of change in the labour market, 
particularly within the context of this study. The concept may be 
employed to exp lain three phe· .omena dealt with in greater detail 
in later chapters, viz; 
1) the entrance to the trades of apprentices without the minimum 
educational qualifications required for apprenticeship train-
ing, in order that employers may comply with job reservatior. 
determination etc.; 
2) the decision by employers to employ Africans on skilled work 
• 
irrespective of whether or not this is legally prohibited at 
the time; 
3) the entry of the Coloured people into the skilled trades, where 
employers face the choice of employing either White or Coloured 
people as artisans. 
The first two aspects are discussed in Section 5.3 which 
deals with the Witwatersrand building industry where the interface 
i~ between White and African workers, wl1ile the third aspect be-
comes relevant in Section 8 which concentrates on the Western Cape. 
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2. 2 P roduc ti vi tv Bo.~-::.g~niYl9:, 
2.2.1 The Objectives of Productivity Bargaining 
We now come to the second major objective of this 
section, i.e. to review the analytical work which has been done on 
collective bargaininc; within the context of labour mark et adjust-
ment. This does not concern the complete opening of all occupations 
and complete freedom of mobility, but rather the process of admiriis-
trative adjustments. As has already been noted, excessive reliance 
on either a 'market forces' concept or a 'power' concept of adjust-
ment in th9 labour market obscures the position in real la~our 
markets. 
In particular, we are looking fo::::- ways in which labour 
costs per unit output c~n be stabilised through the medium of 
collective bargaining. We want to try and establish the direction 
of change needed to bring this about and try to show that it is 
optimum or 'desirable'. In this respect, overseas studies of the 
labour experience have something to offer. 
Although some of these studies were not relevant for our 
situation, many of the same issues were found to be at work in this 
country. In South Africa the question is not only one of admitting 
Blacks to skilled jobs in order to relieve shortages and stabilise 
labour costs per unit output, but underlying the whole process there 
is a need to improve the performance of workers as sue h, i. e o to 
reduce labour costs (e.g. by reducing overtime and generally 
tightening the pay-productivity nexus). Some releva·nt hypotheses 
concerning the attitudes of registered unions with respect to 
fragmentation negotiations in South Africa, are developed further 
in Section 3. 
The arguments mentioned above deal in particular with 
the obligation of union members to renounce restrictive practices 
in order to move along a more optimum path of adjustment in the 
labour market. McKersie and Hunter put it as follows : 
"Where restrictions on manpower deployment and effort 
exist, management cannot embark on a unilateral pro-
gramme to remove them because th~ workers and their 
union representatives will nbt allow it. It first has 
to be recognis~d that these practices fulfil a cultural 
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need, before progress in ·removing the obstacles to 
productivity improvement can be made. This hold which 
the work group has over the work system, and its 
natural instinct to preserve the status quo, are key 
elements of the situation prior to productivity bar-
gaining. 
Once customary practices are present (for whatever 
reason) they are naturally protected by those with 
vested interests. While trade unions may not always 
initiate demarcation arrangements, for example, they 
are certainly quick to use them as defensive arrange-
ments. Generally, unions prefer the existing pattern 
of working arrangements and express a reluctance to 
try the unknown simply because the known is more com-
fortable and secure. As a result thev exude suspicion 
of management and of any overture to_, change". (l6) 
What we are concerned with here is known in the literature 
as "productivity bargaining". The term is Essentially a. produc;t of 
the industrial relations system of the United Kingdom in the 1960's, 
"productivity bargaining" forming part of that government's incomes 
policy during these years. In the relevant clause of the incomes 
policy which 18d to the productivity bargaining approach it was 
argued that, although changes in the cost of living and trends in 
profits and productivity could not be regarded as a sound basis 
for w~ge increases 
''··· there may, however, be cases in which an increase 
could be justified as part of an agreement under which 
those concerned make a direct contrib0tion, by accepting 
more exacting work, or more onerous conditions, or by a 
renunciation of restricti\re pracV_\.:es, to an increase of 
productivity and a reduction of costs". (17) 
McKersie and Hunter give a concJ.se account of the 
approach taken by management and unions at productivity bargaining 
negotiations : 
"Productivity bargaining, though concerned with the same 
problem of relating work to payment, seeks to do so by 
rather different methods. Instead of operating through 
the payment system, it places the consideration of ways 
of improving productive performance directly in the con-
text of wage bargaining. It involves the parties to the 
bargaining process in negotiating a package of change~ in 
working method or organisation, agre~ing on the precise 
contents of the packag~, their worth to the parties and 
the distribution of the cost savings between the reward 
to labour and other alternative destinations such as the 
return to capital and the reduction or stabilisation of 
the product price. In this sense each productivity bargain 
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is a once-for-all method of relating increases in pay 
to increases in productivity - though this does not 
preclude the possibility of a sequence of such bargains 
over time. It does, however, contrast with schemes which 
work through the payment system, where rewards to labour 
may fluct.uai:e from week to week as output or productivity 
varies':. (18) 
Recently it has become practice to refer to fragmentation 
agreements between employers and registered unions in South Africa 
as "productivity bargaining". This may be because the approach in 
South Africa, or rather the ends strived for, are implicitly the 
same. Implicit in both approaches is an attempt to stabilise the 
increase in labour costs though the means differ. In South Africa, 
it will be shown that the approach appears to be one of fragmenting 
skilled work with as yet no real commitment on the part of the 
unions to act. With respect to the gold mining industry, Wilson 
argues, however, that f:com 1967 a major change in the White wage 
structure was introduced with the acknowledgement that all White 
wage increases were to be based upon improved productivity, pre-
sumably through f~agmenting the less-skj_lled parts of the White 
miners' jobs.(lg) These arguments will be dealt with in detail in 
Section 6. 
2.2.2 Union Attitudes 
Productivity bargaining in the United Kinadom has had 
to conf~ont strong craft traditions within the unions. As McKersie 
and Hunter note : 
"Where restrictions on manpower deployment and effort 
exist, management cannot embark on a unilateral programme 
to remove them because the workers and their union rep-
resentatives will not allow it. It first has to be recog-
nised that thes~ practices fulfil a cultural need, before 
progress in removing the obstacles to productivity im-
provement can be made. This hold which the work group has 
over the work system, and its natural instinct to preserve 
the status quo, are key elements of the situation prior 
to productivity bargaining". (20) 
McKersie and Hunter hypothesise that productivity bar-
gaining will develop more readily in industries with a strong craft 
tradition.< 21 > Control over job boundaries, and the tradition of 
such work rules, are found to be strongest in the older craft 
unions, where skilled jobs have undergone little change in work 
content. One example would be the building trades, which gives us 
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a clear iridicatior1 as to thP. building unions' attitude to be 
expected concerning fragmentation agreements. 
Another- pertinent point made by the authors is that 
existing skill delimitations tend to be strongly supported where 
the economic outlook is ~ncertain, either because the long-term 
employment trend is downwards or because the industry is subject to 
+1 t t. . t t d 1 t ( 22 ) I - 'h severe ~ uc ua· ions in ou pu an emp oymen • n no~- cases, 
the reason behind this posture is the workers' fear that the new 
arrangements will erode their skill base and leave them with less 
recourse to both the internal and external labour market during a 
recessionary period. Workers fear to get out of touch with skills 
they once practised, thus having a lesser chance of securing a job. 
When tess work is available, unions would be understandably reluctant 
to hand over certain artisan skills to, say, semi-skilled workers 
o~ allow these tasks to be mechanised. Eldridge cites the example 
of firms in the British shipbuilding industry : 
"··· the industry was subject to severe fluctuations. 
The insecurity which this bred was heightened by the 
fact that notice to quit the job could be given with 
less than a day's warning. It was further accentuated 
by the fact that employment opportunities outside the 
industry were normally very limited ..•. To execcise 
effective job control over a specified ranoe of tasks 
was, therefor~ to provide a cushion aaainst shrinking 
- t -!-- •t• • t• f l II (2-:>) employmen oppor .... uni J.es in imes o _ ~-u:np •. ..) 
However, in another sense, the preservation of demarcation arrange-
ments may simpl~ represent an emphasis on skill integrity. 
2.2~3 Productivity Bargaining Agreements 
It has already been noted that productivity agreements 
attempt to link increases in pay to increases in productivity 
through work rationalisation. According to McKersie and Hunter, the 
prospect of substantial reductions in manning while maintaining or 
increasing output has been one of the most attractive features of 
d . . . t ' . . f th . . . t . ( 2 4) pro uctivi·y nargaining rom e management poin of view. 
Productivity bargaining has, with the co-operation of employees, 
introduced work changes, many of which have altered the ft1ndamental 
content of jcbs and directly attacked acknowledged situations of 
overmanning. McKersie and Hunter note that "the labour-saving 
~f t f k -'- h b • • II ( 2 5 ) ...., 1 er ec s o wor measuremen~ ave een impressive • ror examp e, 
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at the Steel Company of Wales, the labour force reduction envisaged 
after work rationalisation was 5200 men (roughly half the labour 
force). Just under half of the 5200 were laid off due to major 
changes in working practices, the rest being laid off due to te~h-
. - (26) . . . 
nological. change. The elimination of mo.npower has frequently 
been fostered by a work-measurement systein: which involves the 
specification of expected production performance and the planning 
of operations so as to achieve these results. 
One of the essential conditions of many productivity 
bargaining agreements was the guarantee that workers would not be 
made redundant as a result of the agreement. Offers of such security, 
according to McKersie and Hunter, have been significant factors .in 
t . h t. ( 2 7) h t h . 1 . promo ing sue agreemen s. T ese guaran ees ave in genera not 
meant that management ·nas been unable to reduce overmanning in 
certain occupations. A distinction has been made between job re-
t-
dundancy (the elimination of existing jobs) and worker redundancy 
(the laying-off of present employees). Whilst the f?rmer is the one 
generally acce)?ted by the unions as pari: of any programme of change 
(since men can be retrained and used higher up), the latter state 
of affairs has been unacceptable to the unions. 
In the South African context, we may hypothesise that 
craft union attitudes to job fragmentation arrangements will rest 
first·and foremost on a demand for full employment, that is, change 
must take place in the context of a full employment ~conomy. 
Overtime reduction has also been a primary objective of 
many productivity bargaining agreements, particularly in industries 
wi.th high overtime levels. Large amounts of overtime tend to be 
used where labour is in short supply and additional workers are 
difficult to secure. In such cases recourse to the external labour 
market may be more costly than permitting the existing labour force 
to work overtime, since in the former case the employer may drive 
up the wage rate against an inelastic demand curve for labour (cf. 
the elasticity of the curve as dependent on Marshall's four con-
ditions). McKersie and Hunter postulate that industries with high 
overtime levels will be more likely to have extensive experiences 
f d t . . t b .. . ( 2 8) o pro uc ivi y argaining. 
Yet, in many cases worker expectations, rather than 
managements' need for more hours of work, explain the use of over-
t . <29 ) ~ · · · · 1 l of t' ime. Ler~ain minimum .eve.~ over_ime are often demanded by 
workers in tight labour markets as a means of increasing their 
effective rate of pay (the rate of pay per hour of overtime usually 
being 50 percent higher than that for ordinary hours). Employe~s 
operating in such markets ?ay therefore offer longer hours of work 
to prospective employees as a means of attracting workers. Labour 
turnover will tend to rise as workers move to those firms offering 
the highest overtime. In these cases productivity bargaining fotuses 
on a reduction in both the amount of overtime permitted as well as 
the effective rate of overtime pay. 
Other cost--reducing measures became evident during the 
course of the research, as char~cteristic of bargains both overseas 
and, lately, in South Africa. Many bargains, for instance, allow 
for payment-by-results (or piecework) schemE:s to operate alongside 
conventional time rates, particularly in industries where labour 
costs form a high proportion of total costs but also where labour 
is in short supply and productivity does not follow wage rates up-
wards. 
Legislation allowi~g piecework has often superceded its 
widespread, though illegal, use in an industry. Legislation comes in 
response to strong uni6n pressure to euqalise the access of all 
union members fo payment-by-results schemes. In fact this is actually 
the reason for the traditional opposition of unions to these sctemes, 
where members within one occupation may earn vastly.different 
salaries. Equality of opportunity for work and earnings is a 
principle strongly adhered to by the unions, and is reflected in the 
work rules of different industries. These practices can only be ex-
plained in terms of strong social pressures against any individuals 
gaining an advantage vis-a-vis his colleagues. An example of 
this practice comes from the work rules in the British newspaper 
industry 
"no pieceworker shall start work at the beginning of the 
shift until sufficient copy is available to enable every 
operative present to be issued with the equivalent of 
12 lines of copy". ( 30) 
The question of piecework came up during the fieldwork for this 
study. It will be argued later that it has an important bearing on 
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union attitudes towards fragmentation agreements. 
Finally, we can briefly restate the central ideas 
emanating from the productivity experience in· the United Kingdo_m. 
Firstly, whilst the particular context of these events may not· 
correspond with similar situations in South Africa, the ideas and 
methodology contained are extremely useful as analytical tools. The 
central theme of these negotiations has been the attempt to reduce 
labour costs per unit of output and thus to increase prciduction 
efficiency. This may be done in many ways - reduced manning levels, 
reduced overtime, union commitment (however short-lived it may have 
been) to make abnormal wage increases conditional upon job enrich-
ment, etc. It thus involves a union commitment not only to reduce 
labour costs by admitting semiskilled workers to cl.osed trades, but 
also to assess their own earnings structure and working practices. 
The other central point is the question as to which parties bear the 
costs of such adjustment and which benefit. This question has uni-
versal application and the answer will depend partly on the barg~ining 
strength of the particular parties. We will return to these issues in 
Section 6. 
2.3 Conclusions 
One of the most important conclusions reached in Section 
2.1 is that trade unions, notwithstanding the fact that they can 
curtail the supply of workers available for skilled jobs, do respond 
to labour shortages by easing rigidities in the labour market adjust-
ment process. This view is supported by the theories of Reder, 
Marshall and Dunlop. Dunlop concluded that unions cannot press for 
increased wages without taking cognizance of the consequences for 
the employment of union members. Marshall's analysis was extended 
to show the conditions under which union members may be replaced by 
non--union workers in the labour market. Feder, on the ot~er hand, 
postulated certain important characteristics in the labour market 
which would influence the employer's decision to adjust hiring 
standards in cer~ain jobs and admit workers previously excluded by 
the conditions specified by these standards. These two models are 
the basis for analysis in Section 5.3 which deals with the stresses 
in the Witwatersrand ~uilding industry labour market from 1960 on-
wards, 
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Important conclusions emerge from Section 2.2. The first 
is that older craft unions resist labour J:'at ionalisation schemes 
which involve the dilution of certain skilled tasks. Secondly, 
unions in industries with high employment fluctuations are likely to 
resist dilution of artisan work for fear of unemployment. Thirdly, 
"no-redundancy safegua.rds" and job security measures are important 
quid pro quo's· demanded in return for union concessions on over-
ma~ning, overtime and the like. Finally, the most important con-
clusion to be Crawn from productivity bargaining agreements is the 
definite commitment on the part of the unions to renounce restrictive 
practices as a method of reducing labour costs per unit output. 
These aspects become relevant in Section 5.3.4 where union attitudes 
to stresses in the labour market are discussed and in Section 6.4, 
where the bargaining stances of the various parties on the industrial 
council are analysed. 
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SECTION THREE 
LABOUR UTILISATION AND LABOUR 
lVIARKET ADJUSTMENT IN SOTJ'J:':I AFRICA 
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Section 2 discussed some of the important imperfections 
found in 'real' labour markets, more particularly the imperfections 
arising through barriers to occupational mobility and the restrictive 
practices of trade unions. In this Section we wish to look at these 
forces as they have operated historically in the South African labour 
market and how thev operate today. In Section 3.1 the labour legis-
lation which has contributed to the mairitenance and perpetuation of 
the colour bar in the industrial sector is outlined. The emphasis 
falls on the initial impact of these Acts, however, rather than their 
evolution to the present. The three Acts of great importance in this 
regard are the Apprenticeship Act (No. 26 of 1922), the Industrial 
~--~-- ~·------·~ ---
Conciliation Act (No. 11 of 1924) and the Wage Act (No. 27 of 1925). 
Consideration is given to the difference between statutory and 
conventional barriers to Black job advancement, and the us~ of the 
closed shop principle and the rate for the job as protective de-
vices. 
The purpose of Section 3 is also to investigate the changes 
that the industrial colour bar is presently undergoing in South Africa. 
The pattern of change found is one of adjustment according to the 
economic climate at the time, i.e. the threshold between White and 
Black occupational categories changes accordingly. The period from 
1924 to 1960 is dealt with in ~ection 3.2.l, while Section 3.2.2 
analyses the period from 1960 onwards. Some hypotheses relevant to 
this study emerge from the South African literature on Black occu-
pational mobilit~ and the process of job fragmentation, as reviewed 
in this Section. 
3. l Labour Legisla:tion 
3.1.l The Industrial Colour Bar 
The origins of the industrial colour bar are summarised 
by van der Horst as follows : 
11 The pattern of employment whereby Europeans are em--
ployed on skilled work and Africans on unskilled manual 
work, Europeans being paid five or more timesas much, as 
Africans, grew up mare than 60 years ago in the early 
days of diamond and gold mining, when miners and artisans 
had to be attracted from overseas and compensated for the 
high prices and primitive conditions of the remote and 
barren mining camps. Unskilled African labour could be 
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obtained nearer at hand. But it was genuinely un-
skilled and, moreover, unaccustomed and unwilling 
to work away from home for periods longer than a 
few months. Considerable expense was also incurred 
in recruiting it, so that although rel2tively low 
money wages were paid, labour costs were relatively 
high because labour turnover was rapid and efficiency 
low. 
Initially the structure of employment on the mines 
corresponded to the supplies of labour available, but 
this structure was already becoming obsolete 50 y~ars 
ago at the time of Union. Before 1910, the White miners 
and artisans had sought and obtained statutory pro-
tection against potential competition from the Chinese 
indentured labourers employed on the mines after the 
South African War. Immediately after Union they obtained 
protection from African competi ti::m, through regulations, 
~ubsequently declared ultra vires, which were issued 
under the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and excluded per-
sons of colour from a wide range of occup~tions on the 
mines of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. With 
this entrenched position on the mines behind them, craft 
unions successfully maintained all artisan's work as the 
preserve of the Whites, not only on the Rand but in most 
parts of the Union. Other industries were geared to the 
structure of employment and wages on +:he mines". (1) 
( 2 ) Maree, in discussing the rationale of the colour bar, 
showed that the existence of the industrial ~olour bar (and a wide 
wage gap) can be seen in terms of supply and demand for different 
types of labour. Yet, to see it only in terms of market forces would 
be incomplete and misleading since it is necessary to understand the 
underlying forces that determine the supply and demand for labour. 
These forces are ::.:conomic, structural and political. The economic 
rationale is that employers act as profit maximizers and seek to 
reduce costs wherever they can. They will therefore employ workers 
they can pay least in any particular category of labour, provided 
the workers are capable of doing the work efficiently. This is the 
reason for the "breakdown" of the colour bar, since Blacks are almost 
always paid less than Whites for performing the same work. Thus the 
existence of a colour bar can be seen as a method of protectin~ White 
workers from being replaced. 
__.--~- --- -- ··-
There is also a structural reason for the dynamic change 
of the industrial colour bar. As the South African economy grows 
rapidly shortages of skilled labour among the Whites develop and em-
ployers are forced to employ people of other race groups in those 
occupations. 'rhe supply of skilled White workers is simply inadequate 
to meet the demands of the economy and therefore Blacks have to be 
employed in these occupations. This does not contradict the economic 
rationale of the colour bar given above. 
Political forces have played a major part in determining 
the structure of the industrial colour bar in South Africa. This is 
because South African society is not based on the democratic 
principle of consensus, which entails that all racial groups should 
have access to political power and be able to influence the decisions 
of the legislature in matters affecting their well-being. Nor is the 
principle that the majority decision should be accepted by the 
minority established in the country. From the earliest contact in 
industry up to the present time the patterns of employment have ~een 
determined by Whites and been based on White self-interest and on 
------ .. 
maintaining White rule and domination in South Africa. Without under-
--- - .C::......--- ~ 
standing and accepting this principle it is not possible to see the 
full implications of the industrial colour bar. 
The maintenance of the industrial colour bar can be 
associated with the 'policy of White full employment at 'civilised' 
~'-- -
rates of pay, educational discrimination, and the maintenance of 
'industrial peace'. As van der Horst( 3 ) has indicated, it is also 
associated with three of the most outstanding characteristics of the 
economy: the occupational stratification on racial lines, the 
structure of wage rates with the large gap between skilled and ur-
skilled labour and the p~evalance of the use of migr~nt labour. 
We must now turn to the effects of various forms of 
industrial labour legislation on the maintenance of the industrial 
colour bar. 
3.1.2 The Apprenticeship Act 
At the turn of the century, most skilled miners and 
artisans had been immigrants, because there were relatively few 
local artisans. Local European workers were not acquiring skills 
because these were traditionally (i.e. in tl~ absenc~ of formal 
apprenticeship) acquired by working alongside an artisan as his 
assistant, an arrangement White youths found undignifying, since 
these assistants were usually Black. 
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The Apprenticeship Act No. 26 of 1922 was designed to 
overcome this difficulty by providing a system of formal apprentice-
ship in designated trades. The Act was am~nded in 1944 and empowered 
the Minister to appoint, for any trade and in any area, an Apprentice·-
ship Committee composed of an equal number of representatives from 
the employer's side and trade unions. The Minister of Labour has 
power, upon the recommendation of a National Apprenticeship Board 
after consultation with the local committee, to designate trades 
within a specified industry to be subject to apprenticeship and to 
lay down conditions, including inter alia the minimum and maximum 
ages of apprentices, the minimum educational qualification for entry 
to apprenticeship, rates of pay and classes to be attended, the 
maximum number of apprentices to be employed in the industry or by 
any employers. 
A national registrar of apprentices is responsible for the 
entire operation of the system, and he may refuse to register a con-
tract of apprenticeship if the local committee in a particular trade 
advises him that it would net be in the interests of the apprentice, 
taking into account the possibility fhat he will be unable to fi~d 
a position on qualification. Since all applications have to be 
passed by the appropriate apprenticeship subcommittee, Coloured and 
Asian apprentices may be excluded for any reason ~hat trie committee 
wishes to give. In practice, the reason given is often that all 
vacancies have been filled or a White trade union may simply forbid 
its members to t~~in Coloured or Asian apprentices, thus forcing 
the employer to concede that he does not 11ave the staff to train 
apprentices. In the motor industry this type of ban was made public 
by the White Motor Ind.us try Employees' Union in 1968, ( 4 ) and four 
immigrant motor mechanics who attempted to defy it were expelled 
from the union in 1972.(S) 
However, since 1972 the position in the motor industry in 
particular has become more flexible. A government financed training 
school was started in July, 1974 in Bellville with an annui'll intake 
. (Sa) 
of 40 apprentices. After a thre~ year course they take the 
ordinary trade test and become qu~lified artisans. 
Where a closed shop agreement between employees and 
unions is operative, or where trade union influence - even without 
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a formal statutory closed shop clause in an industrial council 
agreement - prevents the employment of Blacks as artisans, employers 
are generally not prepared to bring about a confrontation with White 
labour by apprenticing Coloured, Asian or African youths. In in-
dustries where a closed shop imposes an obligation to use trade 
union members only in skilled positions, Africans are denied access ~ofl to apprenticeshj_ps because it is illegal for them to belong to 
~~~registered trade unions (see below). It is in any case administrative 
f) policy not to allow any African to be indentured in terms of appren-
ticeship legislation. 
If individual employers were prepared to go against 
normal practice and experiment with training Coloured or Asian 
apprentices, the local apprenticeship committee could prevent them 
by recommending to the registrar of apprentices that registration of 
the apprentice be refused. Schlemmer notes that the Minister of 
Labour after representations from the Coloured Motor Industries 
Combined Workers' Union, refused to act in the case of an apprentice-
ship sub-committee in Cape Town which openly stated its policy of 
prohibiting the training of Coloured artisans.( 6 ) 
It is well known th6t an implicit colour bar operates 
through the educational requirements demanded of prospective 
apprentices. The Theron Commission report has recently noted that 
the number of Coloured youths with the required educ a ti on al qualif.i--
.. . t"Jl 11 C7 ) 'Th .. · ' t" 1 l"f" '. cations is s i _ sma . • . e minimum eauca iona.i. qua_ i -ica·cJ_on, 
which is usually Standard 6 or Standard 7, has also been criticised 
- · · 1 h · h ( S ) rn h th · b · t C 1 d as being unnecessari y ig .• ~ e o er main arriers o o oure·s 
and Asians entering apprenticeships has been ~he mutual, unwritten 
agreement between employers and White unions that only White youths 
. . ( 9) 
ar2 to be trained. 
In 1974, out of a total o-f 11218 nev.,r apprenticeship con-
tracts registered, 83,2 percent were in respect of Whites, 12,1 
percent in respect of Coloured people and 4,5 percent in respect of 
Asians.Clo) The ratio of Coloured and Asian to White apprentices in 
different industries varies widely, as the following figures (for 
1974) show : building (l:0,6), furniture (l:0,1), hairdressing (no 
Coloured or Asian apprentices), metal and engineering (1:8,6), 
mining (1:391) ~ motor (1:9,3), central govt. (1:2,5) and printing 
(1:8,2). (ll) 
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The position wiU1 regard to Coloured and Asian apprentices 
is changing rapidly in certain industries, and in recent years the 
number of Coloured and Asian apprentices has increased greatly. (lla) 
In the important metal and engineering and motor trades in the Western 
Cape, there have been particularly important changes. The rapid. 
change in the building industry in the Western Cape and Natal will 
be discussed in Section 8. 
3.1.3 The Industrial Conciliation Act 
The Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 11 of 1924) provides 
machinery for the registration of employers' organisations and trade 
unions and the establishment of industrial councils. Trade unions are 
defined significantly as "any number of ~5p1ovees in a particular 
;_ndustry associated together primarily for the purpose of regulating 
relations between themselves and their employers". 
Industrial councils ope~ate in a number of industries. 
Agreements made by industrial councils which are app~oved by the 
Minister of Labour give legal sanction to ffiinimum wages for different 
grades and categories of work. The Act provides that wages and 
conditions of employment may be laid down via the industrial council 
system in any industry except agriculture, domestic service in 
private households and government employment. Industrial -council 
agreements also regulate the classification of work and other con-
ditions of employment for employees in many industries. Once these 
agreements are given the force of law - <.vt1ich gene.rally occurs if 
both parties are sufficiently representative of those on whose be-
half they bargain - they may be made binding on all employers 
whether or not they belong to the employers' organisation. 
The definition of 'employee' in the Act excluded those 
Africans who we.re subject to certain laws (like the Masters and 
Servants laws in Natal and the Transvaal). In fact, in practice the 
majority of Africans in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal 
were not defined as employees for the purposes of the Act and were 
thus excluded from all the provisions of industrial council agree-
ments. Alternately, industrial councils had no powers to set wages 
and conditions of employment for Africans. Trade unions registered 
under the Act are known as 'register~d' trade unions, while African 
trade unions ca~not be registered. 
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Employers were quick to see that, since African wages ·and 
other conditions of employment were not laid down by any central body 
and were thus only determined by private agreeme11t between employer 
and employee, they could lower labour costs per unit of output dir-
ectly by increasing their African labour complement, particularly 
where a White job could. be fragmented. The Department of Labour, in 
a memorandum (dated 6/7/1931) to the Native Economic Commission wrote 
that 
"The exclusion of pass-carrying Natives •••• meant that 
there was no wage regulation for a large number of un-
skilled and semiskilled workers and some employers soon 
began to take advantage of this defect in the law by 
employing persons of the class whose wages were unreg-
ulated whenever possible. In some industries, e.g. 
~ngineering, which permits of various processes being 
simplified very considerably by a high degree of special-
isation and division of labour, it is pos~ible to conduct 
the work almost entirely with unskilled and semiskilled 
workers and in this way the incidence of agreements under 
the Act was evaded by the employment of uncivilised labour 
(sic) at low wages". (12) 
As a result of this practice the Act was amended in 1930 
to allow industrial councils to set minimum wages and maximum hours 
of work for persons who fell outside the scope of normal agreements. 
(i.e. Africans), whenever it appeared that the object of the agree-· 
ment might otherwise be defeated. In 1937 the Act was again re-
drafted to permit industrial councils to extend~~ of the provisions 
of industrial council agreements to persons excluded from the 
statutory definition of employee. This meant that although African 
workers took no part in negotiations at industrial councils, their 
wages and all other conditions of employment were determined by 
agreements between registered unions and employers. The Act, however, 
made provision for a White Bantu Labour Officer to be present at all 
industrial council meetings where the conditions of employment of 
Africans were to be discussed. More recent adaptations to the system 
include official African observers at ind11strial council meetings as 
well as (unofficial) liaison between management and representatives 
of African trade unions at such meetings. 
The Act also permitted trade unions to maintain a closed 
shop thus preventing Africans from being employed on types of work 
for which membership of reglstered unions is required. In practice 
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registered unions could win a closed shcp concession for a wide 
range of jobs for wl1ich they wished to exclude Africans. This prac-
tice is often referred to as 'self-imposed job reservation' since 
this arrangement also becomes binding once the industrial council 
agreement is published. The Industrial Legislation Commission (1951) 
noted that out .of "88 industrial council aa~eements extant at the ti~~, 
51 t . d 1 d h . . ( 13 ) J con a1ne c .ose s.op provisions. 
The closed shop still operates in important industries 
i 
such as steel and engineering, which employs a quarter of those in 
manufacturing, although recently pressure of demand has been such that 
the ceiling has been raised step by step.Cl 3a> The closed shop also 
operated in the industry in the Orange Pree State and Transvaal to 
exclude Coloureds and Asians from the artisan trade unions.Cl 3b). 
In 1953 the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 
(No. 48 of 1953) was passed in order to provide alternative methods 
by which African workers could negotiate with employers. The Act did 
not retognise African trade unions and it made strikes by African. 
workers illegal. It also did not apply to workers in domestic se~vice, 
on farms, in governmental seivice and on gold and coal mines. 
The Act provided for the establishment of Regional Labour 
Committees whose members are Africans appointed by the Minister of 
Labour, and an all-White Central Native Labour Board appointed by 
the Minister of Labour. The chairman of the Regional Labour Committees: 
the Native Labour Officer, is White. Emp:cyers in firms employing 20 
or more African workers are required to permit them to elect a works 
committee or, more recently, a liaison committee, if the workers so 
desire. One member of such a committee is then responsible for main-
taining contact with the Regional Labour Committee. This committee 
acts as mediator between employers and works committees, should any 
dispute arise. If the dispute cannot be settled it is referred to 
the Central Native Labour Board, which, if not successful in settlinq 
it, refers it to the Minister of Labour. He may then direct the dispute 
to the Wage Board if this is the recommendation of the Central Native 
Labour Board. 
On this method of settling disputes, van der Horst wrote 
in the 1960's 
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"Little use has yet been made of this machinery. Few 
works committees have been established under this 
legislation, and at the time of this study little use 
has been made of the procedure for settling disputes. 
In practice, it is relatively seldom that dissatisfaction 
among African workers with wages and working conditions 
or their treatment by employers, supervisors or foremen, 
takes the form of an open collective dispute. Indeed, 
the balance is heavily weighted against Africans' being 
parties to open disputes, for striking, the final weapon 
in the hands of di ssa tis fied ·workers~ has long been il-
legal for the great majority of Africans, and the Native 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act extended this legal 
prohibition of strikes to all Africans 11 • (14) 
In 1973, only 28 works committees were functioning in 
( 14a) . terms of the Act. However, the widespread series of strikes in 
1973 by African workers has drawn attention to the lack of effective 
Llachinery for the resolution of grievances. The Bantu Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Amendm~nt Act, introduced in 1973, made 
certain welcome improvements to the system. Certain other adjustments 
are under consideration. 
When the Industrial Conciliation Act was redrafted in 
1956 a new section, number 77, made provision for the creation of an 
industrial tribunal of five members. One of the main functions of 
the tribunal was, on the instruction of the Minister of Labour, to 
investigate the desirability of reserving defined types of work for 
specific racial groups, representations from interested parties 
usually being called for. Introducing the redrafted Act in 1956, 
the Minister stated that the purpose of ~hese new provisions was to 
"safeguard the standards of living of the White workers of South 
Africa''.Cl5 l If the report and recommendations of the tribunal are 
approved by the Minister, they b~come a job reservation determination. 
After decreeing that certain jobs are reserved for members 
of a particular race, the Minister of Labour may grant exemptions. Up 
to June 1975 almost 30 determinations had been made, whilst one had 
( 16) been replaced and two had been suspended. Many exemptions, both 
blanket and to individual employers, have been granted from these 
determinations • Determinations may either prohibit the replacement 
of workers of one race by those of another race, compel employers in 
an industry to maintain a fixed percentage of workers of a particul~r 
race in an occupation or reserve any class of work or specific jobs 
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or work generally for members of a particular race. 
Of particular importance for this study are determinations 
number 13 and 6. Determination No. 13 (of 9/11/1962) reserved certain 
building trades in the Western Cape for Whites. Its scope was not 
wide since reservations were only made in skilled trades still dom-
inated by Whites. Under the same determination, similar trades were 
reserved for Whites in parts of the Eastern Cape and Natal. 
Job reservation Determination No. 6 (published under 
Govt. Notice No. 17 of 2/6/1961) reserved all work in the building 
industry in the urban areas of the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
for Whites. "Work" was defined in the determination as all tasks in 
the industry excluding 90 unskilled and se;-n.iskilled jobs which were 
thus the only jobs open to Coloured, Asian and African workers. The 
main impact of the determination was on Coloured artisans working in 
the two provinces, since African workers were previously barred from 
doing skilled work in the industry in terms of the Bant0 Building. 
Workers' Act (No. 27 of 1951). The Act was the second statutory 
colour bar in .industry after the Mines and Works Act. It provided 
for th~ training and registration of Africans as building artisans 
to enable them to construct housing and oth~r buildings in African 
dormitory townships. 
Under pressure from the registered unions in the industry 
t th t · ( 16a) t. 14 . tt +- th ~ t It +- t .:i a -.e ime, sec-ion was wri -en ·~n'"'o . e 1-\.c-. - s'"'a eci 
that no employer could without written permission of the Minister of 
Labour, employ an African upon skilled work in an urban area other 
than in an African dormitory township. This effectively excluded 
Africans from doing any skilled work in the private bu~lding industry 
and was included sb as to remove the threat 0£ competition to White 
building artisans posed by the Bantu Building Workers' Act. 
3.1.4 The Wage Act 
The industrial colour ba~ is not just an occupational 
colour bar. It is also a wage colour bar. The insistence of many 
White unionists on 'the rate for the job' is another way of main-
taining the colour bar; because White employers will give preference 
to White employees when recruiting for these jobs and also because it 
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prevents Black workers from undercutting Whites in these jobs. The 
rate for the job has thus been widely advocated and used as a 
defensive policy for White workers. 
A wage colour bar was promoted by the Wage Act (No. 27 
of 1925). Operating through a Wage Board, it nrovides a means of 
establishing minimum wages and conditions of employment for different 
classes of work in industries where no collective bargaining machin-
ery (i.e. industnial councils) can be establ~shed. The Wage Board 
makes investigations, reports and recommendations to the Minister of 
Labour, which subsequently become wage determinations if approved by 
him. Agriculture and domestic service have specifically been excluded 
from the ambit of the Act. 
The Wage Act, like the Industrial Co·.,ciliation Act and 
the Apprenticeship Act, contains a provision that the Wage Board 
shall not discriminate or differentiate on the grounds of race. 
However, as we have already seen in the previous two instances, this 
has been the practical effect of the operation of the Act. When the 
Act was redrafted in 1937, the Wage Board was directed to include 
with every recommendation a report "upon the class or classes of 
employees to whom it would be equitable ...•• thai: remuneration 
should be paid at such rates as will enable them to support them-
selves in accordance ~ith civilised standards of life''.Cl 7) The 
operation of the Act thereafter set in motion, firstly, a selective 
process which had the potential for displacing Black with White 
workers, and secvndly, machinery which bolstered high White earnings. 
The process is succinctly described by the Industrial Legislation 
Commission : 
"In an unregulated market, the available supplies or 
numbers determine the wage, but, under regulated con-
ditions, wag~s determine the numbers and set in motion 
a selective process in which all who are not worth the 
determined wage must make room for those who justify 
the payment of that wage". ( 18) 
Thus, a wage determination may set such high wages for 
work traditionally done by Whites that employers would effectively 
maintain a colour bar, or, in fact, may be induced to replace Black 
. t' Wh. t k T' . k i · ., · · , ( 19) wi _n i e wor ers. nis was nown :o occur in ear j_J_er perioas. 
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3.1.5 The Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act 
The Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act (No. 22 of 
1941) applies to all manufacturing industry and controls. the use of 
machinery, safety, health and minimum working conditions in factories, 
including controlled overtime, meal breaks, etc. These benefits apply 
to all employees unless more favourable conditions are applicable 
under collective agreements or other labour laws. 
The Act generally applies without racial discrimiriation, 
except that separate toilets, dining rooms and as far as possible, 
workplaces have to be provided for the different racial groups~ 
Although this may appear a small technical matter it may make it 
inconvenient and costly to introduce members of a different racial 
group. It may also make it difficult to promote a member of a 
different racial group., where different toilets, for example, are 
provided for different grades of staff. The Department of Labour 
may intervene in cases to prevent promotion on these grounds. The 
Shops and Offices Act of 1964 covers matters of a similar nature 
to those mentioned above, and along similar lines, in respect of 
sr.ops and offices. 
3.1.6 The Civilised Labour Policy 
A third colour bar in employment is practiced through a 
Civilised Labour policy observed by the state in recruiting its own 
employees. The policy was one of employirg Whites on unskilled and 
semi-skilled work in government departments, at wages above those 
current for this type of work. 
The application of this policy has ebbed and flowed 
according to the state of the economy. It was first applied by the 
Pact government in 1924 when poor and unemployed White farmers 
migrated to the cities. They were not trained to do skilled industrial 
work but were not prepared to work in the ranks of the unskilled at 
unskilled rates of pay, and direct action led to the substitution at 
higher wage rates-of Black by White workers in unskilled jobs in 
many government departments. 
The effect of the Civilised Labour policy was to shift th~ 
colour bar lower down the occupation~l ladder, particularly in 
government undertakings. For instance, bet'i-1reen 1924 and 1933 the 
proportion of White labourers employed by the Railways an.d Harbour 
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administration rose from 9,5 percent to 39,3 percent, whilst that of 
( 'JQ) 
Africans fell from 75 percent to 48, 9 percent.·'- Otlier government 
departments did the same - in 1937 they employed some 10000 
Europeans on work p.ceviously done by Africans, whilst employment was 
apparently found on subsidised works for approximately the same 
number.( 2l) 
Attempts were also made to induce private industry to do 
the same, for example by withholding tariff assistance from industries 
and firms which did not employ a high enough proportion of "civilised" 
labour or by excluding them from approved lists of government tenders. 
The Customs Act (No. 36 of 1925) contained a clause authorising the 
levying of the minimum duty on any article if the protected industry 
concerned was reported to be maintaining 'unsatisfactory labour 
conditions' • ( 2 2 ) 'Ci vi li sed' was always interpre ~ed as 'White' • 
As part of the Civilised Labour policy, the Pact govern-
ment also helped to entrench the legal and wage colour bar by passing 
the Wage, Industrial Conciliation and Apprenticeship Acts which, as 
we have seen, were intended to protect White workers. The statutory 
colour bar was entrenched by amending the Mines and Works Act in 
1926, reserving numerous mining jobs for Whites. 
3.2 Adaotations of the Industrial Colour Bar 
3.2.l The Period 1924-1960 
C'.:3) Maree has divided the adaptations of the industrial 
colour bar into the following periods 
Civilised Labour Policy 
World War Two 
Nationalist Party En-
trenchmdnt 
Rapid growth and labour 
shortages ("booms and 
bottlenecks") 
1924 - 1939 
1939 - 1945 
1945 -- 1960 
1960 - 1976. 
During world War 'I\-vo the direction of adjustment brou9ht 
about by the Civilised Labour Policy' position vvas partially reversed. 
~his was because : 
"In the labour market the most pressin'.J probJ.em was soon 
to become the shortaqe of skilled labrn1r; the armed 
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forces made considerable inroads into the country's 
manpower, while the colour bar made it difficult to 
utilise fully the reserve of non-White labour. Never-
theless, some 'dilution' did take place, particularly 
by using Colou.I.'ed and Indian males as skilled workers". (24) 
Thus the effect of the war on labour was to reduce the supply of 
skilled manpower because many skilled workers joined the defence force. 
Thus Black workers were promoted into skilled and semiskilled jobs 
previously held by Whites. Between 1938/39 and 1944/45 the proportion 
of Whites in secondary industry decreased from 38,l percent to 30,9 
percent whilst the proportion of Africans increased from 46,2 percent 
( 2 5) . to 52,0 percent. Total employment in secondary industry increased 
during these years from 307,100 to 431,400.( 2 G) 
It was during this period that the colour bar began losing 
its effect as an obstacle to Black advancement because of the changes 
that took place in manufacturing methods. The colour b2r had con-
siderable significance in the early years of South Africa's economic 
development when access to craftsmanship offered about the only 
opportunity to achieve higher status and better wages. The process 
of industrialisation during this period extensively reduced the 
ratio of skilled to semiskilled jobs and the impediment of the colour 
bar was no longer as harmful to Blacks as it had previously been. 
Mass production methods and new processes eliminated much· of the work 
previously done by skilled artisans. Used initially as a ledge for 
poor Whites in industry, semiskilled jobs wer:e increasingly handed 
over to Black operatives. While White vrnrv.ers concentr;::;.ted upon 
maintaining the skilled occupations as their closed preserve, they 
shunned the opportunities arising from the new technique of manu-
facturing, leaving the field clear for Blacks. 
The significance of the growth of manufacturing industry 
to the utilisation of labour was the disappearance of the customary 
clear division between skilled and unskilled work. This process was 
particularly rapid in newer industries like textiles o.nd metal 
engineering where no customary pattern of employment existed. 
The period between the end of the war and 1960 was one 
during which the Nationalist Party .had come to power and was seek:ing 
to entrench the position of the White populaticn both in the political 
and economic sphere. In this period the colour bar does not appear to 
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have undergone great changes. The government wa.s attempting to 
maintain it as a rig.id and static structure in the South African 
economyo That employers must have been adapt~ng the colour bar al-
ready to suit their needs can be inferred from the following infpr-
mation : by May 1956 the industry was 7,4 percent short of White 
artisan requirements, whilst the sho.i::-tage of White apprentices wCJ.s 
11,5 percent and that of White clerical workers 5,5 percent (male) 
( 2 7) 
and 4,1 percent (female). 
3.2.2 Adaptations after 1960 
The upward movement of the iridustrial colour bar accel-
erated considerably from 1960 onwards. By any standard, the growth of 
the South African eco~omy during the 1960's was extremely rapid. 
3etween 1960 and 1970 real GNP increased from R5,551 million to 
. ( 28) R9,797 million Cat constant 1963 prices). The average annual 
rate of growth between 1962 and 1966 was nearly 7,0 percent sur-
passed (internationally) only by Japan's 9 perce~t over the same 
. ( 2 9) period. 
The colour bar, both legal and conventional, has often 
been cj_ted as the prime cause of the skilled labour shortage which 
occurred during this period. By restricting skilled jobs to occu-
pancy by Whites only, where the demand for skilled workers exceeds 
the supply of Whites, there is by definition a shortage. As early as 
June 1963 an official survey conducted i~ all sectors of the economy 
revealed a shortage of 28662 White workers.< 3o) In April 1971 the 
shortage of White workers in the professional, semi-professional 
and technical category was 16585 whilst there wa.s a shortage of 
18595 White artisans.< 3l) There were also 8265 vacancies in clerical 
jobs conventionally filled by Whites.< 32 > Shortages in fact were 
probably greater because these figures are only based on a sample 
survey. This despite the fact that between 1965 and 1970 net 
immigration was contributing an estimated 14000 White skilled workers 
(33) 
annually to the economy. 
However, one important factor in the shortage bf skilled 
and technical labour which South Africa experienced during this 
period must surely be ~hat Arrow and Capron analysed as 'dynamic 
(34) 
shortages'. Analysing J.::he shortages of engineer-scientists that 
• 
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developed in the United States in the 1950's, and arguing against 
the conventional wj_sdom that this was due to the failure of the price 
mechahism to eliminate this shortage, they conclude that 
"In the market for:- engineer-scientists as for any other 
commodity we expect that a steady upward shift in the 
demand curve over a period of time will produce a short-
age, that is, a situation in which there are unfilled 
vacancies in positions where salaries are the same as 
those being currently paid in others of the same type 
and quality. Such a shortage we will term a dvnamic 
shortage. The magnitude of the dynarnic shortage depends 
upon the rate of increase in demand, the reaction speed 
in the market, and the elasticity of supply and demand. 
The reaction speed in any particular market depends 
partly on institutional arrangements, such as the pre-
valence of long-term contracts, and partly on the.rap-
idity with which ibformation about salaries, vacancies, 
and availabiJity of personnel becomes generally available 
throughout the m2.1:-ket" ~ ( 35) 
Occupational advancement of Black workers in response to 
these shortages has been widespread, and is well documented.C 35 l 
Discussion can be limited to a consideration of the analytical studies 
covering these changes, even though this literature is not extensive 
while some of it deals only indirectly with Black occupational 
mobility. The most important characterisations of this process can 
be summarised as follows : 
1). Market Segmentation 
The first factor to emerge strongly from all these studies 
is that the labour force in the major urban areas has remained s .:::<J-
mented whilst accomodating quite rapid occupational mobility. 
Terrington studied Black occupational mobility in 20 Wage Board 
industries for three different discrete periods : 1949 - 1961, 
1962 - 1966 and 1967 -·1972.< 37 > In each of these periods more than 
one wage determination had been made. The occupational structure in 
these industries showed the following changes : unskilled labour 
became less important and in some industries this category has actuall~ 
been abolished. However, semiskilled categories gained significantly 
in size with Black occupational mobility and in fact were found in 
most cases to be the largest single category in the occ:upational 
structure. The skilled category on the other. hand remained more or 
less constant. It was also found tha.t VJhilst Whites still dominated 
the skilled strata, m~ny Coloured and Asian workers entered at this 
level in the later periods studied. 
Terrington argued that, from the vantage point of the 
segregation of the races within the occupational structure, this 
process has not brought about significant integration of the labour 
force. Two factors operate to ensure that the occupational wage 
structure remains segmented. Firstly, skilled White workers have put 
up occupational barriers to minimise competition from Black workers. 
Secondly, however, if these workers cannot be trained as skilled 
workers, other methods must be found to ease a skill shortage. 
Terrington concluded that in South Africa skill shortages have not 
been remedied at the skilled but at the semiskilled level, and that 
most African economic advancement has occurred through mobility from 
the unskilled to the semiskilled level. Skill shortages appear fo 
~ave a particular effect on the occupational structure: enough White 
workers cannot be found so a process of job dilution is used and 
these jobs are filled by Africans. 
Dilution is thus a key method of maintaining a segment~d 
labour market: African workers do not take over an entire skilled job 
but work under supervision of Whites as operatives. As Terrington puts 
it : 
"The process of fragmentation increases racial segregation 
in the skill hierarchy by denying Africans access ·to the 
skilled positions, and, conversely, by committing them 
increasingly to work at the semiskilled level, but the 
occupational colour bar is preserved and inter-racial 
competition (and therefore competL~ion among levels of 
skill) decreases". ( 38) 
'rhus, in a racially segmented labour market there is a system of 
labour allocation and a response to shortages. However, the adjust-
ment process it not always met by unrestricted mobility, and free 
choice of workers (the critical assumptions of neoclassical theory) 
but by some other method linking the race and/or skill segments. 
2). Union Strength and Political Power 
Secondly, some of these studies postulate the develop-
ment of a bargaining situation between unions and management in 
which quid pro quos are offered to union members in return for 
. ( 39) 
union agreement to cpep JObs to Black workers. Kraft has noted 
the key influence which the White unions have in allowing or pre-
venting change on the shop floor. He argues that this derives partly 
from their political power as a major pressure group. 
In this regard, there has in recent years been a marked 
shift in government policy in favour of Black occupational advance-
ment. In 1971, for instance, the government issued a White Paper in 
which it accepted the recommendations of the Economic Advisory 
Council which advocated, inter alia, the reclassification of artisan 
work to permit the less skilled work to be done by semiskilled workers·. 
( 3 9a) . The Council alsc advocated the training of Coloured and Indian 
workers for artisan work. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the govern-
ment itself started a school for training Coloured apprentices as 
motor mechanics because of the White trade unions' bar on its members 
training Coloured apprentices. The government has also granted sig-
nificant concessions to ;rivate industry to train Black workers. 
Present government policy, instead of discouraainq all Black 
occupational mobility, would thus seem to be one of preparedness to 
adopt a neutral role as long as employers are ~ble to win concessions 
from White trade unions. 
3). Job Enrichment 
Some authors suggesi- that a process of job enrichment 
takes place during job fragmentation, since the lesser-skilled parts 
of an artisan's job are fragmented and the artisan is left with the 
t 1 f ' k ( 4o) Th. . t ..... . -mos comp ex group o ~as. s. is is a s rang argumenL in favour 
. . ( 41) 
of increased wages and fringe benefits for union members. Schlemr.,_:r 
points out that there is greater flexibility in dealing with labour 
problems provided an upgrading of the White worker's position takes 
place wherever Blacks are advanced. He notes : 
"ft •• there is the knowledge that the overall practice 
and policy of 'white job-enrichment', as espoused 
enthusiastically by some T.U.C.S.A. unions and as im-
plemented in practice by railway unions, can turn Black 
advancement into White advantage" .. (42) 
This increased job-pay enrichment dependency is reminiscent of 
McKersie and Hunter's point (Section 2) that labour rationalisation 
schemes, in order to be successful, must specify this as a pre-
condition for wage increases. Without detailed analysis of individual 
industries and particular agreements, it is impossible to say whether 
White job enrichment genuinely occurs with concomitant be0efits to 
White labour, or whether the payment of increased wages and added 
5 ') L.. • 
fringe ben~fits represent a quasi-rent to a scarce factor (i.e. 
White union labour) with considerable bargaining power. 
4). Relative Remuneration 
Fourthly, the orientation of many of these studies is 
not only with Black occupational mobility but with the relative 
privileges and rewards for Black workers at particular occupationaJ. 
levels. This emphasis is necessary if one is to get a balanced assess-
ment of the costs and benefits of Black occupational mobility. 
Schlemmer< 43 ) notes that the importance of colour in occupational 
reward is most clearly seen when one considers the salaries for 
different races at equivalent levels of skill and training~ Access 
for Black workers to the same occupations as Whites hold does not 
necessarily equalise economic rewards. 
. ( 44) Terr1ngton argues that the process of job fragmentation 
in South Africa has four dimensions in terms of its impact on wage 
differentials. The first is the.demand from White workers for the 
preservation of a racial differential. This process i~ often 
accomplished through job fragmentation whereby skilled work is broken 
down into different types of semiskilled work and made available to 
African workers, but at lower rates of pay than previous vJhitE~ or 
Cololired incumbents enjoyed. Apart from the fragmentatioh process, 
ther~ may be a wholesale takeover by Blacks of a particular occu-
pation, usually semiskilled and notably drivers. This tends to be 
. .~ , l . th 1 f , . ( 4 5 ) accompanJ.ec; ny a l.ecrease in e rea wage o · cr1 vers. 
) 
The second implication of the job fragmentation process 
on wage differentia~s is the White workers' demand that a ski~i 
differential be maintained. This is assured by handing over only the 
least-skilled parts of artisan work to Blacks. A skill differential 
will thus flow automatically from the differences in productivity of 
workers from the two groups. A corollary to this is that all lines 
of authority continue to ilow from White to Black. 
A third union demand, according to Terrington, is for 
the maintenance of a wage differential. This is not clear. As a tenet 
of union policy, it seems presumptuous and not wholly true. It may 
be thought to encompa~s the above two dimensions, since wage diff-
erentials are commonly determined by both skill and racial differences. 
One relevant meaning does present itself. The maintenance of any wage 
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differential (in its wider sense) between two groups of workers 
doing the same work may be perpetuated if employers also recruit 
these workers from two separate and insulated supply sources. The 
realities of the labour market may be such that in order to recruit 
(say) Whites for a particular job, the employer faces one set of 
supply conditions, whilst in recruiting (say) Black workers for the 
same job the supply conditions in the Black labour market may be 
entirely different. This is one explanavon of unequal pay for equal 
work. Therefore a demand that wage differentials be maintained m~y. 
be a demand for the retention of two segmented labour markets. 
5). Status Differentiation 
The last implication of the job fragmentation process for 
wage differentials is tr2 demand for the preservation of a stc.tns 
differential. This is considered separately here since an important 
conclusion of all the studies was that the status fears of White 
workers must be confronted and dealt with by man~gement in any 
labour rationalisation scheme. In a situation where an industrial 
colour bar exists, the entry of Black workers is seen to lower the 
prestige and dignity of Whites in those jobs which are jointly per-
formed by Whites and Slacks. Right-wing unions are worried about the 
status threats posed when Blacks are paid the same wage as Whites, 
even though this is in the interests of the White worker since it 
prevents undercutting. Schlemmer points out that when Blacks were 
allowed to become shunters on the railways, it is partly for thiE" 
( 1 /' ) 
reason that they were named 'train-compilers' and not shunters.'~J 
These status fears can also be checked at fragmentation agreements 
by allowing Whites to retain their artisan status, whilst Africans 
are only graded as semiskilled workers. This also provides a res-
pectable rationale for the payment of lower wages to the semiskilled 
workers since productivity is lower, even though an objective 
evaluation of the job content in both cases would put rates of pay 
much .closer together. 
6). Ideological Constraints 
Finaliy, all writers have referred to basic ideological 
constraints that must be adhered to within the entire framework of 
Black job advancemetit~ Whilst these principles do not all have the 
force o:f law, they nonetheless act as very real constraints to the 
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unrestricted utilisation of Black labour. They are, firstly, a 
prohibition on a common workplace for Black workers promoted to jobs 
simultaneously performed by Whites, although this proviso does not 
apply in the case of Coloured labour anymore. Secondly, no Black. 
worker may work in a superior position to a White worker, and t~irdly, 
no White worker mav be ousted from a job as a result of Black job 
, (47) -
aa vancemen t. 
( 48) Johnstone, set out to refute "the view of many ob-
servers that (this) economic development is undermining the govern-
ment's racial policies of apartheid and the system of white supremacy". 
He concludes that : 
ir ••• the government is not essentially opposed to the 
continuing movement of African labour into the 'White' 
economy; it is simply opposed to this process of labour 
mobility, which is necessary to continued economic 
development, becoming at the same time a process of 
residential and £Olitical mobility, which is not indis-
pensable to economic growth and which is ef":fectively 
being restricted through the system of labour_ controls". (49) 
He continues that : 
''··· the most important labour controls are those which 
most essenti~lly deprive Africans of access to and 
control of economic power (trade union, educat.ional 
and income colour bars) rather than the job and mqvement 
colour bars. The latter can be - and are being - adminis-
tered flexibly without endangering the White power struc-
ture. But this cannot be said of the others, certainly 
, not of the trade union colour har for instance". ( 50) 
3.3 Conclusions 
In this Section we attempted to explain the institutional 
factors governing labour utilisation in South Africa. In Section 3.1 
we considered the labour legislation relevant to the utilisation of 
Black labour in the economy. The building industry, through the 
Bantu Building Workers Act and job reservation Determination Nos. 6 
and 13 has been subject to very important constraints in its use of 
Black labour in skilled positions. The two-party industrial council 
system plays a most significant role in this resfect since it is 
the framework within which all conditions of employment in the 
building industry are determined. As it was shown, labour legislation 
does leave room for change, for exam~le through changes in the job 
categories included in closed shop agreements and job reservation. 
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reversals .. 
In the second part of the Section it was shown that the 
system has responded in the past to shortages of White labour e.g .. 
during World War Two and in the 1960's. 
With respect to changes after 1960 a number of conclusions 
can be drawn from the more recent literature. Primarily these studies 
stressed the centrality of the White trade unions in the labour 
market adjustment process, more particularly their role in bringing 
about de jure (as opposed to de facto) changes on the shop floor .. 
This conclusion has relev.ance for Section 6, where the structure of 
the barga.ining relationship at negotiations ill. the Witwatersrand 
building industry is discussed in detail. 
The studies also suggest that the industrial labour force 
has still remained strictly segmented as between White and African, 
whilst accomodating limited occupational mobility. This implies that 
the protectionism inherent in job reservation and other industrial 
colour bars has not been done away with despite African occupational 
mobility. This conclusion will be taken further in Sections 6 and 7 
in the context of job fragmentation agreements in the building in-
dustry. 
These studies have also postulated a number of different 
influences which the White unions have on the process of job frag-
mentation; more specifically as far as the racial and skill rela·:...~d 
wage gaps are concerned. In particular it relates tQ the practice 
of job-enrichment and unions' insistence on the maintenance of 
differentials. Finally, it was shown that the enduring segmentation 
of the labour market also has important implications for the relative 
wages of White and Black workers at equivalent levels of skill. These 
conclusions are again relevant to Sections 6 and 7. 
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SECTION FOUR 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
BUILDING INDUSTRY 
60. 
The purpose of this section on the structure of the 
South African building industry is twofold : first, to indicate 
the general structure and relative significance of this industry 
and, secondly, to emphasise those characteristics of the industry 
which are crucial for an analysis and und_er standing of the labour 
market stresses and adjustments.discussed in the following sections •. 
A further reason for such a macro-perspective is the fact that the 
more detailed analysis in this study focuses on two regions only, 
with the emphasis on African labour in the one and Coloured labour 
in the other region. The wider perspective sketched in this section 
is to facilitate generalisation of those more specific findings. 
This section is largely based on published statistics 
and information from generally available secondary sources, which 
is the main reason why some of the aspects are covered in a rather 
eclectic way. Primary data collection was limited to the two 
regions analysed in later sections. 
4 .1 Re.lative Si9..nificance of the Building_. Industry 
Wi.th t:Le focu:3 on labour market dym:cmics the relative 
significance of this industry is measur~d in terms of its con-
tribution to overall employment in South Africa. Table 1 shows 
the employment pattern of the economically active population in 
South Africa ~n 1970. 
Table l 
Major Sector 
Agriculture,hunting, 
forestry & fishing 
Mining & quarryin:J 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas 
& water 
Construction 
Commerce, catering 
& accomodation 
Transport, storage 
& communica tio!1 
Financing,insurance 
& real estate 
Com:i.uni ty, sccial & 
personal services 
Unemployed & 
unspecified 
Total economically 
active 
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Comoasition of the South African 
LaE;ur Force < :mo·r----------
c 0 m p 0 s i t i 0 n 
Total Overall Excluding 
Number 01 /.J Agriculture 
& Unemployed 
Unspecified 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) 
2,239,200 28,0 
676,100 8,4 13,4 
1,023,700 12,8 20,4 
49,700 0,62 o,9 
446,400 5' 5 8,9 
71E-, 100 8,9 14,2 
338,300 4,2 6,7 
190,400 2,3 3,7 
1,574,000 19,7 31,3 
732,400 9,0 
---------
7,986,300 100. ,) 100,0 
Male 
Labour 
Force 
% 
( 4) 
29,1 
12,4 
15, o· 
0,8 
8,1 
9,6 
5,7 
2,1 
10,9 
S,5 
100,0 
---
Source Department of Statistics, South African Statistics 
1974, page 1.33 
The total labour force of each sector is given in column 
1. In terms of this criterion, construction ranks sixth in the 
economy, preceded by agriculture, mining, manufacturing, commerce 
and services. In 1970 construction had a labour force of almost half 
a million, comp~red with just over one million in the manufacturing 
sector and almost 700,000 employed in the mining sector. 
Column 2 indicates the percentage breakdown of the 
economically active population, from which we see that the con-
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struction sector only employs about 5,5 percent of the labour 
force. If agriculture as well as the unemployed/unspecified 
categories, are excluded, thus giving a more realistic definition 
of the urban industrial sector, construction constitutes 8,9% of the 
labour force, thus r:.aking it more significu.nt as an employment secto.c 
(See 'column 3 of Table 1). 
It could be pointed out there that there is another 
method of showing the significance of the construction sector in 
the economy. This is by looking at figures showing the gross 
domestic product by kind of economic activity. These figures are 
shown in section 4·.4. 
The figureE for construction in Table 1 include only 
the work of contractors, leaving aside associated professions like 
architects and quantity surveyors. Neither do they reflect the fact 
that construction activities give rise to employment in other 
sub-sectors of the economy like plumbing, electrical equipment, 
fittings, structural metal products, paints and other chemical 
products, materials, handling machinery, etc. Because of this 
related activity, scme count£ies have.different methods of 
aggregating the construction sector in their national product 
statistics. This makes valid international comparisons very difficult 
Table 2 shows the change in the racial c0mposition of 
the construction labour force between 1959/1960 and 1973. 
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The first feature to notice is the rapid increase in 
the size of the l~bour force over the 13 years, i.e. from 124,000 
to 392,000, which is an increase of 216,2%. A second feature is 
the changing racial composition of the labour force. From 1959/.60 to 
1973 the percentage of Whites in the sector dropped from 22,1% ·to 
15,1%. In fact, fron 1920 to 1934 the share of Whites in the labour 
force increased from 24,0% to 35,5%, but since then the trend has 
b . th . t d . t . ( l) Th ' h 1 d f th . een in e opposi-e irec ion. ·us ~- e process revea e or e 
1960's is really the tail-end of a far longer historical process 
which began in the mid-1930's. 
The share of African worker~ in the sector increased from 
63,7% in 1959/60 to 71,2% in 1973, which is equivalent to an almost 
fourfold increase from 79 000 to 280,000. Employment of Asians in-
creased only marginally from 0,5% to 1,4%; in absolute figures the 
increase was fiom 731 to 5,600. Whilst the share of coloured workers 
decreased from 13,5% to 12,1% over the 14-year period, their 
absolute numbers increased from 16,790 to 47,600, i.e. an increase 
of 183,5%. These figures underestimate the regional importance of 
Coloured labour in the industry. Coloured workers in the industry 
are found predominantly in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and in 
Natal whilst few Coloured people are employed in the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State. 
4.2 Structure of the Industr_y 
The construction sector is CGmposed of three industries : 
building, civil engineering and electrical contracting. Each has its 
own separate administration. The South African Federation of Civil 
Engineering Employers and the Electrical Contractors' Association 
represent employers in these industries. The Electrical Contractors' 
Association negotiates its own agreements with the unions in that 
industry. In areas where electrical contracting is not covered by 
separate agreements the conditions of employment of the building 
agreement apply. There are no registered unions in civil engineering 
and conditibns of employment are set unilaterally by the South Africar 
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors. For unskilled workers 
conditions are laid down in Wage Board determ:Lna tions. The building. 
industry therefore ha~ no direct jurisdiction ave~ these other two 
industries, even though the civil engineering body has as members a 
65. 
number of building contractors who temporarily convert themselves 
into civil engineering employers during the course of their work. 
Table 3 gives an idea of the relative size of each of the industries. 
Since strictly speaking sub-contractors work in both building and 
civil engineering the value of their work is shown as a separate 
amount. Unfortunately figures are only available on the basis of 
1963/64, but the relative change is probably insignificant. Tabl~ 
4 gives an indication of the type of work d8ne by sub-contractors 
and the division of their work between building and civil engineering 
Table 3 Construction Sector Activities by Value 
Of'J:0rk-l963/1964 
Main Contractors Building R222,6 million 
Civil Engineering R 90,7 II 
Electrical Contracting H 35,9 II 
All Sub-Contractors R 61,6 II 
Source Department of Statistics, Census of 
Construction 1963/64-; Tables 1 and 10. 
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The building and civil engineering industries are both 
'construction' j_ndustries and as such closely related. It frequently 
happens that employees in the one industry perform work indistin-
guishable in character from work done in the other. The feature 
that distinguishes the two industries is not so much the type of 
work performed as the kind of structure erected. Basically civil 
engineering includes excavation work, and the construct~on of 
harbours, bridges, railways and dams, as well as shaft-sinking and 
roadmaking. Apart from their close functional and corporate re-
lationship the two industries are widely different. Civil engineering 
activities are extensively loca~ed on isolated sites in rural areas, 
whilst building is confined mostly to urban areas. Building demands 
more skilled labour-intensive work because there is more finishing 
work. In the electric.-.1 contracting industry "employers and employees 
are associated for the design, preparation, erection, installation, 
repair and/maintenance of all electrical equipment, forming an 
. t 1 d l- t . f 1. - J d. '' ( 2 ) in- egra~ an perma.nenL por ion o ~ Du·L .. ings . 
The above distinction does not dispose of the very diffi-
cult problem of defining the limits of the building industry and the 
boundary of the activities to which the industry's rules, labour; 
legislation and principles apply. There is for instance the question 
of whether building maintenance work by building tradesmen at a 
factory should be covered by the labour legislation for the building 
industry. In an early test case Rex v. Siderski (1928 T.P.D. 109) 
the accused, managing director of a chemicals factory in the Transvaal. 
appealed against his conviction of contravening regulations 1.n the 
local building ac;reement o In the course of his business he employed 
two bricklayers on maintenance work which included the building of 
a storeroom on the premises. It was agreed that he had temporarily 
converted himself into an employer in the building industry becc.use 
of these two artisans. He was there¥or~ bound by the local building 
industry's agreement and had to pay the prescribed wages. The 
judgement heJ.d that the employer -::ould not be said to have any 
business other than chemical manufacture: he had not employed the 
e.rtisa.ns on ar~y i11dustry oth<:r thc:1;1 the one he 1.vas conducting, and 
therefore remained an employer in chemical manufacture and had.n0tg 
converted himself into an employer in the building industry. 
68. 
termined not bv the ~cin;:J. of occupati:~n in which the e~E..!~es ar5:. 
~ngaged, but by t[2~ na t':,!~2f the enterI?_ri s~J:!l_whj_c}1 Jloth emp.l.£yer 
and !=1!U?.loyees are 9:ssociated for a common purpose. Once the 
character of the industry is determined all the employees are 
-engaged .in that indPstry whatever the actual work may be which the 
employer allots to them. It is therefore common to explicitly ex-
clude from the provisions of local building agreements building 
artisans doing maintenance work on the gold mines and in factories 
and firms like Iscor. These artisans would have all their conditions 
of employment determined by the parties to t'he industrial council 
in the industry in which they work. 
Section 15 of the Bantu Building Workers Amendment Act 
(Act No. 60 of 1955) also excludes from the rules of the industry 
work done in private residences 'in respect af the renovation; 
maintenance, repair or alteration (excluding the addition of one or 
(3) 
more rooms) of the residence which he o~~J-e~.' In Rex v. Port 
Elizabeth Municipality (1928 E~D.L. 49) it was ruled that a municip-
ality engaged in a public utility undertaking was not bound by the 
local building industry agreeme~t. Thus, there is a substantial 
amount of building work going en which is not part of the building. 
industry, and which also does not fall into either civil enginee~ing 
0r electrical contracting industries~ 
Master Builders' Associations operate in the country. On 31st May 
1974 Industrial Councils operated .in the following regions : Albany 
(Grahamstown), Bloemfontein, Boland (magisterial districts of Paarl, 
Wellington, Stellenbosch, Somerset West and the Strand), Cape 
~ 
Peninsula, Durban, East London, Kimberley, Kroonstad, Natal-Northern 
Areas, Pietermaritzburg and Natal Midlands, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria 
and Witwatersrand, Queenstown and Worcester.< 4 > Builders' interests 
are r~presented at the national level by the Building, Industries· 
,-
~ederation South Af~icawhich is a federal union of autonomous 
affiliated associations. 
Except for a short period during the 1930's when the 
National Industrial Council for the Buildi~g Industry existed, 
building negotiations have always been conducted on a regional basis 
between Master Builders' Associations (MBA's) and the unions in that 
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area. At present there is only one area - the O.F.S. Goldfields -
where conditions of employment are set unilo.terally by an MBA. In 
this case the MBA consists of a well-organised and closely knit 
group of employers. 
Industrial councils seldom extend thei~ area of juris-
diction beyond the town or city within which they operate. This also 
applies i. a. to rural areas, unless a significant amount of building 
work is being carried out there. As a result in rural areas building 
work (as opposed to civil engineering) is not subject to any specific 
labour legislation, such as minimum wages, maximum hours of work, etc. 
·4. 3 R~ion2l Distribution of Building Ac ti vt_b'.: 
Table 5 shows for 1975 the value of buildiug work com-
pleted in the nine major metropolitan areas of the country. The 
concentration within a few areas is striking. 
Table 5 Private Sector Buildinq[; Co~le'teci_ in 1975 
Witwatersrand R258,4m Pietermaritzburg Rl9,4m 
Durban El42,9m Bloemfontein Rl6,2rn 
Cape Town Rl04,0m East London R.13, 4m 
Pretoria R 62,6m Kimberley R 6,3m 
Port Elizabeth R 21,6m 
.Source Department of Statistics, Bulletin pf Statistics 
(quarter ended June 1976), pp. 7.12 - 7.16. 
Pretoria and the Witwatersrand alone already account 
for almost half of all the buildings completed in the major 
metropolitan areas~ These a:ceas are follo: . .,:ed by Durba.n and Cape 
Town. These four areas constitute more than 80 percent of all the 
metropolitan areas. 
Table 6 shows similar information but on a different basis. 
It disaggregate~ building work completed in the private sector in 
1971 into (a) provincial sub-totals, (b) riew residential and non-
residential construction plus additions and alterations, and (c) 
that completed in metropolitan areas and rural areas as well as 
70. 
"other important urban areas". The latter distinction is bas.ed on the 
Statistical Yearbook, 1974, where 59 other towns such as Paarl, 
Welkom, Grahamstown, etc. are identified. 
Table 6 
Area 
Cape Province 
MA 
OUA 
Rest 
Natal 
:MA 
OUA 
Rest 
Transvaal 
{\ii\. 
OUA 
Rest 
Orcinge Free State 
MA 
OUA 
Rest 
Total 
Abbreviations 
B~ildings Completed by the Private Sector in 1971 
Residential Non-Residential 
Construction Construction 
Rm. Rm. 
105,1 50 7 7 
5 7 ,o 31,1 
17,3 7,4 
30,7 12,2 
67,5 27,8 
40,9 19,9 
5,9 2 '0 
20,6 5,8 
183,2 60,2 
140,9 39,1 
26,7 11,2 
15,5 9,8 
17' 2 9,4 
6,9 3,6 
7,0 3,5 
3,2 2,3 
R373,lm Rl48,4m 
MA metropolitan areas 
OUA - other important urban areas 
Rest - balance of work completed. 
Additions 
& 
Alterations 
Rm. 
35,5 
26,8 
3,9 
4,7 
25,9 
21,7 
o., 8 
3,2 
48,2 
41,6 
4,6 
1,9 
5,2 
2,1 
2' 1. 
0 Cl 
' ';J 
-----
Rll4,9m 
Source Department of Statistics, South African Statistics 
1974, pp. 13.18 - 13.19. 
According to the information in Table 6 the metropolitan 
areas (as listed in Table 5) account for :cot1ghly 70% of all building 
71. 
work done in the country. Thus a significant amount of building work 
is still done in smaller urgan and rural areas. The building labour 
force in these ar2as is still quite large, i.e. of the order of 
100,000 workers. The Witwatersrand and Pretoria alone accounted for 
one-third of the value of all buildings completed in 1971. In the 
future this share will hardly decline, given the nature of the Wit-
watersrand as an expanding urban industrial complex. In contrast 
in the Orange Free State the industry is quite insignificant, com-
pared with the country as a whole (about 5 percent) and the Transvaal, 
(about 11 percent). 
In the country as a whole 58,6% of all buildings erected 
(by value) were residential (i.e. houses and flats), whilst 23,3% 
were non-residential Ci~e. office blocks, factories, dams, harbours, 
etc.) and 18,0% was for additions and alterationso One would ez:pect 
non-residential construction to bear a much higher proportion to 
total buildings completed in urban than rur&l areas, given that 
metropolitan areas are the centres of i.r..dustry, yet Table 6 does 
not bear this out, largely because major non-residential civil 
engineering projects are undertaken in ru.cal areas. 
4.4 'I'renos in Outpu:t and i'.:mpls:yment 
Some aspects of the growth of the construction during 
the period 1960 to 1973 are analysed in Table 7. The Table is 
largely self-explanatory and hence requires no detailed comment. 
Output figures only refer to work carried out in the private con-
tracting industry. The amount of work done by the public sector is 
not large. The Central Government and Provincial Administrations. 
(including the Railways and Public Works Department) have all their 
work done by outside contractors, apart from the maintenance. Only 
municipalities and divisional councils maintain their own building 
sections, mainly for the construction of low~cost housing~ The 
figures in the Table refer to construction work in the eighteen 
principal municipalities and 44 surrounding areas, as well as in 45 
smaller towns. With the exception of the data on the buildir1g and 
civil engineeting industrie~, all the. statistics h~ve been obtained 
from the S.A. Reserve Bank's Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics. Un-
fortunately the figures in columns 4 and 5 were taken from a source 
whj_ch is not updated regulc:1rly. The figures in colurrrns 1,2 and 3 
have been deflated with the building price index compiled by the 
Stellenbosch Bureau :t;or Economic Research. 
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Since the mid-1940's construction in'South Africa has 
been a growth industry with a rate of expansion considerably higher 
than that of the economy as a whole. Between 1946 and 1971, con-
t · · t t · 1 L • - b_ y ') t:l.8. , 8°!.. ( 5 ) si· nee 1940,,.. s ruction ou pu in rea terms increasea  ~- -~ 
the share of construction in the GDP has doubled: from 1946 to 
1963 it rose from 2;2% to 3,0%, and by 1972 it had increased to 
4,7%.( 6 ) By contrast the share of manufacturing in the GDP rose 
from 17,1% to 23,5% between 1946 and 1973.< 7) 
After the war the building industry found itself under 
strong pressure to meet the housing backlog. Building permits were 
abolished in 1948 and a number of schemes were introduced to train 
ex-servicemen as artisans. In the nine years between 1946 and 1954 
( 0' 
real output in the industry doubled. vJ Total employment in these 
years rose from only 39,915 in 1946 to over 102,653 eight years 
later.Cg) This was followed by a period of slo~ but steady growth 
until 1961, inter~upted only by the 1956/57 slump. 
The recession of 1961/62 had an adverse·effect.·on all 
industries, although a look at Table 7 indicates that the effect on 
building was relatively more severe. Whilst non-residential con~ 
struction showed only a moderate decline, homebuilding fell by 35% 
and output in the building sector declined by almost 20% in three 
year~. Over the same period, the physical production of manufa~turinc 
still increased steadily. Fluctuations in employment were also more 
severe in the ~j.1ilding industry, whilst the index of manufacturing 
employment rose from 86,5 to 92,8 between 1960 and 1962, employment 
of building workers fell from 130,847 in 1961 to 121,893 the follow-
. (lO) I' d . th' . 1 k . d '-1 t t" ing year. ~was uring lS S acr perio ~la- many ar lsans 
left the industry permanently to seek employri1ent in more stable 
industries. 
The rapid economic revival of the 1960's found the 
industry so ill-equipped to meet the challenge that building control 
had to be re-imposed as early as 1964. The period from 1963 to 1967 
is generally considered to b~ exceptional for the construction· 
sector, in as far as its output in real terms almost doubled over 
the four years, rising from Rl40,83 million in 1963 to R267 5 0l 
million in 1967.Cll) Table 7 (columns 4 and 5) show that civil 
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engineering was growing at a slightly faster rate than building 
during this period. Between 1963 and 1965 the share of construcU.011 
in the GDP increased from 3% to 4% ( 12 ) , whilst that of manufacturinr;; 
( 13) 
rose from 21,9 to 23,4 percent. 
Non-residential construction fluctuated in line with 
investment generally during the 1960's and tllerefcre tended to 
move pro-cyclically (Table 7, column 3)8 The uninterrupted growth 
in non-residential construction betweer. 1963 and 1967 should be 
seen as a result of the investment boom in the economy. Overall 
domestic capital formation rose from R575 million in 1962 to 
Rl821 million in 1967, as indicated in Table 8. Between 1961 and 
1965 gross domestic fixed investment rose at. a rate of 12,9% 
annually compared with only 8,5% for private consumption expen-
diture. ( 14 ) This includes investment of both the pri1...-ate and pu})lic 
sectors. Whilst private investment decreased sharply in 1966 pre-
cipitating a slump in non-residential construction which was to last 
for two years, public capital outlays increased steadily throughout 
the decade. 
Table 8 Net Domestic Capital Format ion 1962_:-_1961.__J Rm) 
Private 
Enterprises 
--·-----
Public 
Sector * 
Total 
* Including 
Source 
-------·-·-·-----
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
267 538 637 794 585 1023 637 1017 1316 1401 
308 388 473 685 728 798 803 899 1194 1342 
575 926 1110 1479 1313 1821 1440 1916 2510 2743 
·--... ---
public authorities and public corporations. 
Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 1972, 
page V-18~ 
Compared to most forms of non-residential construction 
which fluctuated in line with investment and thus moved pro-
cyclically, house-building was subject to separate influences. The 
factors determining house-building are not very relevant to non-
residential building~ A major determinant of house-building is the 
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supply of mortgage finance since building societies normally fund 
about: 80 percent of new residentio.l construction. The chie:f reasoa 
for the cyclical availability of money is that ~1ilding.societies 
operate on the basis of borrowing short and lending long in a very 
competitive money market. The break in continuity of housing 
S:lpply caused by a lack of funds, invariat,::..y builds up into a 
demand backlog which tends to compound the pressure on the industry 
in any subsequent upturn. Looking at Table 7 (columns 2 and 6), we 
see the close correlation between mortgage finance granted by 
building societies and the level of residential construction. The 
boom conditions of the early sixties were an indirect result of the 
tremendous growth in fixed deposit funds placed with the buildin.g 
society movement in this period,ClS) as well as the high level of 
Government expenditure on housing projects. Between 1961 and 1971 
the public sector spent R745 million on new housing.(lG) The rate 
of output of this sector rose by almost 70% in the three years 
from 1963 to 1965, and house-building was only able to cope with 
the demand because of the large number of speculative builders 
operating on the fringe of the industry who took advantage of 
prevailing profitable opportunities. By 1965 mortgage advances had 
dropped back to their pre-19~3 levels and only reached the 1964 
level again four years later, (Table 7, column 6). 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the manufacturing sector, 
construction output in real terms (at 1963 prices) rose from only 
R360 million in 1963 to R585 million in 1967, levelling at R58l 
. 11 · . 1°68 ( 1 ?) s. . l t 1 . d t f th . mi_. ion in_ J • im1. ar rencs are ev1 en or : e non-resi-
dential sector of the industry. In 1970 the ~ndustry resumed its 
rapid pre-1967 growth, again with both sectors participating 
initially. Between 1967 and 1969 the availability of mortgage finance 
had eased considerably and home-building recovered rapidly. It con-
tinued to maintain high levels until the end of 1971. 
The severe pressure placed on non-residential building 
during this period was the result of huge increases in net domestic 
fixed capital formation (NDFCF) Q Investment in buildings rose from 
Rl,503 million in 1969 to R2,032 million two years later, (Table 
9) o The upswing was initiated by the private sector in 1968/69, but 
public sector investments started to dominate by 1969. Whereas 
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public authorities accounted for only 20,1% of the increase in 
NDFCF in 1968/69, this proportion rose to 63,5% in 1970/71. By 
the beginning 0£ 'the 1970's the authorities found it necessary to 
suppress demand by cutting back heavily on planned public capital 
expenditure. Severe pressure on the labour resources of the iri-
dustry show up in both the rapid increase in employment (from 
1967 to 1971 total employment increased from 252,000 to 385,800) 
and in the amount c1:f overtime worked during these years o 
Table 9 Gr~ss Domestic Capit~l Formation (Rm) 
Building 
and 
Construction 
Transport 
equipment/ 
machinery 
Transfer 
costs 
Gr.ass dom-
estic fixed 
cap:_tal 
formation 
Change in 
inventories 
Gross dom-
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
587 666 827 1058 1162 1263 1305 1503 1769 2032 
460 600 735 877 880 904 981 1029 1263 1475 
25 36 49 42 42 52 64 99 107 97 
1072 1302 1611 1977 2084 2219 2350 2631 3139 3604 
46 211 147 221 20 472 37 316 508 404 
estic capital 1118 1513 1758 2198 2104 2691 2387 2947 3647 4008 
formation 
Source Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 1972, 
page V-18. 
An important :feature of the industry that emerges frbm 
an analysis of the time series, is the extremely marked pattern of 
seasonal and cyclical fluctuations. This is largely attributable 
to the changing p2.ttern of overall demand for the industry's 
services. For example, in 1966 and 1968 private investment fell 
sharply, precipitating a two year slump in non-residential construc-
tion. Construction output in real terms was R267 million in 1967, 
but by the following year had dropped back to R257 million. Another 
example is the Sharpev:Llle recession. While it affected all in--
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dustries adversely, Table 7 shows that the effect on building was 
much more severe, with total output in tonstruction declining by 
almost 20% over one year (column l)~ 
In employment the building sector.also experiences 
more severe cyclical fluctuations than most other sectors, as can 
be seen by comparing columns 8 and 10 of Table 7, e.g. employment 
in the building sector fell from 130,847 in 1961 to 121,893 the 
. (18) following year , while employment in manufacturing actually 
increased. 
Fluctuations differ between regions and the pressure on 
the industry is often more severe in one region than another. Be-
tween 1966 and 1970 construction output rose by 86,7% in Cape 
Townr 71% on the Witw~tersrand (112,9% in Pretoria alone), 45,9% 
in East London and only 32,3%, 11,7% and 3,3% in Durban, Bloem-
fontein and Port Elizabeth respectively.Cl9 ) Between 1960 and 1962, 
the-drop in output was also greater in some regions than in others : 
Cape Town showe_d a decline of only 14%, whilst building 'Jork on the 
Witwatersrand dropped by 22% (Pretoria declined by 43% and Jchannes-
burg dropped 38% between 1960 and 1963) and in sharp contra.3t, Port 
E 1 . ' . - t 11 h d 11 . ( 1 ' 2=10 ;' • ( 2 0 ) iza~etn ac .ua y s ~we a sma increase ~ 
The disparity between peaks and troughs during these years 
was higher on the Witwatersrand than in other regions of the country. 
This is acco~nted for by the fact that after 1963 a high propo~tion 
of manufacturing and commercial investment took place in that region. 
The Witwatersrand alone accounted for 52% of all manufacturing and 
commercial buildinq investment in the major metropolitan areas in 
1966.< 21 > Of great~r importance, though, is the fact that in the same 
year, volatile non-residential construction accounted for 27,7% 
of all Witwatersrand building work whilst in areas like Cape Town 
and Durban it only accounted for 15,8% and 14,8% respectivel.y.< 22 ) 
For the most comprehensive perspective on the structure of 
firms in the building industry we have to include sub-contractors, 
even though they f~nction between the building and civil engineering 
sub-sectors. Table 10 shows the breakdown by employee size group of 
main contractors in building, as well as all sub-contractors. An 
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establishment refers to any office which controls the operations 
-------·--·~-
of a firm in a specific area. This differs from a .f~rm which, a~3 
a legal entity may comprise one or more establishments. 
Employee 
.Size 
Group 
0-·4 
~)--9 
10-19 
Table 10 : 
1965/66 
A. B 
930 817 
1023 1006 
9413 848 
c A 
1,6% 1037 
4.3% 1361 
8,0% 1207 
1967/68 
B 
942 
1338 
9 '78 
·~-------·----·-
c A 
----
1,6% 1053 
5,0% 1411 
9,0% 12 77 
1969/70 
-----
B 
t~69 
1315 
1000 
c 
1 ')O/ 
....!,.. ' ->it..' 
·-----------·-·-----. ---·------·-.. --···--------·-----
Subtotal 
0-19 2901 2671 1319% 3605 3258 15,6% 3741 3184 13' :;~~. 
·------·~--. --.-~ -~-·------· ·----.. --·-----·-----· 
20-49 838 545 15' 7% 
50--99 293 106 12,6% 
100-199 194 40 16' 7% 
200-299 61 14 9,2% 
300-399 24 5,2% 
400 ... 499 14 l 3,9% 
.500-999 24 10 '3% 
1000+ 9 11,8% 
1016 5 :"i8 16 ~ 7% 
325 lL~ 12,3% 
207 35 15,3% 
63 2 8,5% 
32 5,2% 
15 3,6% 
23 8,4% 
12 J.3' 7% 
104 7 
424 
228 
73 
22 
20 
28 
19 
5 68 14, :.f;6 
105 13,9% 
19 14,2% 
8 8, 8% 
3,5% 
------------·-··-··--- ·------·--------·-·-
Subtotal 
500-1000+ 33 22,1% 35 22,1% 47 
--··--·--------
________ ,_ .. ___________ ,,_, _______ _ 
rrotal 4358 3376 100,0% 5298 3964 100,0% 5602 3885 l00,0% 
Abbreviations Number of Establishments 
.Sources 
B - Number of Working Proprietors 
C - Share of Total E::nploy!11.2nt (%) 
Department of Statistics, Ce~sus of Construction 
19G5/E6, Table 3.1 
Department of Statistics, Census of Construction 
1967/68, Table 1.3 
Department of Statistics, Census of Construction 
1969/70, Table 1.3 
79. 
The most characteristic feature of firms in the industry is the 
diversity of firm sizes. This can be seen quite clea~ly from Table 
10. In 1969/70 there were 3741 establishments with 19 or fewer 
employees employiilg only 13,5% of the labour force, whilst the 
47 largest establishments employed over one-quarter of the total 
labour force. 
We note also from the table that most of the firms 
C::..~e. 0-19 employees) have working proprietors. The structure of the 
firm is essentially limited to the builder and his small team. The 
builder is responsible for all the planning, negotiation of contracts 
and supervision of work on site and his home usually doubles up as 
an office. Firms in this category characteristically operate on 
repair and maintenance jobs and home-building. Furthermore almost 
all subcontractors fall into this category. 
The share of these small-scale enterprises has stayed 
constant during the late 1960's. This is undoubtedly associated 
with the fact that the competitive advc>ntage o:f large firms is not 
great. Economies of scale in building operations are few for various 
reasons : expensive capital and equipment j_s not needed; building 
merchants reduce the need to carry large stocks; building know-how 
is easily acquired and only becomes more technical for very large 
pro _i ects. Competition therefore a.lso tends to be keener .in house-
building. 
In line with this perspective on the competitive paL~ern 
of the industry one would expect bu_ilding booms to· be accompanied 
by the entry of new small firms (often it ~s an artisan setting 
himself up as a contractor) and 2 conversely, slumps to be associated 
with an exodus of these small firms. This is difficult to support 
on the basis of the data in Table 10, which shows that the share of 
total employment of small firms actually declined between 1957/68 
and 1969/70, the latter years being a boom period for the industry. 
It is however known that a large nuraber of subcontractors did not 
register as employers with industrial councils when entering during 
that year, especially those doing subcontracting on the basis of 
their labour only. This is an illegal practice usually associated 
with peak conditions in the industry. 
The larger firms are the more stable section of the 
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industry in terms of the longevity of each firm. Amongst them 
are usually the most experienced builders and the majority are 
main contractors, concentrating on a region, with operations on 
several sites simultaneously. Only the largest of these firms 
operate nationally, combining building activities with civil 
engineering. They may therefore have a number of establishments of 
varying sizes in different centres. As a result we cannot get a 
clear picture of the size of the largest firms from Table 101 e.g. 
the Roberts Construction Company (which operates in the Trarisvaal, 
Orange Free State and Natal) employed 35,000 workers in 1976, about 
50 t f th . t . · 1 . . t. · ( 23 ) It percen o . em on i s civi engineering opera ions. . s 
closest rival, L.T.A., employed 21,200 workers in 1975.( 24 ) At 
this stage the size of firms decreases rapidly and the size of the 
next bigg~st firms in the industry is of the order of 1,000 em-
ployees. 
The larger establishments increased their share of total 
employment from 22,l percent in 1965 to 27,2 percent in 1969 (Table 
10). While the total building labour force increased by 38,9 per-
cent between 1965/66 and 1969/70 that of establishments employing 
more than 500 workers increased by 68,3 percent over the same 
peric1. This cannot be seen as an accurate reflection of their 
growth, since the larger firms expand their employment ~n·order to 
undertake other tasks as well. The increasingly more complex Gov-
ernment contracts result in the large firms ~ecoming ever more 
diversified in their construction activ:~ies, including e.g. civil 
engineering, harbour development, mine development and mechanical 
. . ( 2 5 ) 'rh t t . k t R . h d B P 1 1 engineering. ,e cons rue ion wor. a ic ar s ay, _a aJorwa 
and Sishen-Saldanha are examples of the skills required by large 
contractors today. Thus, the industry tends to become highly di-
versified in its leading firms, opera ting both in rural ci.nd urban 
areas and with the work in urban areas being concentrated on 
"high rise" projects, with some competition from smaller firms. 
4 ~ 6 Te_chnological Charact~ristics of the BuildJ-nq_lnc!_~try 
The relatively small size of the av~rage building firm 
is an important factor to explain the low capital intensity of the 
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sector. In an unstable market like building, investment in equip-
ment involves great risks because capital may lie idle for long 
periods of time. What is more, the nature of building work often 
limits the use of different types of building machinery to one 
job only (e.g. ·sophisticated shuttering) • iVIore generally, however, 
the main reason for the low degree of mechanisation in the industry 
is the need for standardisation, which is seldom met on the 
building site. 
The main inputs in construction are labour and material. 
Estimates vary as to their relative importance, but it is common 
to attribute about 1/3 of total costs to labour and 2/3 to materials 
According to the Laidlaw Commission in Great Britain (1948) the 
proportionate costs of materials : labour: management was in the 
ratio 55:36:9.< 26 ) There are two other inputs in building, viz, 
land and capital. Together they probably account for about 10% of th1 
final cost of building work. In 1967/8 in South Africa., total value 
added in construction was 49,4% as against 40,4% in manufacturing. 
( 2 7) 
The range of materials required by the industry is very 
wide. The Simon Commission jn Great Britain (1948) estimated that 
some 250 different categories of materials were used by buiJ.ders. 
<
23 ) Cement - the main component in.concrete - as well as sand and 
stone, are the most widely used materials in the industry. Approx-
imately four-fifths of the cost of materials used in building can 
be attributed to timber, bricks, iron and steel products, slat= 
goods, cement and concrete products.< 29 > 
The high labour intensity of the building industry is 
clearly visible in Table 7, which shows how employment expansion 
in the construction sector between 1960 and 1973 in contrast to 
the manufacturing sector, was much faster than the rate of increase 
in production. This is partly because capital employed per worker 
in 1967/68 was R389 in the building sector as against R2,280 in 
f t . ( 30 ) r. d. t t l . k manu ac-uring. ~xpen lure per cons ruc·:ion wor~er on new 
assets increased from R95,30 in 1964 to Rl00,20 in 1970, indicating 
no appreciable growth. In 1970 however, rent paid on hired equip-
ment was Rl5,2 million while the value of owned equipment was 
R99,7 million.< 3 l) In fact, a recent feature 0£ the industry is 
the increasing tendency tov1ards the rental of 8quipment, ranging 
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from tower cranes to small cement mixers. (Plant hire fir~s now 
.number about 250 in South Africa, compared with only a handful 
ten years ago) • 
The relative cost of labour and materials differs between 
the subsections in the industry • In tunnelling labour and plant con-· 
stitute 90% of total costs while in painting, labour cost and 
materials make up 48% and 33% respectively of total costs. <32 ) High 
rise construction generally has a higher p~Li3.nt content than home-
building because of the use of elaborate shuttering and materials-
handling equipment (e.g. cranes and hoists) in the former. 
Home-and high-rise construction have dissimilar tech-
nologies, with production methods for housing being largely tra-
ditional and unchanged. Brickwork, plastering, carpentry and painting 
still account for roughly two-thirds of the cost of house-building; 
bricklaying alone accounts for 30% of the cost of an average house. 
Even the range of materials used has largely stayed the same, except 
for the recent· introduction of the larger cement block to replace 
bricks. 
In high-rise construction the largest cost item is the 
preparation of formwork, i.. e. the pouring of the concrete 'shell' 
of the building. This is usually done by the main contractor before 
the finishing work is started. The form work is usually built by 
skilled carpenters with timber or, more recently, with prefabricated 
metal shuttering. It is a horizontal tray-like structure suppo~~ed 
by the concrete columns built on the previous 'slab' or floor. Once 
this has been completed, the concrete is poured to form a slab and 
the formwork is removed. 
Given that building is more labour-intensive than rnanu--
facturing, it might be argued that production per worker would be 
higher in the latter sector. This, however, is not born out by the 
data since a higher output per worker may be due to any of a number 
of other factors: greater use of land or management in the pro-
duction process, or better health standards. This notwithstanding, 
the investigation of labour productivity plays a crucial role in 
this study. Table 11 shows average product per worker and its in-
crease in the manufacturing and construction sectors of the South 
African economy from 1946 to 1970. 
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Table 11 
------------··---·------~---------
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Year Total 
No.of 
Output 
of 
Workers Industry 
(Em) 
------·---·---·--------
1946 359,745 2 r:" JL 
1951 502,100 454 
1960 644,109 916 
1946 153,000 35 
10r1 
-- _, J ·'- 240,139 87 
1S•60 2 76 '144 140 
Production Increase in 
per Productivity 
Worker 
( R) 
700 
904 
1,422 
288 
362 
506 
(R) (%) 
204 29 
722 103 
74 26 
218 76 
Source : J.K. Evenwel, "Mociern Building Methodsn, page 48. 
The table clearly reveals a much higher labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector. The reasons for this cannot be deduced from 
the table; it may be the higher capital intenstty or the combined 
effect of several forces. However, such a gap was rei.atively con-
sistent over the years and it actually widened in the 1960's. At 
present the increase in labour productivity is still lower in 
construction than in manufacturing. 
This labour-intensity is the important link between the 
future growth of the industry and its projected labour requirements. 
Assuming the production function of the industry remains unchanged in 
the future, this will exacerbate the industry's labour recruitment 
problems, especially its White skilled labour recruitment problems, 
in.the future. Gideon has pointed out that building (as an assembly 
industry) is the only industry that has not undergone major 
structural-technical changesr since the industrial revolution, not 
only in terms of approach, but al~o in terms of building techniques 
d . t" 1 t t <33 ) an organisa iona s rue ure. 
The National Building Research Institute (NBRI) which 
is attached to the CSIR and is probably the most authoritative 
source in South Africa on this industry, estimates that the annual 
investment in building ~nd civil engineering construction calculated 
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at 1970 prices will increase from R2,290 million in 1975 to 
R3,068 million in 1980; R4,158 million in 1985; RS,620 million 
in 1990; R7,548 million in 1995 and Rl0,169 million in 2000.< 34 ) 
Thus, they expect the industry to enter a phase of unprecedented 
demand in which output will have to increase more than· fourfold 
over 25 years. The high income elasticity of demand for the in-
dustry's services in the 1960's is projected to continue in th~ 
future. 
Evenwel of the National Building Research Institute 
(NBRI) shows that if traditional construction methods are maintained 
the productivity of each skilled White worker in the industry would 
have to be in the region of R60,398 by the year 2000 if the pro-
jected building programme is to be completed. (See Table 12). The 
difference between the availability of skilled labour and the 
demand for buildings characterises the quest for industrialisation 
in the industry. (Table 13). 
Year Estimated No. 
of Skilled 
White workers 
available 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
43,841 
49,788 
53,827 
56,158 
58,913 
61,668 
64,820 
Table 12 
Esti~ated Estimated out required 
Expenditure per skilled White worker 
on 
buildings 
(Rm) 
654 
882 
1,188 
1,600 
2,156 
2,905 
3,915 
( R) 
14,900 
1 7' 700 
22,000 
28,400 
36,500 
47'100 
60,300 
·----·---
Source J. K. E venwe l, "Modern Bui. ld.ing Methods" , page 92. 
Period 
1970 - 1975 
1975 
-
1980 
1980 - 1985 
1985 
-
1990 
1990 - 1995 
1995 - 2000 
Source 
85. 
Table 13 
Estimated reqvired 
net increase in 
output per skilled 
White worker to 
maintain estimated 
buildinq programme 
(at 1965 prices) 
R 
2,798 
4,355 
6,421 
8,105 
10,511 
13,291 
Estimated average 
annual increase in 
industrialization to 
maintain building 
programme 
% 
3,8 
4,9 
5,8 
5,7 
5,7 
5,6 
J.K. Evenwel, "Modern Building Methods", page 92. 
The issues that have been dealt with above raise an 
important question, i.e. whether there has been any technical 
progress in the South African building industry which can be re-
garded as skilled labour-sav}ng. The question refers specifically 
to ski~leq labour--saving devices, since we are interested in the 
extent to which technical progress may have lessened the dependence 
of the industry on White artisan labour. 
Although skilled labour forms the biggest component uf 
total costs and has been the factor in greatest shortage, it is, 
paradoxically, unskilled jobs that have been mechanised first in 
the industry, since they tiave been the easiest to mechanise. 
Traditionally unskilled tasks like carrying materials have been 
supplanted by hoists, tower cranes, dumper vehicles and concrete 
pumps which are operated by semi-skilled workers. Excavation work, 
which was traditionally entirely unskilled labour-intensive work 
has been revolutionised by the use of bulldozers and excavators. 
To explain the greater progress with unskilled-labour 
saving technologica.l change rather than skilled--labour saving 
development one should bear in mind the general labour pattern in 
countries which take a lead in technological innovation. Fer the 
highly industrialised countries this pattern cf change is rational, 
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since many of them experience severe shortages of skilled labour. 
Naturally, this condition is not met in developing countries, of 
which South Africa has to be taken as an example. As is well-known, 
this dilemma has given rise to the d·::bate c.bout and development of 
"intermediate technologies 11 • In South Africa the artificial short-
age of Black unskilled labour in certain regions of the country 
has initiated strong pressure for the introduction of similar 
unskilled-labour saving devices, much to the detriment of employ-
ment opportunities in the present and coming decades. 
Skilled jobs are much more difficult to mechani~e because 
the building tradesman is essentially concerned with the. measure-
ment and placement of materials, in accordance with the particular 
details of each plan. Such tasks cannot easily be replaced 
with mechanisation , since the content of the ~ork is too unpred-
ictable. The trend in skilled jobs is towards the development of 
'labour aids', that is, portable equipment to mechanise whatever 
can be mechanised in a skilled job. For example, high-pressure spray 
equipment for painting and plastering is widely used in the industry 
as are power trowels for the smoothing of walls and the compacting 
of concrete slabs. Since mechanis2tion implies standardisation, 
mechanisation is bound to be concentrated in the preJaration, 
handling and movement of materials on a larger scale. This applies 
in particular to high-rise and bulk construction projects, i.e. 
larger building firms are more prone to use mechanised equipment 
than small-scale enterprises. 
Significant progress has, however, been made in the 
replacement of skilled labour with other factors of production by 
the substitution of craf~processes on site with the simple fixing 
of factory-made components. Walls, floors and other building 
elements are pre-cast in concrete, steel or asbestos and then 
assembled. This process is_ often referred to as "industrialised 
buiJ.ding" or alternately "prefabricated construction"., 
The Phelps Brown Commission of Inquiry in Great Britain 
discussed the implications for th~ labour force of the introduction 
of such construction methods.(JS) The main conclusion reached by 
the commission was that industrialised building is changJ.ng the 
skill mix of the building labour force by eliminating many of the 
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traditional on-site crafts. On the industrialised building sites 
far less plastering is done, which clearly has major implications. 
for the plasteririg trade; proportionately more carpenters are 
employed than on traditional sites, but th~ir work shifts in 
emphasis from operations involving on-site fabrication and assembly 
towards work involving large prefabricated components ; fewer 
bricklayers are required, and work is transferred from site to 
factory. 
Evenwel views the change as follows : "European ex-
perience indicates that the demand for specialist labourers in-
creases in direct proportion to the degree of industrialisation 
applied. The skill of these specialist labourers is certainly 
below that of traditional craftsmen, but the actual degree of 
specialisation has res~lted in the important upgrading of the 
11 d k . 11 ~' k ( 3 6 ) so-ca e uns i ea wor er. 
To give but one example, the head of Roberts Industrial-
ised Building Company (RIBCO) , the industrialised building arm of 
the Roberts Construction Company, has said that of the l 800 
production workers employed by RIBCO in 1976 no more than 15 were 
Skl·11~d t• <37 ) ~ ar isans. 
Partial or complete prefabrication has meant the intro-
duction ~f building materials that reduced the skilled labour 
content of wall construction, e.g. bricks for walls have been 
replaced by glass and prefabricated cement panel ling. Timber hc.:.3 
been replaced by steel and aluminium for windows arid door frames 
which are generally delivered ready for installation on siteo 
Lately walls have been constructed by m~ans of interlo~king con~ 
crete blocks requiring operative-type labo~r with minimum super-
vision. Table 14 shows the change in the breakdown of materials 
used by the building and contracting (buildings) division of the 
construction sector between 1963/64 and 1969/70, and bears out 
the general conclusions of the para~raph above. The categories 
of iron and steel, wood products and glass are of particular 
significance. 
Table 14 
Sand - all kinds 
Stone -- crushed 
and other 
Building lime 
Cement 
Bricks 
Tiles - all kinds 
Iron and Steel 
1) Sheets 
2) Other products 
Wood products 
Glass 
Paint 
Other products 
Total 
Valu~ of Selected Materials Used 
_}}~--th~ Buildi~Indus L:ry ~ '~ (Rm) 
1963/ 
1964 
4,9 
7,2 
1,1 
13,7 
16,9 
6,1 
4,1 
18,5 
22,4 
2,6 
3,4 
16,1 
Rl20,4 
1969/ 
1970 
5,5 
9 Ii ~ '± 
0' 86 
18,4 
18,8 
7,1 
5,7 
26,5 
20,l 
4,3 
3,8 
17,6 
Rl43,3 
% Change Over 
Period 
+ 12 
+ 29 
- 26 
+ 33 
+ 11 
+ 15 
+ 40 
+ 43 
- 11 
+ 65 
+ 11 
+ 9 
+ 19 
* Since the Census is based on a sample survey, it tends to 
underestimate the total value of materials used. 
Sources : Department of Statistics, Census of Construction 
1969/70, page 17. 
Department of Statistics, Census of Construction 
1963/74, page 9. 
In the light of these tremendous skilled labour-saving 
possibilities of industrialised building, it is important to assess 
their actual use in South Africa. We can distinguish between the 
past 16 years, that is roughly the period covered by the study, and 
the future prospects. There are strong indications that in the 
past 16 years these techniques have not been adopted widely in 
South Africa, e.g. according to the managing director of RIBCO, 
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there are only two other building firms in South Africa doing 
large scale industrialised building, i.e. L.T.A. and Bester 
Homes.C 3B)He also merltioned that RIBCO contributed only 5% to the 
1976 group turnover.( 39 ) 
More indirect evidence is the fact that the trade 
unions have not yet seriously complained about the introduction of 
these systems, neither have they arranged to regulate wages for 
semiskilled work on industrialised building sites. Thus, they do 
not regard the encroachment of new methods as harmful to their 
employment. It is feasible that the shortage of White artisans 
(brought about by supply factors) and the rapid expansion of the 
industry over this period probably meant that the introduction of 
these systems had little impact on the amount of work available 
to union members. In ftlct, it can be argued that in the past 16 
years, the introduction of these techniques did not solve the 
skilled labour recruitment problems of the industry, which mean that 
it also di~ not threaten the strong bargaining position of skilled 
(White) labour. 
The scope for the application 0£ these industrialised 
systems in the future are very good. In particular they have shown 
to be highly flexible, being used to build warehouses, offices, 
.flats, schools, factories and houses. RIBCO, the incfustria1ised 
building subsidiary of Murray and Roberts founded in 1969, had 
a gro~th in real turnover adjusted for building cost increases 
from 100 in 1970 to 1103 in 1976. C4o) 
Although direct cost comparisons between industrialised 
and conventional building methods are as yet inconclusive, local 
t d . . d. + 1 t . . i l f ( 4 u s u ies in ica~e sower cos increases in c1e ·armer. Indus-
trialised building also appeals to clients and builders because it 
cuts down on construction time (in some cases by as much as half) 
which makes direct cost comparisons irrelevant. This is particul~rly 
so if the work is being done in boom conditions when fi :ems are 
under tremendous pressure to complete contracts. In addition to 
these two aspects industrialised building methods also have an 
advantage with respect to quality control. 
90. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This section has presented macro-data to put the con-
struction sector into its proper perspective as far as employment, 
contribution to GDP, investment and cyclical patterns of growth 
are concerned. The sector is relatively small compared to manu-
facturing and the tertiary sector, but it is in itself of substantiaJ 
size with a total present employment of well over 400,000. 
The data has shown that much of all building activity is 
concentrated in the metropolitan areas, even though major civil 
engineering projects have increased the relative significance of 
the rural sector. By concentrating on the Witwatersrand and Cape 
Town areas, this study does therefore capture the situation in the 
metropolitan areas and conclusions can thus be regarded as sig-
nficant in the overall sense. 
Apart from these more general conclusions, certain other 
conclusions emerge which are critically important in explainirtg_the 
White labour shortages which developed in the building industry in 
the 1960's. Firstly, great stress has been laid on the fact that 
the construction sector had an extremely high rate of growth in 
the period under ~onsideration in this study , real output almost 
trebling between 1960 and 1972. Secondly, the labour-iritensity 
and also the skilled labour-intensity of the industry has been 
changing, even though unskilled-labour intensive industrialised 
building techniques were not yet widely in use in the period in 
question. This has meant that the industry has had to grow by in-
creasing its labour inputs relatively faster than its inputs of 
capital equipment. These factors must be considered as an important 
setting for the stresses that developed in the Witwatersrand, as 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, the section has suggested that 
South Africa may be at the brink of major breakthroughs in the 
wider application of unskilled as well as skilled labour-saving 
devices, which will have a major irnpact on labour utilisation and 
the relative bargaining position of the (un)organised labour group. 
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SECTION FIVE 
THE LABOUR MARKET 'IN THE 
WITWATERSRAND BUILDING INDUSTRY 
94. 
This section presents a detailed" analysis of the con-
ditions in the Witwatersrand building industry labour market from 
1960 onwards. It buiJds on the previous secb_on by discussing the 
implications for the labour market of the rapid rate of growth in 
the industry over the period as well as its inability in the short-
term to gainfully use the industrialised system of building. Its 
main aim is to show that the two job colour bars existing, i.e. 
job reservation Determination No. 6 and the Bantu Building Workers' 
Act, which made Whites the only legally-approved source of artisan 
labour to the industry, failed to stand the test of reality. It 
also purports to describe the irrevocable pressure that built up 
to reclassify certain jobs. Thus the analysis in this section may 
be considered a prelude to the discussion in Section 6. 
In Section 5.1 the nature of the demand for labour in 
the industry is discussed. It is shown that the present character 
of the labour force is a direct response to the cyclical nature of 
demand 'in the product market. Section 5.2 deals almost exclusi\.rely 
with the supply of White labour to the industry, particularly with 
respect to apprenticeships. Section 5.3 discusses the stresses that 
arose in the labour market in the 1960's and 1970's ard the con-
traventions in legislation resulting from employer adjustments to 
the shortages of artisan labour. 
5.1 The Deman~ for Labour 
5.1.1 White Labour 
Table 15 shows annual employment of artisans, semi and un-
skilled labour in the Witwatersrand building industry from 1960 
to 1973. For purposes of comparison, the index of employment of 
the total private construction labour force is shown in column (3). 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
i963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
----
Table 15 
( 1) 
Artisans 
10 000 
7 200 
6 400 
8 000 
9 800 
11 400 
11 500 
11 300 
10 100 
11 500 
13 100 
13 200 
11 700 
10 300 
* 1963 = 100 
9 c ::i • 
Eme..~.£Y.~~ent in the _~~2-_t_:·iatersrand 
Buildinq Industrv 1960 - 1973 
-----~-----··-~·--------
----·----------
( 2) ( 3) 
Semiskilled/ Index of Private 
Unskilled Construction 
Labour Labour Force * 
29 000 94,5 
24 000 94,3 
21 000 96,1 
28 000 100,0 
34 000 113,2 
39 000 152,4 
40 000 16 7' 8 
38 000 189,4 
38 000 205,0 
43 000 234,6 
45 000 266,9 
46 700 288,0 
43 100 288,6 
43 000 292,8 
Source : Building Industries Federation South Africa 
(BIFSA), Memorandum for the Information of 
the Industrial Tribunal (1973), p.65 
Table 15 shows substantial fluctuation in the employment 
of labour by the industry. The table shows _empl~nt rather than · 
the de.£C1.and for labour. Actual demand could be greater but not less 
than total employment. Thus, the cyclical tlature of demand in the 
product market as discussed in Section 3, can be seen as reflected 
in the demand for labour. 
The pattern of employment that emerges is one of extreme 
cyclical fluctuation. The industry has experienced three protracted 
slack periods. From 1960 to 1962 the employment of artisans halved 
and it took a further two years for it to return to the level it 
had reached in 1960. This means that in 1962 approximately 3 500 
artisans who worked in the industry in 1960 had found alternative 
employment or were unemployed. Between 1962 and 1966, employment 
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increased steadily and by 1966 was 11 500, almost twice as high 
as it was in 1962. It then dropped to 10 100 in 1968, but increased 
again to 13 200 in 1971. Between 1971 and 1973 artisan employment 
decreased by 2 900 - a drop of 21,9 percent over the two year~·· As 
we can see from Table 15, the trend in semiskilled and unskilled 
employment was almost exactly the same as that of artisans over 
the period. 
Unfortunately neither the building trade unions nor the 
Department of Labour offices in Johannesburg have kept figures on 
unemployment registration of building tradesmen. These figures would 
in any case be too low since many unemployed artisans find work on 
their own through the "grapevine" rather than to register with 
their unions or the Department of Labour. If an artisan finds 
temporary work in another industry, he will not register as unem-
ployed in the building industry either. However, it is still possible 
to get some idea of the amount and duration of unemployment (i.e. 
the inability of an artisan to find work in the Witwatersrand buildin1 
industry) by comparing the numbers employed when labour demand is 
at a peak and at the lowest point in any downturn. Accordingly we 
find that 35,6 percent of the artisans employed in 1960 could not 
find employment in the Witwatersrand building industry in. 1962, and 
that the employment level of 1960 was only reached again in 1964. 
Further, 12 percent of those artisans employed in the industry in 
1966 could not find employment there in 1968 (the 1966 level of 
employment was only reached again in 19C9) and 21,9 percent of the 
artisans employed by the industry in 1971 could not find similar 
employment in 1973. 
We also find that the average number of weeks worked 
annually by artisans is low. The 12 387 artisans who worked in the 
industry in 1974 realised on average only 35,4 working weeks, painters 
realising the lowest number of weeks (31,9) followed by bricklayers 
(33,0), plumbers (36,0), carpenters and joiners (36,5) and plas-
terers (37,5).Cl~ (Please read footnote). A survey of employment 
conditions in the industry between 1955 and 1961 showed that only 
27 percent of artisans worked what could be considered a full year 
( 40 -· 49 weeks) , whilst 30, 9 percent worked between 2 5 - 40 weeks 
. ( 2) 
and 14 percent worked under 10 weeks. - The number of weeks worked 
seems to vary according to the level of total employment of the in-
9 7. 
dustry : Between 1954/55 and 1956/57 (when the value of buildings 
completed in the Transvaal and Orange Free State fell from £55,2 
million to £42,6 million) average man-weeks worked fell from 31,1 
to 27,4. This figure then rose again to 32,4 in 1960. In 1961 the 
average man-weeks worked had dropped back to 27,6.( 3 ) 
The low number of weeks worked by building tradesmen is 
attributable to two other causes of employment instability in the 
industry, viz. unstable demand at the level of the firm and· se~sonal 
factors. At.the level of the firm, "stops" and "starts" in a con-
tractor's workload seldom correlate. The instability of employment 
associated with the temporary nature oi work on a given site is 
related to, but distinct from, fluctuations in total employment, 
and occur when the completion of work at a few large sites is not 
offset by starts elsewhere. On the completion of a contract, the 
builder is in fact faced with two alternatives, i.e. either to lay 
off his workforce and engage new workers when there is work on hand 
again, or to carry his labour force until there are new contracts. 
With regard to seasonal fluctuations in employment, we find that the 
monthly value of buildings completed by the private sector in the 
Witwatersrand metropolitan area from January to December 1973 
flucL1at2d widely, as revealed in the list follovJing (in R millions): 
11,09, 13,57, 16,67, 15,13 13,93, 23,89, 17,62, 17,13, 15~53, 17,96, 
( 4) 17,36 and 14,52. 
Weather conditions also have a ·significant effect upon 
the regularity of work operations in the building industry. This 
seasonal factor in the demand for labour must operate to reduce 
demand in wetter seasons (being t~e summer months on the Witwaters-
rand) and get contractors to shift new contracts to the winter 
months. In passing we may simply note that out of a total of 93 
rainy days in ,Johannesburg in 1973, the monthly average from October 
to March was 12,6, but only 3,3 from April to September.CS) 
The discrete nature of building projects and the 
seasonal variability of output in the industry mean that hiring and 
lay-offs take place much more frequently in building than in other 
industries. Building firms recognise the need for greater flexi-
bility in lay-offs than in other industrieso Workers can be laid 
off at relatively short notice by employers - often a matter of 
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hours or days - although slightly longer notice periods may be 
given to long-service employees. The minimum notice period in the 
Building and Monumental Masonry Industries (Transvaal) Non-Artisans 
Agreement is two days.( 6 ) The average annual labour turnover in 
construction in 1972 was 7,3 White persons engaged per 100 Whites 
employed in 1972, as opposed to 4,6 in manufacturing. Similarly 
there were 7,4 discharges per 100 White employees made in con-
struction in 1972 as opposed to 4,6 in manufacturi~. From 1971 to 
1974 the comparative figures (engagements shown first) for con~ 
( 7 
struction were 6,8 and 7,2, 6,5 and 6,2 and 7,8 and 7.2 respectivelyft 
We can already see that the average building tradesman 
faces a highly insecure existence. Employment fluctuations may either 
result in unemployment or in the movement of tradesmen to other 
industries. The high s~asonal and cyclical fluctuations in building 
work are thought to account for the short-term movement of tradesmen 
between building and other industries. Of particular significance 
is the movement to skilled occupations in other industries and 
back, depending on the state of employrnpnt in building. Table 16 
shows the distribution of unemployed time. An artisan who has not 
purchased a stamp from the industrial council in any one week is 
considered unemployed by the 9uilding industry for that week. The 
table is based on a sample of artisans who did not work a full year 
for the Witwatersrand building industry in 1963. It is drawn from 
a manpower study conducted by the C.S.I.R. in this period. The 
average number of weeks worked by the sample was 29,9. 
Table 16 : Distribution of Unempl~d Time. 
Reason why no ~tamps received 
Worked for an organisation outside 
the building industry 
Sick or injured 
Unemployed 
Self-employed 
Holiday/unpaid leave 
Worked outside the jurisdiction of 
the building industrial council (Tvl) 
Reasons unspecified 
% of all week-s in which no 
starnps received 
27,3 
21,9 
16,8 
12,8 
6,9 
3,7 
10,6 
100,0 
Source l'lational Development Fund for the- Building Industry, 
Studies of Manpower in the Building Industry, p.82. 
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According to the study, 36, 4 percent of the artisans in the sample: 
h d . . 11 1 f' 1 . . t b ;.;.. k (B) a origina y e. t tie indus-ry ecause c11ere was no more war • 
Another 27,6 percent had left the industry as a result of sickness 
or an industrial accident.(g) We fihd from the table that 27,3 
percent of the "unemployed" time spent was spent working for organ-
isations outside the building industry. The areas of "outside" 
employment are not limited to any occupation or industry and include 
work on the railways and mines, in factories and in Government 
service. Fully 44,0 percent of the tradesmen who worked for other 
. t. d . t. 1 . - . f-f t t. ( lO) organisa ions were engage in some en ire y di ·eren occupa ion. 
The average artisan in the sample was unemployed (in 
the true meaning of the word) for 16,8 percent of every working year 
(8 weeks, excluding the holiday period). This unemployment is 
proba.bly linked to the resistance of most artisans to work away from 
home. No major firm operates on a nation-wide basis. The general 
secretary of the Industrial Council said that even within the Wit-
watersrand region, some tradesmen would only work on projects within 
the vicinity of the suburbs in which they lived. This is borne out 
by the results of another manpower study undertaken by the C.S.I.R. 
on behalf of the building industty. The study found that in an 
eight-year period from 1955/l<J56 - 1961/1962, 73 percent of the 
artisans from a sample had not changed their centre of employment 
. ( 11) 
once, whilst only 14 percent had moved from another province. 
The other category in the table accounting for a higb 
number of man-weeks lost to the industry is "sick and injured". 
Injury in particular is an important occupational hazard in build-
ing. This is discussed in Section 5.2.1.2. 
The sharp ~on.traction in building from 1961 td 1963 
brought about a steep decline in artisan employment and a permanent 
loss of artisans to other sectors. BIFSA estimated that out of a 
skilled labour force of 15 000 in 1960 on the Witwatersrand and in 
Pretoria, approximately 5 000 had abandoned their trades permanently 
( 12) by 1964. Resear~h carried out in 1961, showed that 5 200 of 
.. ,.. .... 
the 21 320 men on- the records of the Witwatersrand building in~ 
dustrial council (including Pretoria) in that year had no working 
. d . th th . d t f t ( 13 ) Th. tt -recor wi. e in u~· ry or wo years or more. _is pa- ern of 
events appears to have been repeated more recently. We would expect 
that the longer the period of unemployment, the more likely artisans 
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are to le~ve the industry perManently. Put differently, the industry 
is more likely to lose artisans permanently during cyclical rather 
than during seasonal fluctuations. Many tradesmen have been forced 
to leave the building sector during 1976, according to the general 
secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers.Cl4 ) 
The ability of building tradesmen in the past to find 
work in other sectors of the economy has not detracted from the 
desire of the unions to stabilize or increase the number of jobs 
available for local artisans. In February 1976 the general secretary 
of the Blankebouwerkersvakbond predicted that because. of the slump 
in building activities the Government was considering denying work 
permits to refugees from Mocambique in order to protect local 
artisans. ( 15 ) 
The loss of 5 000 artisans to the Witwatersrand industry l 
between 1961 and 1963 was an important cause of the artisan shortage 
that developed afterwards. There is little doubt that this pattern 
has been repeated since then, although the number of retrenchments 
is still smaller. This point will be discussed in the context of 
White labour shortages in Section 5.2.1. 
A very real reason for the building unions' opposition 
to job fragmentation is that, handing over work to African semi-
skilled workers to cope with artisan labour shortages during a boom, 
has meant less work to go round when employment opportunities shrink. 
Since the buildi~g unions are craft and not industrial unions, 
their strategy is to oppose any reclassification of artisan work 
if this means less work to go round during a slump. Major fragrnen·-
tation agreements in the Witwatersrand industry have been made on 
the unde~standing that these newly-created semiskilled jobs could 
be reclassified as "artisan work",as a cushion against shrinking 
employment opportunities for artisans. This will be referred to in 
Section 6.4.3al. 
5.1.2 African Labour 
\ 
The figures in Table 15 ~how that there was a 50 percent I 
l 
increase in African employment in the industry between 1960 and / 
1973. This figure underestimates the de facto growth in African 
employment if account is taken of African workers illegally 
I 
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employed in the city. 
Although labour bureau are still important instruments 
in effecting influx control' policy, they have not been able to stem 
the flow of illegal work-seekers into the cities. A look at pass law 
contraventions gives a clear indication of this. Wilson notes that 
in 1964 there were 373· 000 known contraventions, compared to 479 000 
in 1966, 693 700 in 1968, 632 100 in 1969 and 621 400 in 1970. (l6 ) 
Since the promulgation of the Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) 
of 1968 in terms of which an African may not leave his homeland 
unless he is registered at the tribal labour office, there has been 
a slight decrease in the number of offences, but it is still ex-
traordinarily high. 
We also have to consider the special role played by the 
construction sector in developing countries in the recruitment of 
illegal workseekers. Howe, in his study of urban employment in 
China, concludes 
''·· we find that there was an acute contradiction in 
construction labour management arising from the 
conflict between short-run cost objectives on the 
one hand, and employment and population control ob-
jectives on the other. For the pressure to minimise 
costs caused enterprises to respond to fluctuat~ons 
by maintaining a high labour turnover and by having 
a high proportion of temporary workers in their work 
gangs. Thus the idea] construction worker was a peasant 
with seasonal availability and secondary sources of 
income (from agriculture). The effect of this was to 
make the c~nstruction industry a major channel for 
illicit miyrants to enter the urban labour force ••• 11 (17) 
The similarity with the results of this study are striking. The 
following picture emerges from published information obtained 
through discussions with builders and from the general secretary 
of the industrial council. In building operations unskilled labour 
requirements vary considerably as the job progresses. Since the 
skill required for unskilled work is low, th~ unskilled gang will 
do many different types of jobs and will be moved to different types 
of work as the stages of operations dictate.Unskilled labour require-
ments vary as the job progresses, ~or example, excavation and con-
creting are unskilled, labour-intensive jobs whilst finishing 
work is normally sl<.illed-labour intensive~ The essential feature 
of such a system is the requirement that labour be readily available 
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when needed (i.e. that it can be hired directly on site for a few 
days or weeks) and quickly disposed of depending on shifts in 
seasonal demand and the phase of the job. The labour force, in 
other words, must be able to be readily expanded and contracted to 
supplement a stable core of permanent workers. There must also be a 
body of workers prepared to work by these rules. 
Using the same reasoning, the industry is less well 
suited to accommodate contract labour. Since the actual cost of 
labour recruitment is high and is analogous to fixed costs, it 
serves no purpose if the contract has to be broken by the employer 
before the conventional one year period is up, to be started all 
over again (altt_o.ugh one firm pays its workers a subsistence 
allowance instead of breaking the contract). As the time span over 
which labour is required decreases, the fixed costs to a builder 
of using contract labourers will rise. This argument does not apply 
to the firms in the industry with a continuous workload or those 
which can move labour from one site to another. 
The supply of hostel accommodation also makes it difficul~i) 
to fulfil labour requirements "legally" (i.e. by using statutory I 
methods of recruiting migrant workers). Some firms are unable to get, 
quotas for hostel beds sufficient for their labour force. One of the 1 
large construction companies, at its own expense, has built a hostel 
/ in Soweto for its African workers. Another firm studied had 600 
African manual workers, but a bed quota of only 300. This accenc11ates 
the practice of illegal hiring, and it also leads to the questionable 
practice of workers living secretly on building sites. 
Another important drawback of the contract labour system 
for the builder is that labour is not obtainable at short notice. 
This is important for the industry as it requires its labour at 
short notice. The legal procedure for an African to be placed in 
some urban-centred work is as follows :(lB) The employer informs 
the district labour bureau of a vacancy; the applicant will be told 
he will have to wait for a period to see if the vacancy can be filled 
by a local workseeker; the bureau in turn looks to those Africans 
who are registered as unemployed at the bureau. If a suitable African 
is found, the employer and the African nrust wait for three to six 
weeks for permission to come through, whereupon the African is sent 
\ 
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to the employer. At the end of builders' holidays delays are even 
longer. The law requires ~:hat medical tests be conducted on contract 
workers before they are employed. Since there are too few doctors in 
the homelands some rirms have to spend up to six weeks doing their 
I own testing at the start of each year.(lg)As noted, the employers must also specify exactly where their employees will be housed be-
\ fore permission is granted. 
\ 
............. 
In practice the procedure is different in many building 
firms. Many workers come to the city without pre-arranged employment, 
and only after finding employment are they registered at the labour 
bureau concerned. A chief culprit in this regard is the employer 
who, in order to take advantage of the lower wage demands of the 
illegal workseeker, employs them and then only later, if ever, 
registers them. 
It would appear that there is a meshing of requirements 
between employers ancd illegal work seekers. Builders experience 
difficulties caused by influx control in regard to the supply of 
African labour. They employ a large proportion of casual labourvaryin~ 
to the work in hand at any given time and labour bureaux can 
frequently not meet the demand. Furthermore if this is discovered, it 
is the African and not the employer who is prosecuted (although 
this will depe!ld to some extent on how the contravention is dis-. 
covered). The employer has no responsibility for finding sleeping 
accommodation nor any of the other costs of recruitement, including 
rail fares. Illegal workseekers on the other hand can be hired on 
the building site at little or no cost. This was illustrated by one 
employer who chose from three or four workers coming round every day 
and a second who relied on his staff to recruit workers for him 
according to his daily requirements at a particular spot in the 
townships (apparently widely known for this purpose). 
To the illegal workseeker who knows that he can usually 
get short term unskilled work in the industry with a chance of being 
registered later, and that he stands a 12sser chance of being caught 
on a building site than in a factory, the building·industry is an 
important channel for entry to the urban labour force~ 
It would appear that illicit hiring accelerated to such 
an extent that the inspectorate though under considerable pressure, 
! 
i 
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cannot effectively control the practic~ by regulalr checks and raids. 
In 196 7 it was es ti.mated for the Wi twa te rs rand t~at up to 50_ perc::.2:1 t 
of African workers on building sites were being employed illegally~ZO) 
Unregistered workers probably bear the brunt of retrench-
ments in the industry. They will not appear as official retrench-
ments since they work without official contracts and therefore do 
not appear in the wage records. Conversely, when they are engaged 
they work without any formal contract. The effect of this is to 
underestimate the swings that occur in African employment as re-
vealed in Table 15. In 1972 the number of engagements and discharges 
of African workers (per 100 Africans employed) was 4.7 and 4,6 
respectively. The same figures for the manufacturing sector were 
4,5 and 4,2.( 2l) This could mean either that African labour turn-
over in manufacturing is about the same as in construction or, 
rather, that a substantial number of engagements and discharges are 
not recorded. 
By all accounts illegal workers are doing semiskill~d. 
work in the industry. However, given the risks of employing an 
illegal worker on skilled work, a weeding-out process ensues once 
the worker has been hired : those that are proficient are given semi-
skilled work and then registered. Whilst the builder has DOthing to 
lose if the worker is unskilled, the investment in skilis can be 
quite high (e.g. crane drivers) and it is unli.kely that a builder 
will risk having a large proportion of his semiskilled workers un-
registered. For the same reason, buildeLS often carry a force of 
key operatives and semiskilled workers during a slump. 
5.1.3. Coloured Labour 
In the period studied there have always been a small 
number of Coloured artisans in the industry. This number has remained 
,, 
: small and has not fluctuated much. In 1971 it was estimated that only 
J 
t 4,2 percent of all artisans in the Transvaal were Coloured persons. ( 2 2 ) 0 . t . b t. . D t . t . N 6 ti.. . b h wing -o JO reserva ion e ermina ion o. , .11is num er as 
always been smaller than it would have been without these res-
trictions. 
Employers, . however, won cone es s ions with respect to the use 
of Coloured labour in 197i when employers were granted certain ex-
emptions from Determination No. 6. Employers in the Transvaal and 
the Orange Free State are currently (from mid-1975) free to employ 
Coloured labour on any skilled work but no long-term trend in de-
mand has yet emerged because there is currently a shortage of Col-
oured artisans in the area. ~he total Coloured population in th~ 
Transvaal is rather small and there are other impediments, e.g. 
housing. The u.tilisation of Coloured labour in the industry is 
discussed in detail in Se~tion 6.3 
5.2 The Supply of Labour 
5.2.1 White Labour 
I I 
/. 
I 
At the outset it must be clearly stated that we are 
looking only at shortages of White manual labour (i.e.· artisans a.nd 
foremen). It is the supply of White manual workers that is the 
relevant variable effecting Black occupational advancement. The 
building industry employs Whites at two levels : on manual work and 
at the management-mid management level. The latter category includes 
quantity surveyors, draughtsmen, etc. The needs of the industry ~t 
management and mid-management level have always been effectively 
' d f b W" . t d. d t ( 2 3 ) S. th . t d t. . t· catere ·or y ill e can i a es. ince _ .e in-ro uc-ion in ne 
indus~ry of building science, construction supervisor and general 
foreman courses (the latter two part-time at technical c,o Ileges) 
there has been no need to rely on artisans to fulfil these functions. 
5.2.1.1 Apprenticeship Intake 
The apprenticeship system is the most important channel 
for entry to skilled trades in the industry. There are statistics 
available on ~he estimated apprenticeship requirements of the in-
dustry. A statistical manpower study conducted by the industry, 
estimated that between 1964 and 1980 the demand for skilled building 
labour on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria would double, necessi-
tating an annual average increase in artisan manpower of approximately 
700 t , · :1 ( 24 ) Th. b t k t h t man years over .ne perioc. is can e a en -o meant~ 
the industry needs to indenture roughly the same number of first-
year apprentices each year to satisfy its skilled labour require-
ments. Table 17 shows the tremendous shortfall in first-year 
apprentices indentured in the Witwatersrand area between 195J. and 1~72 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Source 
106. 
Table 17 First-Year ~_entices on the 
Witwatersrand 1951-1972 
Number Year Number Year Number Year Number 
648 
618 
570 
610 
524 
280 
1957 413 1962 59 1967 64 
1958 386 1963 69 1968 72 
1959 358 1964 107 1969 104 
1960 400 1965 107 1970 91 
1961 101 1966 127 1971 92 
1972 61 
1) National Development Fund for the Building Industry, 
Studies of Manpower in the Building Industry, p.67. 
2) BIFSA. Memorandum for the Information of the 
Indusfrial Tribunal (1973), p.65. 
From at least as far back as 1951 the industry has b~en /1 
I' unable to meet its skilled labour requirements through the normal 
apprenticeship channels. Figures for first-year apprentices probably, 
overestimate by a substantial amount the number that remain in the 
indu~try. The usual wastage rate among first-year apprentices is fi 
hl ' ( 2 5) L' th th t • ' • . . • lj roug y one quarter. LUr ermore, - e appren 1cesn1p require-
ments shown above were calculated in man yea~s, but we have seen 
that the average building artisan works roughly 35 weeks annually. 
Included among first-year building appr~atices are those who will 
eventually work in all other industries employing building tradesmen. 
It has been traditional practice to regist0.r all building trade 
apprenticeships in the building industry. Thus we find private con-
struction in this country employs only 70 percent of all building 
trade artisans~< 25 > Civil engineering in 1970 employed roughly 
4 500 out of the total skilled construction labour force of 45 000~? 7 l 
, I 
thus roughly another 10 percent of apprentices that qualify will 
leave the industry. 
It would appear that the poor apprenticeship intake in 
the building industry is a result of the relative unpopularity of 
the building trades among prospective apprentices as well as the 
general White manpower shortage in the economy. In 1961 the ratio 
of \filhite apprentices to artisans in building and contracting was 
' 
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lower than in three other major industries (metal and engineering, 
motor and furniture).< 2 B) More recent evidence comes from the 
Department of Labour's Manpower surveys. The statistics in Table 18 
are drawn from these reports and refer to White artisans and appren-
tices in designated trades in all industries throughout the country. 
The table shows three different time periods and three different 
indicators of labour shortage : vacancies for artisans as a percen-
tage of the artisan labour force in the building trades and in all 
non-building trades; the number of apprentices per artisan are 
shown in the same way, and the percentage of apprenticeship posts 
unfilled. 
Table 18 : Labour Shortages in 
Designated Trades 
196 9--19 7 3 
Manpower Survey 
No.8(30/4/69) 
Building 
All trades 
Manpower Survey 
No.9(30/4/71) 
Building 
All trades 
Manpower Survey 
No.10(27/4/73) 
Building 
All trades 
Artisan 
vacancies 
as a % of 
all artisans 
12,88 
8,8'-3 
16,95 
10,22 
9,34 
7,18 
5.2.1.2 Occupational Preferences 
Apprentices 
per Artisan 
0,09 
o,23 
O,l 
0,22 
0,1 
% of Appren·-
ticeship posts 
unfilled 
13,0 
5,37 
22,74 
9,6 
9,18 
7,59 
The unstable employment c6nditions in the industry deter 
many boys from becoming apprenticed in a building trade. This was 
cited in one South African study of attitudes towards careers in 
the industry as the major cause of dissatisfaction among potential 
. ( 29) 
recruits. There ~s no permanency in the sense that artisans 
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never know how long a job will last. The possibility of unemployment 
is very real for every building tradesman, irrespective of the 
quality of his work or the tenure of his service. 
Working conditions in the industry are difficult. The 
usual characteristics. of building sites - working at great heights, 
movement of heavy materials, temporary installations like gangways 
and a large complement of unskilled workers - each have an element 
of danger. In 1969 the construction sector - after agriculture and 
the iron and steel industry - had the third highest number of in-
dustrial accidents in the country, costing the industry some 
R2,05 million.< 3o) Construction workers made up 5,6 percent of the 
total labour force in that year, but construction accidents accounted 
for 16,4 percent of all fatal and 9,1 percent of all permanently 
d . bl. . d .f- • '1 • d t ( 31 ) isa ing in us~ria_ acci en s. 
The variability in location of building sites requires 
that workers and managers be highly mobile and rural projects 
require that the workforce maihtain temporary living quarters away 
from home. Recreation facilities are closely conditioned by the 
temporary nature of jobs and the relatively small size of the units 
operating in the industry. It is consequently difficult to provide 
welfare conditions comparable to those in factory employment. Em-
ployers are generally obligated to provide e.g. changerooms where 
there are more than 10 employees on a job. Facilities such as 
messrooms need only be provided on large sites. 
The weather also poses a variety of problems to workers 
and managers, at least for exposed operations. There is, for artisans, 
loss of time due to bad weather. A distinctive group of rules 
provide some degree of insurance against full loss of wages attrib-
utable to periods of unfavourable weather conditions, over and 
above the compensation normally for loss of wages arising from 
unemployment. 
The most serious shortages of apprentices have been in 
bricklaying, plastering and painti0gd These trades require hard 
physical labour and most parts of these jobs are arduous and 
repetitive, e.g. the application of plaster to walls. Employers 
also aggravate the status fears of White workers in these trades 
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by claiming in support of arguments that Black workers should be 
trained for these posts that the work is less skilled than that in I 
other building trade so 'rhe "wet 11 trades, plastering and bricklaying, 
show proportionally lower recruitement and higher wast.age rates 
than the technical trades of plumbing, electrical wireman and 
joinery.( 32 ) In 1966 only seven White bricklaying and plastering 
apprentices were indentured in the whole of the Transvaal. <33 ) In 
the period 1967-1969, only thirty-seven new apprentices were in-
dentured in these trades in the provincea ( 34 ) This is despite the 
fact that bricklayers and plasterers constitute about 40 percent 
. ( 3 5) 
of all tradesmen in the industry. It has been shown that 45 
percent of all White apprentices registered in building trades in 
recent years have been indentured in the trade of electrical wire-
man. 
( 35a) 
5.2.1.3 Inflow of Artisans through other Channels 
One important source ofbuilding artisans has been 
immigration. It was estimated, for instance, that in 1973 50 percent 
of artisans on the Witwatersrand were immigrc.nts from the United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Mocambique and Angola. ( 36 ) It is reported that 
20 490 building trade immigrants entered the country between July 
1963 and June 1973 although a number took up employment outside the 
' • ld • • d t ( 3 7 ) U d d • t • f '•Th• t .I-• l b Dui. ing in us ry. n er con i ions o vv i· e ar~isan a our 
shortage, temporary work permits have also been more freely granted 
to foreign artisans. A. number of these workers have however only 
come because of political or economic factors in their own country 
and their: entry or exit from the industry cannot be· predicted with 
any accuracy. It is, for example, estimated that 599 immigrant 
artisans left the Witwatersrand industry permanently in the boom 
. ( 3 8) period September 1970 - June 1972. 
Some of these workers have been recruited by local 
organizations. Individual major contractors in the Witwatersrand 
area formed a consortium (in the early 1970's) which employed a 
private immigration recruitment organisation to bring in artisans 
as permanent immigrants. These workers were initially for their 
own use but in fact benefited the industry at large. 
During the 1960's the Building Industries Federation 
I 
I 
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South Africa established two funds - financed by levies on 
employers - solely for the purpose of recruiting labour for the 
industry. The Building Industries Recruitment and Training Fund 
(BIRTF) confines its activities to the training and recruitment of 
labour up to craft level. The National Development Fund for the 
Building Industry concentrates on recruitm2nt at university and 
advanced technical levels. BIRTF advertises extensively overseas 
fer artisans and has on five occasions - twice to the Netherlands 
and three times to the United Kingdom - deputed and financed a 
representative to provide information to prospective building trade 
immigrants. It is estimated that this programme has cost BIFSA 
almost R80 000, but only 891 artisans were brought into the country ( 39) 
under the BIFSA scheme between September l970 and June 1972. 
BIFSA has also sought to train persons (other than minors), 
who cannot be enrolled under the Apprenticeship Act, to be artisans. 
In July 1971 it established a special centre in the Transvaal to 
train Whites over 21 years of age as bricklayers, plasterers and 
carpenters. The scheme was later extended to persons at least 19 
years of age. This necessitated the Minister of Labour exempting 
the industry from the provision in the Apprenticeship Act regarding 
the maximum age of o.pprentices. This was the first tLde that the 
Department of Labour had given positive recognition to ·the problems 
experienced by the building industry, in competition with other 
avenues of employment, in the recruitment of apprentices in these 
three trades. 
The present training scheme is 18 months and is divided 
into two phases : fourteen weeks intensive formal training at the 
centre in Baragwanath near Johannesburg and the balance of the 18 
month period in the service of an employer. The salaries of ~an-
\ 
dictates who enrol for initial training at the centre are paid by 
the Building Industries Recruitment and Training Fund. In the past 
the industrial council conducted a simple test after which the 
learner is accorded full artisan status. 
When viewed as a.measur~ to compensate for poo~ apprentice-
ship intake through regular channels, the scheme has had little 
success. Between July 1971 and December 1974 only 349 learners 
qualified as artisans. This was composed of 121 carpenters (including 
I 
• 
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42 minors), 92 plasterers (29 minors) and 136 bricklayers (36 
mincrs). 40) Up to the end of 1973, there were 1 002 applicants of 
whom only 318 were ~cceptable in terms of aptitude and motivation. 
By the very nature of the scheme, it has attracted many applicants 
who are unsuitable for regular employment. According to reports 
from the Durban, Bloemfontein and Witwatersrand Master Builders' 
Associations at the end of 1973, only 57 percent of the learners 
placed in employment in these areas were still engaged ~n the 
industry. It is estimated that the cost to the industry per qualified 
candidate, including the wastage factor referred to, has been in 
excess of Rl 000. C4l) 
This method of circumventing the Apprenticeship Act in 
order to increase the number of Whites taking up employment in the 
building industry is not a totally new expedien~. COTT (Central 
Organisation of Technical Training) for example came into existence 
( 42) . 
after the war. Its aim was to start the training of ex-volunteeis 
with special emphasis given to training in building trades due to 
the accomodation shortage during this period and the low number of 
bullding apprentices who 11ad been indentured during the war. One 
aim was to provide intensive training, both practical and theoretical, 
covering a short period, which would then fit into th~ general 
framework of apprenticeship. The training period for b~icklayers, 
plasterers and painters was 17 weeks, whilst that·for carpenters and 
plumbers was 19 weeks. The original intention of the scheme was to 
train 5 000 ex-"1;lunteers. 
5.3.1.4 Adjustments in Hiring Standards 
The schemes described above may also be interpreted as 
a move on the part of employers, trade unions and the Government 
to recognise as artisans those who have undergone training inferior 
in quality to that provided through the normal apprenticeship 
channels. Important changes in this direction have also been made in 
the conditions of apprenticeship in the industry. In 1970 the length 
of apprenticeship in all building trades wo.s reduced from 5 to 4 
(43) years. The only exception was the trade of electrical wireman 
in which the period of apprenticeship remains 5 years. 
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Secondly, it appears that many prospective White 
r apprentices without the minimum educational qualification required 
\ . ( 44) by the Act for entry to a trade have nevertheless been indentured. 
An analysis of the education standards of the 1 134 apprentices 
under contract in Durban at the end of 1972 revealed that applications 
for exemptions from the minimum education qualification had to be 
obtained for 45 percent of the 199 White apprentices employed in 
the industry at the time.< 45 ) On the other hand, all but 5 of the 
1 015 Coloured and Asian apprentices in the industry at the tim~ had 
attained the minimum education qualification of Std. 7. 
In attempts to comply with job reservation restrictions, 
employers have been forced to employ White artisans of poor quality. 
For instance between 1954 and 1961 it has been estimated that only 
28 percent of all White building apprentices in the country qualified 
fully, i.e. having passed their trade tests, the rest having become 
artisans automatically after serving 5 years' apprenticeship. <45 ) 
This figure was-estimated to be 34,l percent (all races) in 1974.< 47 > 
This means many artisans have a very poor knowledge of the theoret-
ical aspects of their trade. 
Possibly the most i.nteresting question is the extent to 
which the trade unions have sought to operate a policy of insisting 
on apprenticeships as a precondition for practicing as an a~tisan 
in the trade. In discussions with officials at the industrial 
council, it was found to be not uncommon for a man to work as a 
tradesman without having completed his apprenticeship. This occurs 
particularly in bricklaying, tiling u.nd plastering 1 but above all 
in painting. This is known as the 'back door' entrance to the 
trades: workers who have acquired skills - sometimes those who 
move from the country to town - may be accepted by the union and 
given a ticket. A recent study has argued that this practice is 
• • th w t c b • - d • • d t ( 43 ) 0 th T,J • t occurring in e es ern .ape. uii ing in us:ry. n - e ~1 -
\I 
I 
~ 
watersrand this has occurred frequently with immigrant artisans, 
many of whom arrived largely untrained. The unions apparently have 
been quite happy to take them - both to perpetuate the myth that the 
industry has enough White artisans and to increase fees from member-
ship. 
Thus it could be argued that an important trend operating 
113. 
in the White labour market during the 1960's was the decrease in 
efficiency, brought about by "sucking" less skilled workers into 
the labour force. Almost all the contractors and professional men 
approached during 1969 in a survey conducted by Evenwel stated 
'that the standard of skilled building labour had deteriorated 
1 . 1 d . tl . f. ' ( 49 ) I 19 75 t· P . a arming~y uring 1e previous ive years·. n ne resi-
dent of the Witwatersrand Master Builders and Allied Trades' 
Association stated publicly that there was a shortage of 3 000 
skilledi competent artisans on the Reef and in Pretoria alo~e.< 5o) 
This implies that approximately 30 percent of the artisans working in 
the industry that year were probably not meeting the production 
standards demanded of them, but were demanding wages equal to those 
paid to good quality labour. Clearly, under pressure of demand 
less experienced workers had to be drawn into the industry. Further, 
under the time payment (as opposed to piecework) system of remun-
eration used to pay artisans in the industry, no automatic adjustment 
mechanism operates to link wage levels to productivity. 
5.3.1.5 Withdrawals from the Industry 
As a result of the low apprenticeship intake in the past 
20 ye3rs, the number of artisans who leave the industry every year 
due to permanent disability, having reached retirement age, early 
retirement or death is strikingly high. The number of artisan 
withdrawals from the industry in selected years from 1963 to 1972 
is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19 : Withdrawals from the Buildinq Industry 1963--1972 
Year Death Normal Early Permanent Total 
Petiremen t Retiremen!:: Disability 
1963 123 127 Not Not 250 
a v0.i lab le available 
1965 151 100 rt II 251 
1968 170 166 86 50 472 
1969 161 133 146 48 488 
1970 184 145 169 49 547 
1971 249 419 59 40 767 
1972 232 389 74 79 774 
Total 1 2 70 1 479 534 266 3 549 
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To see these figures in their proper perspective, we must look at 
the size of the artisan labour force. For example, during 1972 when 
the number of withdrawals was 774 the artisan labour force on the 
Witwatersrand was estimated to be 11 700 (Table 15). 
It is a.lso .interesting to note that the number of with-
drawals due to normal retirements has risen sharply over the years. 
Whilst it was 127 in 1963, it had risen to 389 by 1972. The number 
of artisans who will leave the industry due to normal retirement in 
1980 is estimated to be 460. C5l) 
Another perspective on the withdrawal of artisans from 
the industry can be obtained by looking at the average age of the 
labour force. AccGrding to the Federated Employers' Insurance Co. 
Ltd., which administers the industry's pension £und, 7 136 (or 54 
percent) of the 13 100 artisans working under the industrial council's 
jurisdiction in 1970 were between the age of 50 and 65.< 52 > 
In recent years these withdrawals have exceeded by a 
wide margin the number of apprentice~ and learners entering the 
industry which must mean a net decrease in the number of artisans in 
the industry. This can be seen quite clearly by compa~ing the figures 
in Table 19 with those in Tabl~ 17 and with the number of learners 
entering the industry (Section 5.2.1.3). 
The large number of immigrants that have supplemented 
the inflow of a1·+.isans to the industry htlve in no way been a pre-
dictable inflow and, what • • J_ ' is more imporLant, this inflow stabilised 
in 1974 and is not expected to contribute as greatly to the in-
dustry's skilled manpower in the future. At the end of 1973 the 
Witwatersrand Master Builders' Association concluded : 
"It has become evident that recruitment of immigrant 
artisans, the training of learner artisans and the 
acceptance of apprentices will not be sufficient to 
provide the industry with the requJ_red skilled man-
power needed to execute construction wcrk expected 
from the building industry1' e ( 53) 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, the attempts by organised 
employers to comply with job reservation restrictions should not be 
underestimated. As has been pointed out, these attempts have been 
made with the greatest sincerity. BIFSA l"!as embarked on a number of 
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extensive manpower research programmes in addition to its more 
practical efforts to alleviate the skilled labour shortage. Up to 
the end of 1973, the total cost of this programme was estimated to 
b• Rl "lJ" CS 4 ) Th' . 1 d d t-' ' 'd' . +-h e over mi .ion. · is inc u e appren _ice su0si ies, ~ e 
Ba.ragwanath Centre, immigration, recruitment and research studies 
and the subvention of university and technical courses. 
These efforts have partly been th~ result of two 
external pressures operating on the organisation. The first is 
the attitude taken by the Department of Labour when the organised 
industry made an initial approach to the Department concerning a 
relaxation of job reservation restrictions. It would appear that 
suggested alternative sources of White labour be investigated be-
fore any adjustment to existing work reservations were made. An 
executive in the industry has said : 
"In the past we have gone to the a.uthorities with our 
problems on the supply of skilled labour, we have been 
told to train, become more productive, mechanise, in-
dustrialise, recruit and so forth. We have complied 
with these requests, usually at a great cost to our 
industry, and in the case of training and recruiting, 
under present legislation, we are rapidly coming to 
the end of available resources". (55) 
Secondly, this policy was probably interpreted as an 
act of faith on the part of organised employers by union leaders. 
For unless a concerted effort had first been made to recruit from 
all legally approved sources, it is doubtful whether the unions would 
have agreed to negotiate over labour rationalisation at all. By 
all accounts, this strategy has been followed despite the ·fore-
sight the organised industry probably had that it was working 
against an inevitable trend. In the final analysis it appears to 
be an integral part of the negotiations leading to Black 6ccupational 
mobility in the industry and progably served to strengthen the 
bargaining hand of employers at negotiations. 
5.2.2 African Labour 
The supply of African labour to the industry, consisting 
of legal and illegal labour, in terms of their right to reside in 
the area, will not be discussed separately. This has already been 
touched on in Section 5.1.2 when contract labour procedures were 
discussed. The topic will be discussed implicitly again when the 
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question of wage determination is discussed ln Section 8. 
5.2.3 Coloured Labour 
A discussion of the supply of Coloured labour to the 
industry will be deferred until Section 6.3 where the scope for 
Coloured building members in the Transvaal is discussed. 
5.3 Labour Market Stresses in the 1960's and 1970's 
The White labour shortages discussed in Section 5.2.1 
manifested themselves at two levels in the industry. These shortages 
firstly revealed themselves through imbalances in the industry's 
labour cost structure and secondly, in day-to-day recruiting and 
organisational problems in the labour market. 
5.3.1 Increases in White Labour Costs 
In the 1960's the building industry, in common with all 
major productiop sectors of the economy, experienced a rapid increase 
in labour costs per unit output. This was due to a widening gap 
between average labour earnings and real output per worker. It is 
estimated that in the construction sector labour costs per unit 
output more than doubled betw::en 1961 and 1970, whereas increases 
of only 24 and 28 percent were experienced in manufacturing and 
. . ( t 1 d. . . ) ( 5 6 ) I 1 ' . . 1 b ' mining excep go~ mining • n go a mining, average a our cos~s 
per unit output actually declined during the first half of the decade. 
It is estimated that building costs were rising more 
than twice as fast as the retai 1 price index. According to Borcken--
hagen and Lauw, a firm of quantity surveyors, the retail price 
\ index rose by 80 percent from 1963-1975 whilst the building cost 
\ index increased by a startling 183 percent over the same period. CS 7 ) 
These trends already give some insight into ~he process 
of adjustment that was to be :followed by employers, since labour 
costs per unit outp1J.t could have bee·n lowered by substituting 
cheaper Bla~k labour for more expensive White labour. 
The large gap in construction was reinforced by a 
decline in real output per worker from 100 to 75 between 1961 and 
1970 (1961 = 100), whilst the national average rose frcm 100 to 
. ( 58) 125 over the same period. 
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Analysing labour ccsts in greater detail, we find that 
whilst the total price index for building rose from 100 to 151 
from 1963-1972 (1963 = 100), the building materials price index 
rose from 100 to only 129 in this period. On the other hand, the 
price index of labour over this period increased from 100 to li3.(Sg) 
Marshall argued that a crucial determinant of the elas-
ticity of demand for union labour was the proportion that union 
labour bore to all labour costs. The higher this proportion-the 
greater the impact of wage increases to this group on labour costs. 
As we have argued, the greater too the pressure to rationalise the 
labour structureo As Kessel put it 
"In the construction sector all wages make up 31 per-
cent of all total costs; 10 percent is accounted for 
by African wages, 4,6 percent by other non-White wages 
and 16,4 percent by White wages". (60) 
Incidentally ~he share of total wages in total costs in manufacturing 
hl 20 t • t' ( 61 ) mh t • f was roug y percen in ne same year. i_ e propor ion o .. 
White labour costs in total costs is higher on the Witwatersrand· 
because of an almost complete absence of Coloured labour( 11 other 
non-White labour!') there. 
In the period 1962-1966, a weighted average of .White 
building artisans' average hourly earnings on the Witwatersrand 
increased by 44,6 percent whilst this increase was only 23,1 per-
(62) 
cent in the case of labourers. Thus during this period White 
wage increases were exerting greater pressure than African wages 
on overall labour costs. In the period 1968-19 72, however, we find 
that artisan wages on the Witwatersrand rose by only 40 percent 
('"')) 
whilst those of labourers rose 60 percent. 0 ~ In this period 1 then, 
the impact of White wage increases on labour costs would still have 
been the same as that of Black wage increases, because of the 
higher proportion of White wages in the total wage bill. These 
changes must have influenced employers to try and reduce the rate 
of increase in White wages to stop the rapid increase in labour 
costs. 
One of the most important reasons why the increases in 
wages in the White labour market was unsatisfactory was because 
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contracts were negotiated up to the beginning of 1973 with con-
tractual clauses allowing for statutorr increases in wages (and 
certain building materials) rather than average increases in these 
prices. ·The earliest cost escalation clauses written into tender 
documents provided that the owner should pay for any statutory ·cost 
increases in labour, steel and cement, which occurred whilst a 
contract was still in progress, i.e. payment over and above the 
tender price. Whilst this was agreed to in all public sector con-
tracts, builders did this unilaterally in the private sector. Apart 
from the fact that builders were not granted these concessions on 
many price-controlled materials, these rules did not accommodate 
increases in the so-called "all-inclusive market cost of labour". 
This was especially necessary for large contracts where the cost 
of artisan labour was increasing within the life-span of a project. 
It was only in 1974 that the public sector took the 
lead in covering builders for increases in all price-controlled 
materials plus changes in the market cost of labour. This latter 
condition presently only applies to contracts above R200 000, sirice 
it is reckoned that for contracts below this price the duration of 
the job is short enough to predict cost increases. Since this step 
was a~proved in the public sector, private sector clients have / 
adjusted their tender documents likewise. BIFSA has set _up machiner~ 
for the calculation of a labour cost index on a regular basis, with 
a panel of contractors agreeing to supply statistical data from 
which average wages can be computed. La}:,,:)ur costs have been defined 
for this purpose as the total of wages, cost-of-living allowances, 
holiday and pension fund contributions, all other fringe benefits 
and any form of statutory levy. 
The pressure to contain cost increases for the reasons 
given above has been largely confined to artisan labour because of 
substantial "wage drift" in their earnings. The gap between minimum 
and average earnings was much wider in the case of White than it 
was for Black wages. For example, the minimum weekly wage in 1970 
of building labourers on the Witwatersrand was 24,1 percent of that 
of artisans whilst the _?Ve.rage weekly earnings of labourers in the 
1 16 LI. t r th ' r ' • ( 6 4) T'l- • • same year was on y , - percen- or a~ or ar~isans. 111s is 
true of other grades of African labour as well. Whilst wages in 
African wages have increased subs tan ti al 1y in the pc.'!riod studied, 
these increases have been due to legislated increases in minimum 
wages rather than wage drift. 
5. 3. 2 Recruitment anq Hiring of White Labour 
The difficult recruiting conditions in the White labour 
market have already been referred to in Section 5.2.1. Builders on 
the Witwatersrand experienced serious difficulty in finding artisan 
labour during boom periods. In building, contracts present them-
selves quickly and unexpectedly; under a competitive tendering 
system a contract may be awarded unexpectedly to one builder. 
Further, contractors are not indifferent to t:he length of time it 
takes to complete projects because of penalty clauses in building 
contracts. An executive who worked for a. consortium whilst it was 
building the Carlton Centre told the writer that during 1971 the 
consortium was flying artisans out from England and paying their 
hotel accomodation since this proved cheaper than late completion. 
The general problem of labour recruitment is compounded by the fact 
that firms must retrench a certain proportion of their artisan 
labour when conditions in the industry become unfavourable. 
Working overtime was one important means by which firms 
could overcome staff shortages. There was the added threat of lnrge 
penalties on overdue buildings. In the period 1970-1972 the artisan 
labour force on the Witwatersrand was expdnding much more slowly 
than the real value of buildings completed.( 6 S) One explanation for 
this is the large amount of overtime worKed by artisans in this 
period. Up to July 1972 the industrial council permitted employers 
to ask their staff to work 13 hours overtime a week - 1 hour per 
day and 8 hours on Saturday. However during the peak shortage in 
July 1972, this automatic exemption was raised to 2 hours per week-
day and 8 hours on Saturday.' 66 ) Requests for extended overtime 
from individual construction companies were also considered (on 
merit) by the council. 
In the industry in 1970 the average weekly overtime 
worked by artisans was 10,2 hours. This had risen from 6,5 in 1968. 
By contrast, unskilled labourers were only working 7,8 hours over-
time per week in 1970.< 67 > High amounts of overtime, of course, add 
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an inflationary element to labour costs per unit output because of 
the proportionately higher rate of pay for overtime work. In 1970, 
overtime earnings accounted for no less than 17,8 percent of the 
. . 1 . th . d t ( 68 ) total earnings of brJ.cklayers and p ast<:-:rers in e J .. n us ry .. 
Apart from difficulties experienced in actually rec~uit­
ing artisans, builders experienced difficulty retaining such labour 
during a boom period. For instance, it was reported in 1965, wherr a 
great deal of overtime was being worked, that artisans were taking 
advantage of the situation to float from one job to another in 
accordance with the amount of overtime they could secure.< 59 ) The 
existence of "labour brokers" was apparently also a common phenomenon 
in the period studied. These brokers dealt in the supply of artisans, 
enticing them away from their employers and then passing them onto 
their clients. In 1971 lt was estimated there were at least 50 
J...' • th b 'ld' . d ' C70) I 't' f th' operal..ing in e UL ing in ust:ry. . n recogni ion o _ is 
practice, BIFSA has laid down in its articles of association that 
"Members shall not bid for labour in competition with 
other members". 
''Members shall not approach an employee in the service 
of another member with a view to offering him employ-
ment without first advising the member concerned of 
his intention"~ (71) 
The intention of these rules was obviously to prevent the exploit-
ation of a possible imbalance between supply and demand in the 
skilled labour marketo 
5.~.3 A~justments by Employers 
Both as an attempt to cut labour costs and as a reaction 
to the day-to-day recruitment realities in the White labour market, 
an important strategy open to employers was to entrust to Africans 
certain tasks reserved for White workers. It was noted in .Section 
2 that (in the short·-run) , the direction of substitution in a labour 
market segmented by union restrictions, is from union to non-union 
labour. In the longer run, labour-saving technologies such as 
industrialised building may be introduced. This distinction between 
the short-and long-run is important because it highlights the 
limited options readily available to employers. This distinction 
is also reminiscent of Reder's point that employers will initially 
121. 
lower the minimum hiring standards they insist on from applicants 
for a particular job category, before altering the entire production 
technology they have been using. 
The conditions in the building labour market at the 
time were most favourable to the use of job dilution techniques to 
overcome shortages of artisans. Several jobs of a simple repetitive 
nature were reserved for artisans in the industry by job reservation 
Determination No. 6. As~isted by one or two African 'handlangers', 
White artisans have cut corners in order to speed up the building 
process by permitting Africans to do some of these jobs. Bricklayers, 
for instance, have concentrated on building up the corners in wall 
construction (the most skilled part of bricklaying). African workers 
are then allowed to lay the bricks inbetween. 
In plastering artisans have permitted labourers to lay 
on and smooth down the plaster before the final trowelling. In 
plumbing, labourers often do soldering work and the cutting of 
earthenware to size. A newspaper report quoted a Randburg plumb~~ 
as saying that he was the only White in his firm and had 42 
plumber's assistants - he dropped them all off at different jobs 
and tben travelled from site to site supervising the work.< 72 > The 
most widespread contraventions have been in the painting t~ade, 
where the skills are very simple, and a lack of training· can be 
easily concealed since Africans often only do the undercoat or use 
rollers for painting. This would support Reder's conclusion that 
where the needed skill can be acquired L. a short time by erstwhile 
excluded workers, hiring standards will be adapted. 
There were also certain farcial prohibitions in these 
job laws. Africans were not permitted to hammer in nails with the 
correct side of the hammer, although they were permitted to use the 
round-headed side. They were not permitted to put a final coat of 
paint on a wall, but were allowed to nail in skirting boards -
provided they did not use a hammer. They were also not allowed to 
use a bricklayer's trowel although they were permitted to use the 
· f · fl t .1... 1 ( 72 a) in erior a Lrowe • 
The training effort involved in bringing workers to the 
level where they could perform these jobs appeared to be low or 
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non-existent. The general labour pa.ttern in the building indust;::-y 
is that each artisan work~ with one or two unskilled labourers. 
The skills are generally picked up on-the-job, through learning by 
doing, which in fact does not even amount to on-the-job training. 
Thus it would appear that both the costs of training were low and 
the prospective net gain from training could be quickly realised. 
Wilson's study of the gold mines provides a further 
example of this apparently large 'skill overlap' between White and 
Black workers on the same job. He quotes the view of one senior 
mining official that there were enough African miners with the 
necessary experience and ability to obtain without further training 
all the blastina certificates that the industrv needed to issue 
(blasting was a~job reserved for White miners :t the time).C 73 > 
Some reports have stated that there were also some 
trained Bantu Building Workers (see Section 6.2) doing skilled work 
in the private industry in the period. A newspaper report in 1964 
stated that a high proportion of African building a~tisans in 
Johannesburg at the time were working alongside White artisans be-
cause township build:Lng had been curtailed..C 74 ) 
There is little evidence that the employment of Africans 
on skilled work has been undertaken after detailed cost~saving 
studies by employers, although one employer, the managing director 
of one of South Africa's largest home-building companies estimated 
in 1973 that he could cut the price of c..,1y house he bu.il t by R2 000 
if he could employ African builders legally.C?S) It is arguable 
that the practice of employing Africans illegally lends weight to 
the argument that the basic neoclassical two-factor analysis is the 
key force operating on the employer, i.e. that the demand for 
different factors of production is determined by the condition that 
costs per unit output be minimised. It would be unwise to regard 
this as a prime behavioural assumption about employers and as such 
may not offer real insights into the labour market behaviour des-
cribed. This is because the cost-cutting objective may not be the 
' 
only motive employers have in conditions of extreme labour scarcity. 
The use of Africans on skilled work may simply reflect the attempts. 
of an industry to arrange its labour force such that essential 
production can be carried out. One W~twatersrand builder estimated 
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in 1974 that if Africans were not employed illicitJ.y, 50 to 75 
percent of the buildings going up at the time could not be built.(?G) 
Thus promoting old staff as it \"Jere was cheaper than 
raising wages for a whole category, e>.nd was thus a feasible 
strategy. The difference between this insight and that offered by 
the neoclassical two-factor analysis is that whilst the latter force 
operates at all times and under all conditions in the labour market 
due to wage gaps, the colour bar etc., the former is more specific 
in its insights suggesting that employers only had limited freedom 
to work in accordance with two-factor analysis. 
5.3.4 Contravention of Legislation 
In September 1973 inspectors from the industrial 
council raided 2 501 building sites or1 the Witwatersrand (181 high-
rise and 2 320 housing projects) in an attempt to ascertain the 
extent of illegal work being done in the industry. On 1 569 (or 
62,7 percent) of the 2 501 sites visited, contraventions of colour 
bar restrictions were found. These ~ontraventions concerned mainly 
African labour, although a small number of Coloured artisans were 
also found to be employed in contravention of these laws. Table 20 
shows that the trade in which these laws were being contravened 
on each site were largely those of bricklaying, plastertn9, painting 
and carpentry. 
Table 20 _S.urvey_ of Labour Leq isl.a ti on Contraventions 
Actil!ity Housing High-rise Total 
----No. of % No. of % No. of % 
Contra- Contra- Contra-
ventions vent.ions ventions 
Bricklaying 326 22,0 14 12,0 340 22,0 
Pt.Carpentry 347 24,0 28 2 5 ,o 375 24,0 
Floating 74 s,o 30 2 7 ,o 104 7,0 
Painting 352 24 '0 . 11 10,0 363 23,0 
Plastering 338 23,0 29 26,0 367 23,0 
Other 19 l,O 1 1,0 20 1,0 
·-----
1456 100,0 113 100,0 1567 100,0 
Source Industrial Council 
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The predominance of contraventions in the four trades mentioned 
is noteworthy, both because these trades experienced the greatest 
shortage of artisans and many repetitive tasks have been reserved 
for artisans. 
\ 
It is also noteworthy that the rate of overall contta-
ventions was the same on housing as high-rise construction (62,8 
vs. 62,4 percent respectively) .. Housing sites are less exposed to 
view than high-rise projects and this could encourage housing cdn-
tractors to take greater risks in the use of labour illegally. 
This is contradicted by the evidence. In view of the fact that the 
serious shortage of artisan labour was felt in both sub-sectors of 
the industry and that the alternative in high-rise was to increase 
wages to attract artisan labour, it is not surprising that larger 
contractors were prepa1.ed to take such risks as well. This con-
clusion is given added support by the fact that convictions under 
these laws were few and far between (see below). 
\ 
The ~ntry of Africans to these trades has not been con-
trolled by the unions and conditions of employment are difficult 
to ascertain because employers are understandably reluctant to 
discuss this area of employment. However, the writer had access to 
prosecutions in terms of job reservation Determination No. 6 and 
the Bantu Building Workers' Act handled by th2 industrial council 
prosecutor. Of the 148 cases in which employers had employed 
Africans illegally, in not one case were skilled rates paid, with ./~ 
wages being in the region of one quarter of the minimum skilled 
rate at the time. In 131 cases, the workers were b~ing paid at or 
slightly above the unskilled minimum rate ruling at the time. In 
I' 
another 17 cases, workers were being paid below this r~te. Howev~r,~ 
of the 31 contraventions involving Coloured artisans, only 12 were ' 
II 
paid less than the minimum artisan rate payable at the time. 
The nature of the contraventions concerning Africans 
were tasks such as laying tiles on a floor, plastering using a 
trm·Jel and hand hawk, nailing and fixing of timber skirting to 
walls, fixing ceiling board, laying stockbricks and laying slasto 
to a floor. 
Some of the largest wage infringements have been at 
growth points in rural areas where industrial councils have by and 
large not extended their jurisdiction. In 1971 fifteen contractors 
' I
\ 
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in Richards Bay and Empangeni (Richards Bay is a border area) were 
granted exemption to employ Africans on skilled work in bricklaying, 
plastering, carpentry, plumbing and painting. The industry there 
was at that stage not subject to wage regulation, and the Secretary 
of the Amalgamated Trade Workers' Union stated in 1971 that African 
bricklayers at Empangeni were being paid bet0een 20 and 35 cents 
(7/ per hour whilst the ruling artisan rate 111a.s between Rl.50 and R2.00 • 
. Between 1969 and 1971 legal proceedings were instituted against 8 
employers in the Newcastle area for underpayment. Apparently, the 
Africans being employed on skilled work were being paid one four-
t 
( 78) 
teenth of the ruling skilled ra e. 
There is evidence that the Department of Labour and the 
industrial council (who both do inspectorial work) were almost re-
signed to the de facto position in the labour market. The original 
industrial tribunal which investigated the industry (in early 1960) 
noted that it was aware of widespread contraventions in painting, 
( 79) . bricklaying, plastering and carpentry. Simons and Alexander 
. I 
have argued that the Native Building Workers' Act (1951) was intro- 1 
1· duced partly to stem this illegal employment - they estimated over ', 
4 000 Africans were doing skilled work on the Witwatersrand at the /.' 
. ;30) time. 
Assessors on the employees' side at the re-investigation 
of job reservation Determination No. 6 stated in their memorandum 
"It was obvious from observations c.i·lroughout the tour 
of inspection that because of the lack of control of 
applying both the Determinations, Nos. 6 and 13, and 
the Bantu Building Workers' Act, that job reservation 
in the building indt.:str:y has not been applied in the 
manner envisaged". (81) 
A past Divisional Inspector of Labour for the Southern Transvaal 
said that in 1967 there were 27 inspectorial posts in the Depart-
ment of Labour but only 7 were filled at the time. Due to this 
staff shortage, they were only able to follow up complaints re-
ceived. 
Apart from the fact that inspectors found it impossible 
to police the area effectively because of a serious staff shortage 
in some outlying areas they were well known and there were often 
only three of them for nine magisterial districts. Further, em-
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players often paid admission of guilt fines which do not involve a 
. h"l t d <32 ) great deal of money and it was often worth their w i e ·o o so. 
As time progressed, contraventions tended to become more 
common and inspectors have been quoted as saying that they turn a 
blind eye to blatant contraventions. <33 ) Co'ntraventions were also 
encouraged by the large discrepancy between the number of contra-
ventions found and the number of prosecutions obtained. Employers 
too, had the court's sympathy - White workers simply were not 
available to do the .work - and the law had to be applied with equity. 
Further, there was a difficulty in actually obtaining convictions 
since a firm might overcome a job reservation prohibition by for 
example not issuing specialised tools to Africans doing artisan 
work: for example, by issuing an inferior flat trowel instead of a j 
bricklayer's trowel to ~frican bricklayers. Contraventions were also. 
'• 
encouraged by the large-scale exemptions granted to job reservation '\ 
laws in the late 1960's by the Department of Labour. 
5.3.5 Union Attitudes 
In order to understand more fully the change that occurred 
in the unions' attitude towards de jure (as opposed to de facto) 
Black occupational mobility, \v::! must look more closely at the 
dynamics of the labour market during this period. 
In urban areas some of the largest contraventions of the 
colour bar have been by labour-only sub-contractors. Under labour-
only, the main contractor provides the materials and equipment. 
That the sub-contract is for 'labour only' distinguishes it from 
the predom~nant form of sub-contract known as 'supply and fix' in 
which the sub-contractor provides the materials and equipment as 
well as the labour needed to perform a specified part of the whole 
taske Since the sub-contractor is therefore small and requires no 
capital or organisation, the 'firm' is most often little more than 
an artisan and a labourer, and he moves backwards and forwards 
across the border between self-employment and normal employment. 
Payment may either be 'lump sum' or 'piece rate' i.e. Rx per l 000 
bricks laid, for example. Piece-rate payment is the more popular 
form however. Labour-only subcontracting was an illegal practice 
in the industry until. 1975. 
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Often these employers pay very low wages - they use 
mostly casual labour ~ and since they operate largely in the field 
of bricklaying and plastering, they utilise their labourers on parts 
of these jobso In many instances the contractor will disappear on 
the last day of a job and save himself the cost of paying wages. 
Many main contractors are negligent in checking up on the conditions 
of employment of labour-only sub-contractors' employees. Since 
labour-only subcontractors do not consider themselves to be employers 
in the industry (in the strict sense of the word), they do not 
register as such with the industrial council and therefore cannot 
be pinned down by the industrial council as to whether, for instance, 
they are purchasing stamps for their workers or not. A rough survey 
conducted by the industrial council in 1973 disclosed that 2 500 
labour-only subcontractors were working in the industry, although 
none were registered at the industrial council. 
As long as the labour-only contractor is registered with/ 
the industry and can be pinned down, the sub-contractor can be 
treated as a bona fide employer. It is the prevalence of not reg~ 
istering in the industry that makes wage evasion high. 
A drawback common to all methods of 'payment by results' 
is that to put a man under strong incentive to work quickly puts 
him under a strong temptation to work shoddily. Labour-only is feJ_t 
to be inherently less responsible than. "supply and fix" because 
they do not pay for broken materials, aPd generally blame poor 
workmanship on the quality of materials. Some subcontractors some-
times have to sacrifice 10 percent of their due payment from the 
client as part of the retention clause for defects that appear 
after the job is finished. However, they may well build in such a 
manner that in the 6-9 months during which payment is held back 
everything will appear well-built. 
It would appear that the extension of labour-only sub-
contracting is encouraged by the high levels of artisan employment 
in the industry; ·in labour markets where vacancies exceed appli-
cants and employers are competing for labour, artisans feel in-
clined to strike their own barga.ins and go out on their own. Sub-
contracting under piece-rate payment offers higher returns at little 
risk. Unemployment tends to encourage conv(~ntional artisan employ-
128. 
ment and restrain men from returning into unprotected bargaining 
through subcontracting. /'\. main reason for jo~Lning a union is its 
ability to prevent a depression of the rate for the job by an excess 
of applicants over vacancies .. 
To some extent, the attitude of artisans to colour bar 
restrictions will depend on the basis upon which they place their 
services at the disposal of the industry~ Thus, for instance, an 
artisan employed on a time basis, as intended by the industrial 
council agreement, is much less inclined to permit or encourage 
irregularities than those employed on a piece-rate or contract basis. 
Under a 'piece-rate' payment system, there is a great incentive for 
labour-only to allow colour-bar contraventions, since the quicker 
the work is completed the higher the rate of payment per hour. One 
builder indicated that the labour-only bricklayers he employed in 
1972 were laying up to 1 500 bricks a day whilst the average time-
paid artisan would normally only lay 800. The rate of payment for 
labour-only contracting is high - in 1971/72 the same builder was 
paying labour-only contractors R30 per 1 000 stock bricks and R45 
per l 000 face bricks laid. This fee may, however, be shared between 
two artisans in a team. 
Labour-only subcontracting t2nds to alienate union 
members from the union. There has been a loss of membership by all 
unions - the general secretary of one union understandably declared 
labour-only subcontracting to be the r1number one problem11 facing 
the union. This tendency to leave the union has been encouraged by 
the absence of serious unemployment which may inhibit labour-only 
subcontracting. Appa.rently the prevalence of labour-only sub-
contracting in the industry diminished greatly in 1975 and 1976. 
Labour-only contractors have through their colour bar 
contraventions undercut the hard-line stance taken by union leaders 
on the job colour bar. This has weakened the bargaining power of 
the unions at negotiations. This argument also applies to conven-
tionally-employed union members who actually take time off from 
the job to allow Africans to perform the more disagreeable jobs 
reserved for White artisans. Whilst the union has within its power 
the right to discipline members who allow such contraventions, it 
needs to be careful in case it alienates its members. 
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Apart from the internal political coherence of the 
unions, they are also influenced by the forces operating in the 
labour market. Firstly, pressure emanates from employers to bring 
about change because stresses in the labour rnarket manifest them--
selves in the cost structure and day-to-day recruitment proble~s. As 
will be pointed out in Section 6, th~ Government has stepped in to 
provide training facilities for Blacks where the union attitude 
was creating a bottleneck. This is one part of the broader issue of 
whether unions can alienate public opinion by their hard-li~e atti-
tudes. On the side of the unions, they regard themselves as having 
a responsibility to restore order in the labour market when the 
traditional industrial organisation breaks down. In 1972 Gert 
Beetge of the militant Blankebouwerkersvakbond stated : 
"There is no job reservation left in the building 
industry, and in the circumstances I support the 
rate for the job as the second best way of pro-
tecting our White artisans". (gl() 
Clearly, this union leader was not only acknowledging the widespread 
contravention of the various job colour bars in the industry but 
also suggesting that the entry of Black workers should be controlled 
by the various interest groups in the industry. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The major conclusions emerging from this section are o:f 
two different types, though interrelated. Firstly, strong factual 
evidence of certain major trends and st~2sses in the labour market 
were presented. Secondly, certain conclusions were reached as to 
the reactions by three interested parties - the Department of 
Labour, employers and trade unions - to these trends and stresses. 
The conclusions will be discussed in this order. 
It has been shown quite clearly what impact the cyclical 
pattern of building output has on the character of both the White 
and Black labour force in the i.ndustry. In the case of the former, 
cyclical unemployment has probably depleted the industry's artisan 
labour force by up to one-third since 1960. The various other forms 
of unemployment have also been a major deterrent to Whites keen on 
careers in the industry. 
1f.l 
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Secondly, the artisan shortages experienced have been 
structural rather than 'dynamic' as ref>?::r:ced to by Arrow and 
Capron. All the evidence suggests that there has been a long-term 
trend for White workers to move out of the industry. The building 
industry generally employs Whites at the lower end of the intelli--
gence distribution. With economic growth White artisans have been 
able to move either into higher echelons of the industry or to 
preferred avenues of employment. This may partly be a result of 
unavoidable forces causing substantial unemployment in the industry. 
The general argument is particularly characteristic of the brick-
laying, plastering and painting trades which exhibit very large 
shortfalls in apprenticeship requirements and a high average age 
of the labour forc2. 
Thirdly, there has been a definite response by official 
organisations and employers to these shortages, ri9idities in de 
facto changes notwithstanding. At the official level, the entry 
requirements for prospective apprentices have been lowered in order 
to comply as fully as possible with colour bar legislation in th~ 
industry. With regard to employers, there has been a widespread! 
I 
tendency for shortages on the shop floor to be corrected by re-1 
clas' ification of work, in advance of changes brought about by J 
negotiated means. The advent of labour-only subcontract~ng has 1 
further weakened the control unions ha'ire over changes on the shop 
floor. 
The first-line reactions of 0oth the Department of Labour 
and organised employers to these shortages have been similar. This 
strategy has involved the full exploratio~ of every possible avenue 
in order to place the industry in a position to comply with job 
reservation Determination No., 6 and the Bantu Building Workers' 
Act. This is witnessed by the policy of granting exemptions from 
various important provisions of the Apprenticeship Act. 
This strategy has also involved BIFSA in a costly, time-
consuming and extensive programme embracing research, education, 
recruitment and 
federation 'has 
expected of it' 
training. This has proved beyond all doubt thatl 
done as much and more than could reasonably be 
to make work reservation a viable proposition. 
the 
-~ ) 
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The lag in de jure adjustment to the reclassification of 
work as a result of this has allowed White labour costs to escalate 
-/) 
and forced employers to contravene colour bar legislation in an t. 
attempt to cope with vast expansion in the sector during this ..._/ · 
period. 
The propeniity of unions to begin bargaining in this 
period over the reclassification of work is understandable in the 
light of two major trends revealed in Section 5. Firstly ,there 
was little evidence to lend weight to the traditional union claim 
that the employment of Africans on reserved work had been to the 
detriment of the White workers' interests. The foregoing analysis 1 
suggests that the dilution of artisan work that occurred was not ((J 
part of a wider programme to rearrange the labour force in accor- ~ 
dance with a labour cost-minimising programme. ~his fuller adjustment 
I 
would be predicted by neoclassical labour market principles (with 
full adjustment due to a wide wage gap between union and non-union/· 
labour etc.). ThE process was rather one of delaying the increase dn 
White labour costs by pro~oting workers internally rather than ( •. 
having recourse to the external labour market. As will be pointed ; 
I 
out in Section 6, employers exercise a strong preference for Whitei 
labour when it is available and this inhibits the free utilisation 
of labour. 
Secondly, the failure of the extensive White recruitment ~ 
programme undertaken by BIFSA was probably interpreted by the unions 
as an "act of fai.th" on the part of employers. 
Finally, the unions became aware that their bargaining 
power had been undermined by events in the labour. market, and that 
their policies had to be based on new realities. These realities 
included the ability of the market to pre-empt changes in the de 
jure labour structure of the industry with de facto reclassification. 
These two features of the labour market - an elastic supply of non-
union labour and the diminished essentiality of union labour - ( 
Marshall predicted would make the demand cury-e for union labo~r. J l 
more elastic thereby weakening the ·bargaining power of the unions. , 
I 
Furthermore, the fact that White labour represents a higher pro-
portion of all labour costs in building than manufacturing has 
probably subjected White unions in the industry to pressure from 
employers to adopt a more reasonable attitude to labour rational-
isation. 
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SECTION 6 
INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS AND 
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN THE 
WITWATERSRAND BUILDING INDUSTRY 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous section described the stresses in the Wit-
watersrand building labour market over the period 1960 to 1974 and 
showed the serious position that the industry found itself in be-
l cause of its inability to recruit skilled White labour. It emphasised the factors leading to a need for the reclassification of work in the industry. The focus of Section 6 is therefore on de jure occu-
pational mobility of African and Coloured workers in the industry 
in response to these stresses. 
Black occupational advancem~nt in the building industry 
has meant change in three separate spheres : a) reclassification of 
work in the pri~ate building industry negotiated by the registered 
trade unions and employer organisations~ b) changes in job reser-
vation Determination No. 6 brought about by the Department of 
Labour, and c) adjustments in the Bantu Building Workers' labour 
force. 
Before turning to the actual study of occupational mo-
bility, we must look at the structure of the industrial council, the 
trade unions and the employers' organisations. The area of jurisdic-
tion of the Industrial Council for the Building Industry (~ransvaal) 
extends from Delmas in the east to Carletonville in the west, and 
from Pretoria (in the north) to Sasolburg. It also includes towns 
on the outskirts of the Witwatersrand lj.ke Middelburg, Witbank, 
Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp. About 70-80 percent of all buildings 
completed in the Transvaal are within the industrial council's 
jurisdiction. 
For administrative reasons, the industrial council is 
sub-divided into two committees - the Pretoria committee wh~ch is 
based in that city and administers the agreement in the northern 
areas of its jurisdiction, and the Southern Areas committee (the 
larger of the two), which is based in Johannesburg and controls the 
entire Reef including Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom and the Vaal Triangle. 
The general secretary of the industrial council and its headquarters 
are located in Johannesburg. 
According to information supplied by the council, in 
1974 there were approximately 65 000 non-artisans working in the 
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southern areas with another 25 000 working in the area covered 
by the Pretoria committee. Thus the council legislates over a verv 
large area and, artisans included, its agreements cover roughly 
100 000 workers. This figure may not corre!ate with certain of the 
tables in the text. 'l'his is because some of the other figures refer 
solely to the labour force in the southern areas. 
It is estimated that another 20 000 non-artisans work in 
non-industrial council ~reas of the Transvaal - mainly Rust~nburg 
and Pietersburg. The industrial council has been thinking of ex-
tending its jurisdiction to Rustenburg because of the large building 
projects there at present. 
There are four registered trade unions representing 
artisans at industrial council negotiations. The Blankebouwerkers-
vakbond (hereafter shortened to BBV) is the largest union in the 
industry and was officially founded in 1957. It is a craft union 
admitting all trades except electrical wiremen. It is also an all--
White union. Apart from its Transvaal membership, the union hai 
approximately 800 members in Natal arid 350 in Bloemfontein. It is 
not represented in the Cape Province. 
The Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Works (AUBTW) 
is the second largest union in the area and co.:ne about a-s ·r:i.n amal-
gamation of many smaller unions. It is represented Republic-wide 
and has recently opened a branch in Cape Town. It is a multi-racial 
craft union established in 1918. The unicn admits all trades. 
The two smaller unions in the area are the Operative 
Plasterers Union and the Amalgamated Society Gf Woodworkers (ASW) ~ 
The Operative Plasterers' Union is also an al1-Whi te union hc.virn:r 
less than 100 members, but because of its :::ize merits no special 
•consideration. The ASW is the oldest building union in the country 
and was started in Cape Town in 1888 by British carpenters. The 
union is multi-racial and is represented nationwide. Until 1968 
the Transvaal branch only admitted carpenters and joiners but since 
that date all trades have been admited. Out of approximately 2 200 
carpenters on the Witwatersrand, 800 belong to the ASW. 
The four urtions in the industry do not only admit build-
ing tradesmen working in the building industry. They also accept as 
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members building tradesmen 1rJorking for Esccm, SAPPI, gold mining, 
engineering, A E & C I and the municipQlities - in fact in any 
industry employing large numbers of building artisans. Hence the 
unions negotiate with employers in these industries as well. The 
secretary of the AUBTW estimated that only 60 percent of his m~mber­
ship worked in the building industry, whilst 30 percent worked for 
the gold mines and 10 percent for the Johannesburg municipality. 
At the national level, the AUBTW is the largest building 
union. They are followed by the BBV. The AUBTW estimates that it 
has 75 p~rcent of all union members in the Durban area and 90 
percent in Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, East London, Graharns-
town and Queenstown. Table 21 shows the relative size and membership 
figures of all the registered unions in the construction sector in 
August 1974. 
Table 21 Registered Trade Unions in the 
Construction Sector in 1974. 
1) S.A.Electrical Workers' 
Association 
2) Amalgamated Union of Building 
Trade Workers of S.A. 
3) Blankebouwerkersvakbond 
4) Western Province Building 
Workers' Union 
5) Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers 
6) S.A. Woodworkers' Union 
7) Western Province Building 
& Allied Trade Union 
8) S.A.Operative Masons' Society 
9) P.E.Operative Plumbers' 
Association 
lO)Operative Plasterers' Trade 
Union of S.A~ 
M e m b .e r s h-2:._p_ 
White Coloured/ Total 
Asian 
16077 16077 
4250 6896 11146 
6565 6565 
6323 6323 
2943 923 3866 
2 702 2702 
543 543 
80 80 
38 38 
23 23 
Source S.A. Institute of Race Relations, Registered Trade 
Unions in. S eA., p .17. 
y l o1 & · 
• I 
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Reliable data on union membership in the Transvaal is 
unobtainable. Accordirtg to industrial council records the BBV had 
8 082 members in the Transvaal in 1973 whilst the AUBTW and ASW 
had 2 760 and 756 members respectively. However, these figures·tend 
to be inflated because they include members who are out of benefit 
for being in arrears with their membership fees. Union membership 
expires automatically if dues are more than three months in arrears. 
The general secretary bf the AUBTW told the writer that out of 
11 000 members in his union about 3 000 could be out of benefit for 
being in arrears with membership fees. Certain of these figures 
also include artisans who work in other industries. These figures 
are, however, a reasonable guide to the relative strength of the 
unions operating on the Witwatersrand. 
On the opposite side of the bargaining tableibuilding and 
masonry employers are represented by the Master Builders' Association 
(MBA) and Master Mason and Quarry Owners Association. These two 
organisations have the responsibility of negotiating agreement~ 9n 
behalf of employers in the two industries. Once an agreement has 
been approved, all employers in the industry are bound by it. A 
similar arrangement is enforced with respect to the unions • 
In 1973 there were 5 908 employees on the file~ of the 
industrial council, of which 591 were MBA members, 2 617 were ~on­
MBA members and 12 were Master Masons. The remaining 2 688 were 
inactive employers. (Inactive employerE are those not working in 
the industry. An employer remains on the list until he himself 
0ithdraws his registration - apparently the incentive to do so is 
the employer guarantee/deposit he gets back. In 1973 870 employers 
withdrew from the industry) • 
The discussion irt this section is arranged in the 
following way. Section 6.2 deals with the scope for Bantu Building 
Workers in the industry. This is dealt with :first because the Bantu 
Building Workers' Act (passed in 1951) provided for the registration 
and training of Africans as qualified building artisans. The legi--
slation permitted Bantu housing authorities to train and employ 
Africans as building artisans on skilled tasks and to carry out 
all building operations which were necessary in the development of 
Bantu housing schemes, subject only to a measure of supervision by 
trained White personnel. Thus a parallel artisan labour force to 
the one in the private sector exists, and within this context much 
progress has been made. The extent to which African pupils have 
acquired building skills as part of their technical school curric-
ulum is also discussed. 
Section 6.3 analyses the occupational advancement of 
Coloured building workers in the Transvaal. The utilisation of 
Coloured labour under job reservation Determination No. 6 is con-
sidered first. This D~termination was described in Section.3. The 
relaxation of Determination No. 6 and its replacement with Deter-
mination No. 28 is considered thereafter. Certain hypotheses emerge 
from this section concerning: firstly, the ease of entry of Coloured 
labour into the industry vis-a-vis Africans, and secondly, the long-
term employment prospects of Coloured artisa~s in the industry. 
Section 6.4 deals with de jure changes in African 
occupational mobility in the Witwatersrand building industry up 
to 1974 ~ This is an important analytical section since the conclus--
ions emerging concern the dynamics of job reclassification unde~ 
the industrial council system today. A detailed description of the 
fragmentation agreements made up to 1974 is given in Sections 6.4.1 
and 6.4.2. Section 6.4.2 discusses the events leading up to what is 
acknowledged to be the biggest and most successful fragme?tation 
agreement in the industry, the one concluded in 1974/75·. Using the 
data collected, an attempt is made in Section 6.4.3 to highlight 
the major features of these agreements including the bargaining 
relationship between :the parties. In tL.:_s way it is hoped to emerge 
with a relevant and practical set of explanatory tools concerning.: 
1) how the move away from statutory discrimination inherent in the 
reclassification of jobs has been reconciled with demands for pro-
tection from White workers; 2) concessions in the form of increased 
earnings and employment guarantees granted to White workers. 
In Section 6.4.4 we look at attempts by the private in-
dustry to train black workers, while Section 6.5 summarises the 
main conclusions. reached in the foregoing analysis. 
6.2 The Scope for Bantu Buildina Workers 
6.2ol Historical Perspective 
Since this study is looking at the occupational mobility 
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of African workers in response to shortages of White labour, it 
is imperative to look at the progress made by Africans under the 
Bantu Building Workers' Act. The Bantu Building Workers' labour 
force is an artisan labour force parallel to that in the private 
sector. The material in this section was not presented at a later 
stage because chronologically the training of Africans under the 
Act w\.,as the first organised attempt to tra5-n Africans to do skilled 
building work. 
Housing has been the lynchpin of the urban African prob-
lem. Until recently, local authorities were required to provide 
decent accomodation for Africans resident in their area. One central 
problem in this regard has been the inadequacy of the White artisan 
labour force to carry out the requisite housing programme. This 
shortage was particularly serious after World War Two when it was 
estimated that the ratio of White apprentices to artisans was lower 
. th b . ld. th . tl . . - t ( 1) in ,e ui ing i an in any o 1er maJor indus ry. 
From as early as 1930 there were widespread demands that 
African building workers be employed on all building erected by 
Africans.< 2 > These demands were made on two grounds. The first is 
equit~, namely, that if Africans are excluded from a wide range of 
occupations through colour discrimination, then their emplpyment 
in the service of their own people should, in fairness, b~ open to 
them. 
The second reason for these {Fmands is an economic one. 
The utilisation of African artisans on housing has reduced building 
costs on African housing projects quite considerably. For instance, 
when trained Bantu Building Workers were first employed by the 
Johannesburg municipality in Soweto, it was estimated that labour 
costs per square foot dropped from 12/3c1 (the estimated cost using 
White labour in 1946) to 6/Sd in 1951.< 3 ) 
The earliest attempts to train Africans for this work 
were made in 1946. whffil Africans began training under the COTT 
scheme originally devised for White ex-servicemen (see Section 
5.2.1.3) .( 4 ) In this year th~ postwar building boom began and sig-
nificant shortages of building tradesmen were experienced. Although 
a ten-year employment preference gu~rantee was promised to White 
artisans in the Transvaal once this group qualified, the plan was 
vehemently opposed by the building unions and COTT instructors 
-were compelled to withdraw or fa.ce expulsion from these unions. The 
government, however, continued with the scheme and by June 1947 
almost 90 Africans had qualified. 
Apparently a similar scheme was mooted in 1947. It was 
to provide for the training of 400 Africans a year as building 
artisans at a school to be set up in King William's Town.CS) Ther~ 
is no evidence that this was, in fact, started. 
The Bantu Building Workers' Act No. 27 of 1951 (as 
amended by Act. No. 60 of 1955 and Act~ No. 56 of 1959) provi~ed 
for the training and registration of Africans as building artisans 
to enable them to satisfy the housing needs of their own people. 
Section 2 of the Act provided for the establishment of the Bantu 
Building Workers' Advisory Board. This consists of seven or more 
persons, one of whom is appointed chairman by the Minister of 
Labour, whilst the rest are app?inted from persons nominated by 
employers' orga.ni sations and registered trade unions· (on an equal· 
basis). The Board makes recommendations to the Minister in regard 
to training, conditions of employment and any other matters ref-
erre~ to it (clause 3). Wage determinations are made every three 
years by the Wage Board. 
6.2.2 Training 
There are three stages to bec0ming a Bantu Building 
Worker. The first is working as a labourer on the job, after which 
the worker may be registered as a Learner Grade B. After a minimum 
period of one year, the Learner may do a practical test on the 
recommendation of his employer and if he passes becomes a Learner 
Grade A. However, a Learner Grade B will automatically become a 
Learner Grade A after effluxion of two years. A Learner Grade A 
may in the same way become a qualified Bantu Building Worker after 
two years, but again may do the practical exam after one year if 
he is considered.good enough. It is necessary to pass a practical 
test to become a qualified artisan. 
The system thus resembles apprenticeship training, with 
a stipulated training.period and training procedure, on-the-job 
training and graduated scales of pay for learners. The learnership 
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is served with a team of Bantu Building Workers: there is no 
formal training at a technical college. A Learner may qualify in 
any~ of the following trades : blocklaying, bricklaying, car-
pentry, electrical. fitting and wiring, painting, plastering and 
plumbing. 
The skills required to pass the practical exam at the end 
of the period are of a similar standard to those normally demanded 
of building apprentices. Bricklaying apprentices must be able to cJ.o 
the setting out of brick foundations, building of door and window 
frames, whilst carpentry apprentices must be able to hang doors, 
make door frames and erect shuttering for concrete beams _and slabs. 
Bantu Building Workers have erected many special buildings, in-
cluding schools, shops, public halls, police stations and sports 
stadiums. Supervision generally amounts to only one supervisor 
per ten building workers and eighty labourers.( 6 ) 
According to numerous people interviewed during the field 
work, the high standard cif training together with both insufficient 
building work at all times in the townships and the artisan shortage 
in the private building industry, encouraged many graduates to look 
for work in the private building industry on the Wibvatersrand. 
• ~ • -I • t C 7 ) h .. 1 This has been note0 in cer~ain newspaper repor;s. T e principa-
of the Vocational Training Centre in Soweto indicated that many of 
his graduates were working for contractors in the private industry 
and being paid ~ar higher wages than those laid down by the Wage 
Board. 
A retired Bantu Labour Officer for the Southern Transvaal 
said he too was aware that this was happening on a large scale 
during his term of office and added that, in this particular case 5 
he saw no reason why it should not be allowed legally. 
When the Act was introduced in 1951, it was strongly 
opposed by the registered trade unions on these grounds. Section 
14 was therefore written into the Act and stated : 
"No employer may, except witn the written consent of 
the Minister, employ a Bantu upon skilled work in 
the building industry within an urban area, elsewhere 
than in a Bantu area. Nor may a White person be em-
ployed in connection with building work on which a 
Bantu is employed on skilled work in the building 
industry, unless such White person is employed in 
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the capacity of su>Jervi::;or or instructor". ( 8) 
6.2.3 Employment Conditions 
The inclusion of Section 14 restricts Bantu Building 
Workers to doing artisan work in the townships. This means that 
rates of pay need not.be competitive with artisan rates in the 
private building industry, i.e. it enables a dual wage structure 
for artisans to exist on the Witwatersrand. Rates of pay are in 
fact much lower in the townships as the following figures illus-
trate 
Table 22 
Period 
July 1964 -
June 1967 
July 1967 -
June 1970 
July 1970 -
June 1973 
July 1973 -
June 1976 
July 1973 -
June 1976 
(Western 
Cape only) 
Minimum Waqes of Bantu Buildina Workers* 
in the Southern Tra~s~aai 1964 - 1976. 
lRands per hour). 
Learner Grade B Learner Grade A Bantu Building 
Worker 
0,16 0:20 0 '2 7 
0 '21 0 ,26 0,34 
0 '28 0' 34 0,44 
0,35 (Col. A) 0,43 0,55 
0' 38 (Col. B) 0,47 0,60 
0,44 (Col. C) 0,55 0,10 
I), 43 (Col. A) 0,49 0,60 
0,47 (Col. B) o,53 o,65 
0' 55 (Col. C) 0,62 o,76 
"' Including Learners 
Source Building and Allied Industries' Official Handbook 
(various editions). 
I' 
' 
The earlier determination made no provision for automatic wage 
escalation to compensate for price increases during a determination. 
The penultimate determination however directed that wage rates in 
Column A were only to be paid until the consumer price index reached 
130, after which Column B rates became effective. Column C rates 
have been paid since 1974 when the price index reached 140. Minimum 
wages in the Western Cape are higher as shown in the last row of 
Ta.ble 22. 
( 
. 14 7. 
The minimum wage for Bantu Building Workers in the 
southern Transvaal is R0,70 at present. The minimum rate for arti-
sans in the private building industry on the Witwatersrand ih 1974/ 
75 was roughly Rl,76 (see Section 7). This wage difference will be 
referred to again in Section 7.5. 
6.2.4 Growth of the Labour Force 
Between 1951 and 1973, 6 853 Bantu Building Workers were \. 
. t d ( 9 ) Th . . t . . 1 regis ere . is gives a ra e of increase in the abour force of 
approximately 280 per annum. However, it appears that the rate was 
higher in later years. During 1972, for instance, 651 candidates 
were tested, of whom 496 passed. In the same year there were 454 
(10) Learners. 
These figures include Africans who h~ve not trained under 
the Act (using the learnership scheme), but who have merely passed 
the trade test in terms of the Act. Few of the Bantu Building Workers 
in Soweto had gained their status throu;h the inservice learnerships 
offered by the building s~ction. Many are pupils who have attended 
trade schools in different centres. In Dube there is a trade school 
(called the Vocational Training Centre) where formal and practical 
training in building work is given. (This centre, for~erly run by 
the Johannesburg muriicipality now falls under the West Rand Bantu 
Administration Bo arc). The only course offered at the school is a 
three-year practical and theoretical training in building work in 
preparation for ~he NTC I exam. At the end of the three years, the 
school arranges for its pupils to do the Bantu Building Workers' 
exam and those passing are offered employment with the building 
section of the West Rand Bantu Administration Board in Soweto. 
The 250 boys at the school are all urban Africans (with 
section 10 rights) and must have passed Std. 6 to get into the 
school (they have mostly pa8sed in the third class, since better 
qualified pupils go onto high school) . 
According to the Minister of Bantu Education, in March 
1974 there were 13 similar trade schools in South Africa. It is 
planned to have at least one in every homeland.(ll) Of the 3 119 
students enrolled at these schools in 1973, 621 were carpentry 
students, 651 were concreting/bricklaying and plastering students 1 
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343 were training in plumbing and drainlaying and 57 in painting and 
. ( 12) glazing. The duration of these courses is two after after Std. 
6 (one year less than at the Vocational Training Centre because these 
students do not prepare for the NTC I). Many of these students take 
the Bantu Building Workers' practical examination at the end of this 
period. A Bantu Administration Board wishing to recruit Bantu Build-
ing Workers will therefore either promote learners whom they have 
employed, or recruit Bantu Building Workers on contract from the 
homelands. 
During 1972 there were also 284 Afiican long-term 
· t d t ·· · < 13 ) r d t · d t d b th · convic s un er ra1.ning. ' ra e est:s are con uc e y e pri-
son authorities • 
. The trade test to become a q'..lalified Bantu Building 
Worker is normally conducted by Bantu Administration Boards in the 
following areas : west and East Rand, Vaal Triangle, Cape Peninsula, 
Cape Midlands, Port Natal, and in each homeland. 
There are several signs that the rate of growth of this 
labour force is outstripping demand· for their services by the 
building sections of the Bantu Administration Boards. The Boards 
are the major employers of qualified workers, since they do almost 
all the building work in the townships. The building section in 
Soweto, the largest in the country, en1ploys only .250 Bantu Building 
Workers. The amount of work completed depends largely upon the 
amount of fund~; received from the Department of Community DeveJcp-
rnent • For instance, in Soweto funds for building maintenance and 
repair usually total about Rl million annually, but funds for new 
housing fluctuate - apparently between R2-and R3-million in recent 
years. All other building work done by the WRBAB is on behalf of 
the private sector and depends on the flow of private funds (such 
as TEACH funds; employer hostels, etc.) 
In the Western Cape furthermore, the virtual embargo 
on new African family housing since 1968 has severely curtailed 
building operationso Only 80 Bantu Building Workers are employ~d, 
mostly on maintenance work. No learners are employed. The con-
struction of private employer hostels in the dormitory tcwnships 
around Cape Town is currently being undertaken by private firms, 
using their own labour force. 
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Two other sources of employment for Bantu Building 
Workers can be indicated. Both are likely to increase their im-
portance in the future. Firstly, there is the private sector. The 
skilled work being opened up to African workers in the Transvaal 
(Section 6.4.2) will provide Bantu Building Workers with their first 
chance to utilise many of their skills legally in the private in-
dustry. Moreover, rates of pay are competitive with those being 
offered in the townships (Section 7). 
Secondly, employment opportunities exist in rural ar~as 
and in the homelands. It could be argued that the Bantu Building 
Workers' Act, like job reservation Determination No. 6, exclude all 
rural areas from its scope (Section 6.3.1), thus offering Bantu 
Building Workers the chance to do skilled vrnrk in these areas. 
With regard to the homelands, one should remember that 
because building is a place-bound industry, it should show more 
rapid employment growth in the homelands than other industries. 
Furthermore, the absence of job colour bars in these areas could 
lead to an expansionary effect on the demand for their services. 
6. 3 Occupational _Ad~1cement __ of Coloured Building Wor_Js~-~-s 1:_~ 
the Trans 1.ra3.l 
6.3.1 Job Reservation Determination No. 6 
Job Reservation Determination No. 6(l) reserved all 
"vvork" in the building industry in urban areas of the Transvaal :::i.nd 
Orange Free State for Whites. "Work" was defined as all.tasks in 
the industry excluding 90 unskilled and semiskilled jobs. These 
jobs thus remained open to Coloureds, Asians and Africans. Self-
employed Coloured artisans were not affected by the Determination, 
but were debarred from employing other Colcured persons in skilled 
jobs. 
Authority was delegated to the Divisional Inspector of 
Labour (Johannesburg) to exempt from the Determination Coloured 
artisans working in Coloured group areas. Such an exemption was 
granted soon after the Determination was made in order to build 
the Coloured housing estate of Lenasia. Built by the Department of 
Community Development using Coloured contractors and artisans, all 
artisans on the project worked under exemption. Coloured contractors 
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were allowed to operate without restriction in Coloured group 
areas. In practical terms, the burden of the reservation fell on 
Coloured contractors and employees who were not able to obtain work 
5.n Coloured areas. 
The industrial tribunal did not reserve work in any of 
the rural areas of the two provinces. Since building work in rural 
areas consists largely of farm dwellings, outhouses, barns and 
general maintenance - w6rk which is generally done by the farmer 
and his labourers - the industry's White artisan labour force in 
particular would not be affected by this exemption. It was thus 
decided not to reserve skilled work in these areas because of the 
small quantity of work, the administrative problems involved and 
the fact that they were already almost completely denuded of White 
b . ld. t. ( 2 ) ui ing ar isa.ns. 
The tribunal appeared to side with the Transvaal unions 
who were all strongly pro-reservation, and saw the small number e>f 
Coloured artisans as a competitive element keeping their members 
out of work. The tribunal heard evidence that certain firms in the 
Orange Free State were recruiting Coloured artisans in the Cape 
Province for work on specific projects, and that this wa.s making 
more difficult to compete with these builders. 
.,_ 
l (... 
The tribunal noted that this was happening to a far 
lesser extent in the Transvaal. In a memorandum to the tribunal, 
employers in this province said that the~ entry of Coloureds in the 
province was so small that legislation was unnecessary. However, 
the Determination was applied to this province as well. 
The tribunal admitted to being swayed by economic con-
siderations at the time in the two provinces - between 1954/55 
and 1956/57 the money value of building work in the two provinces 
had fallen from £55,259,858 to £42,626,168. In evidence, the ASW 
reported an average of 70-80 members unemployed, although it was 
the only union to report unemployment. 
Despite concrete evidence linking White unemployment 
to the entry of Coloureds~ the tribunal proceeded with its re-
commendations. The Determination was promulgated in 1961 during the 
151. 
worst of the 1960-1962 recession in the industry. As such it must 
have been a psychological boost to the White unions, and their 
members who wanted to safeguard the number of jobs in the industry. 
However, its real effect on White employment must have been marginal. 
The Coloured, Malay and Asiatic Building Workers' Union 
produced a memorandum at the time pointing 01J.t that the approximately 
550 Coloured and Asian building artisans in the two provinces could 
not be held to be threatening the position of the approximately 
12 000 Whites.< 3 ) 
6.3.2 The Utilisation of Coloured Labour under Determination 
No. 6. 
There follows a long period - roughly from 1961 to 
1970 - of uncertainty with regard to the position of Coloured labour 
in the industry. It appears that some Coloured artisans left the 
two provinces, or what is more likely, stopped bein~ recruited by 
employers fearful of prosecution. According to ~ Department of 
Labour manpower survey, there were only 252 Coloured building 
artisans in the whole of tl1e southern Transvaal in May 1956. The 
comparable figure for the Orange Free State (in 1958) was 254.< 4 > 
According to the industrial tribunal, many cf these artisans were 
only working on a project basis, having come from adjacent Cape 
towns like De Aar, Vryburg and Ma£eking. The tribunal noted that 
these workers were due to leave once their contracts had expired. 
Thus the supply of Coloured artisans probably dwindled to those 
who were permanent residents in the area. 
The Coloured, Malay and Asiatic Building Workers' Union 
was forced to disband in 1971 because of the reduced number of 
Coloureds in the indus~ry. Its remaining members were asked to 
join the AUBTW.( 5 ) 
It is probable that many of the permanent residents also 
left the industry. Coloured builders.were o~ly allowed to operate 
in Coloured group areas where the amount of work was probably 
erratic. The industrial tribunal stated that there were 55 Coloured 
builders in the whole Transvaal (32 on the Witwatersrand) on the 
records of the indus~rial council in 1959.( 6 ) However, in the mid-
' 
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J.960's there were reports that the supply of Coloured labour had 
reached a stage where not enough Coloured builders and artisans 
r ·n 
were available to build Coloured housing in Coloured group areas.· · 
Since African artj.sans were forbidden tc work in these areas 
used f, 
on Coloured housing pr.ejects. This has apparently had the effect of '' 
incr·2asing the rentals charged in economic housing in Johannesburg's ii 
. (1 
(Section 6.2), the general practice was for White labour to be 
Coloured group areas .. 
Theoretically, Coloured builders were still allowed to 
indenture Coloured apprentices after the Determination came into 
effect. The small number of Coloured builders together with the 
difficulty of finding work after qualification, however, discouraged 
prospective apprentices from entering the industry. It was estimated 
in 1956 that there were 48 Coloured and 1 697 W~ite building 
apprentices in the urban areas of the southern Transvaal at the 
time. (B) Figures quoted by the latest industrial tribunal show that 
in 1971 none of 2 054 contractors surveyed in the Transvaal had 
C 1 d t • .· , t. d ( 9 ) l"flh. • • • r • t b any o oure appren ices inaen ure . i .is is s1gn1r1can ecause 
in the early 1960' s tl~e building trades were the only ones in the 
Transvaal admitting Coloured apprentices. 
G.3.3 The Relaxation of Determination No. 6 
At the official level, the earlier phase of job reser-
vation was marked by attempts to comply with Determination No. 6. 
These included, :.nter alia, waiving by exemption the minimum edu-
cation prescribed for White apprentices, an undesirable practice 
brought about by force of circumstances. In 1966 the parti~s to 
the industrial council negotiated the first of a series of frag-
mentation agreements in the industry. 
By the end of the 19 60' s it became clear that the in·-
dustry was critically short of White artisans, particularly in the 
bricklaying, plastering and painting trades. As noted, the artisan 
labour force had been depleted by roughly one-third at the ~nd of 
the Sharpeville recession. Furthermore, by 1970 the industry had 
entered its second boom in six year·s, something the industrial 
tribunal could not have predicted when it made the Determination. 
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Determination No. 6 had frozen the industry's labour 
structure and gave employers no leeway to innovate in the use of 
Coloured labour as they had been able to do through industrial 
council bargaining (with automatic exemption from the Bantu Build-
ing Worker's Act). Clearly, the industrial tribunal laid too much 
stress on short-term ~mployment conditions without giving the 
industry any £lexibility in supplementing its labour force in 
the longer term. ':2his was not considered by them. Section 77 (6) (b) 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act states : 
"in making a reservation under this section the powers· 
of the tribunal shall not be affected in any way by 
the extent to which persons of any race (i) are, at 
the time of the investigation ..• employed or available 
for employ~ent; or (ii) are likely to become available 
for employment, in the undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation or class of work or in the area specified in 
the terms of reference". ( 10) 
As has been pointed out : 
"this provision could be interpreted to mean that work 
could legally be reserved for Whites even though there 
were no Whites in employment, available for employment, 
or likely to become available for employment in the 
industry". (11) 
During March 1969 BIFSA proposed to the Department of 
Labour, on behalf of the relevant Master Builders' Associations, 
that the trades of bricklaying and plastering in the Transvaal 
and the Orange I'ree State be excluded from the scope of Determin-
ation No. 6.< 12 ) The federation was told in reply that the indu~try 
should first explore the possibility of attracting more White 
workers to the industry. At this stage such a suggestion was re-
garded as totally unrealistic. In August 1970 BIFSA made a similar 
request to the Minister of Labour to re-investigate Determination 
No. 6, but the Minister replied that much could still be achieved 
by way of negotiation with the unions to bring about job re-
l "f" t" (13) c assJ. ica ion. 
In February 1971, when ~uilding development was at a 
peak along the Witwatersrand, the Minister of Labour called a meeting 
with the parties to the industrial council in the Transvaal and 
announced that he had granted an exemption from the provisions of 
Determination No. 6.Cl4 ) The exemption would allow Coloured brick-
layers and pJ.asterers to workin the private buildi.119 industry on U12 
Witwatersrand and in Pretoria under certain conditions. One con-
dition was that all applications for exemption had to be made to 
the Department of Labour, which would consider every application on 
merit. The exemptions subsequently granted were often only for the 
time--span of one project. They were furthermo.r:e subject to the 
conditions that employers were to continue efforts to recruit and 
train Whites, that Whites and Coloured people must work separately 
as far as possible, and that no White could work under the super-
vision of a Coloured person. 
By 20th April 1971, two months after the exemptions had 
been announced, the Minister of Labour stated that 22 Witwatersrand 
employers had applied for permission to employ 292 CoJ.oured brick-
layers and plasterers whilst 3 employers in Pretoria wanted 48 
( 15) 
workers. In 1974 it was announced that as many as 1 369 Coloureds 
were already working under exemption from Determination No. 6.(lSa) 
This is both an indication of the shortage of White labour and the 
willingness of employers to use Coloured artisans. 
On 15th August 1973, after further representations from 
BIFSA, the industrial tribuna~ received a directive from the Minister 
to investigate the operation of Determination No. 6. The Minister 
of Labour accepted the tribunal's findings, which recognised the 
efforts on the part of BIFSA to augment White skilled labour supplies, 
They also concluded that the demands of economic growth made it 
impossible for the industry to continue to rely solely on White 
skilled labour.Cl 5 ) The tribunal's report concluded : 
"the Tribunal has .•• come to the conclusion .•• that 
the aforementioned efforts are not sufficient to make 
it possible to provide for the future of the industry 
if the latter has to rely on Whites only for skilled 
labour. The Tribunal is therefore of the opinion that 
there ii sufficient justification now for granting 
members of other races freer access to the field of 
skilled v.rork in the industry, J2.~i<2:.t!!..9 this can be done 
on a strict:lv controlled basis". ( 17) 
The tribunal's recommendations were implemented by the 
Minister of Labour through job reservation Determination No. 28. 
The new Deterrniniltion replaced the two previous Determinations -
Nos. 6 and 13 - applying to the building industryc The major pro··· 
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visions of Determination. No. 28 which became legally binding on 
28/7/1975, were that, with the exception of Rustenburg and Pieters-
burg .in the Transvaal and Richards Bay in Natal, job reservation 
as between White and Coloured was lifted in all rural areas and 
confined to municipal areas within the jurisdiction of industrial 
councils. On the basis of this reasonirig, job reservation was abol-
ished totally in the industrial council areas of Albany (Grahams-
town) and Queenstown.Cl9 ) In the urban areas (which thus include 
Rustenburg, Richards Bay and Pietersburg), where reservation con-
tinues to be applied, the Determination states that all skilled 
work is still reserved for White persons : 
"provided that such work may nevertheless subject to 
. the provisions of paragraph (a), be performed by an 
employee who is not a White person, providing such 
employee - (aa) is a Coloured person, an~ (bb) is a 
skilled artisan - Ci) in the specified class of work 
assigned to him; or (ii) in an~ of the classes or 
work in respect of which he acts in a supervisory 
capacity in the case of a general foreman, foreman or 
leading hand; or is deemed to be a skilled artisan by 
any Industrial Council for the Building Industry in 
terms of any Act". ( 19) 
Reservation is virtually confined in those areas where it continues 
to be applied to prohibitions on replacement of Whit0s by Coloured 
people, the employment of Coloured people in a supervisory capacity 
over Whites and the employment of Coloured people as artisans un-
less they have either gained artisan status or are in the process 
of gaining sue~ status, e.ge through apprenticeship. 
The main effect of Determination No. 28 is to scrap 
job reservation as between White and Coloured in rural areas (the 
prerequisite that Coloureds be certified as skilled artisans before 
they can practice does not apply to rural areas) , whilst in urban 
areas it effectively extends to the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
t.he more liberal approach to job reservation operating in the Cape 
and Natal. Country-wide uniformity thus prevails currently between 
White and Coloured artisans. The Determination also means that 
Coloured people may now be trained through all the channels in the 
two northern provinces previously ·open to Whites, including 
apprenticeship. Moreover, the anomaly in the Cape Province and 
Natal where Coloureds could be indentured as apprentices in reserved 
trades but where their employment after qualification was subject 
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to exemption, is now removed. (See Section 8.3.1). 
The position of African workers, as controlled by the 
Bantu Building Workers' Act, was not affected in any way by 
Determination No. 280 
By the end of the 1960's it is possible to get a clearer 
picture of the number of Coloureds employed in the industry, and it 
appears that the demand for Coloured labour had risen strongly from 
where it had begun to languish in the mid-1960's. The industrial 
tribunal investigating Determination No. 28 found that on 25/6/1971, 
4,2 percent of all skilled workers in the employ of 2 054 building 
firms in all urban areas of the Transvaal were Coloured, whilst 
this figure was a surprisingly high 22,l percent for 135 empJ.oyers 
in the Orange Free State (absolute figures = 457 and 210 respec-
. (20) tively) • By November 1974 there were 664 Coloureds working 
. ( 20a) 
under the jurisdiction of the Southern Areas Committee. They 
constituted 5,3 percent of the artisan labour force in this area. 
The long-term position of Coloured labour in the ihdustry is dis-
cussed in Section 6.3.5. 
6.3.4 Trade Union Opposition to Determination No. 28 
The exemptions from Determination No. 6 and subsequent 
promulgation of Determination No. 28 met with strong opposition fron1 
the Blankebouwerkersvakbond. The general secretary of the union 
referred to Determination No. 28 as a "c.ell out" a.nd t1a radical 
change in government policy11 .< 21 > The aim of the union was to 
fight the entry of Coloureds and Asians "with every weapon 2.t our· 
d . l" (22) isposa. • 
When the exemptions to Determination No. 6 were annot::.nced 
in 1971, the AUBTW had sided with the EBV in its opposition to the 
exemptions, but later that year the general secretary of the AUBTW 
announced that they ''decided to break from the attitude· of the GBV 
because they were too radical 11 .< 23 > The ASW has supported the 
AUBTW in this regard. Thus the BBV has been without support in its 
opposition to the employment of Coloureds. 
The BBV has also taken a militant stand against the 
lS 7. 
redetermiriation. When the exemptions were first announced in 
1971, the general secretary appealed to his members to down tools 
when the first Coloured workers appeared on buil_ding sites. ( 23 a) 
The union also organised a protest meeting o~er the industrial 
tribunal's recommendations: however, it was only attended b~ 260 
. (24) 
members of the union •. 
The BBV has for two reasons opposed the entry of Coloured 
workers. The first is the alleged reduction in bargaining power of 
the unions following the entry of Coloureds to the labour force. 
Gert Beetge, general secretary of the BBV, has argued that the 
entry of Coloureds to the ranks of the skilled, forces down wages. 
He has said 
"Every time we negotiate for higher wages the Master 
Builders remind us of the composition of the building 
industry's working population - 1 500 Coloureds to 
12 000 Whites in the Transvaal, Asiatics outnumbering 
Whites two to one in Natal. And employers refuse to 
pay higher wages to non-Whites •••• They can exist on 
lower wages and they' re prepared to do so". ( 2 5) 
This is a justifiable fear, probably shared by the other unions. 
There have consequently been attempts on the part of the unions to 
try and control the entry of Coloureds to the industry. 
The BBV has also opposed the entry of Coloureds on the 
grounds that it will undermine the prestige of th~ trades practised 
by its members. A spokesman for the union, at the time when the 
government was considering granting exemptions to Coloured workers, 
said that : 
"We are proud of our status and want to keep it ••• 
and our standards will obviously be lowered with the 
employment of Coloureds as artisans"$ (26) 
The BBV has, for the above reasorts, preferred the im-
plementation of an operative system on a sliding basis to ease the 
industry's skilled labour shortage. Firstly, this system would have 
the advantage of adjustment according to the needs of the industry 
(see Section 6.4.2.2) rather than the entry into the union of 
Black workers with the possibility of undercutting White artisan 
labour at the bargaining table. Secondly, by grading the Black 
workers as semiskilled - no matter how skilled the work in fact 
would be - the status of union members could be protected. 
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The different objectives that the three unions have had 
with respect to the entry of Coloureds can be partly explained by 
differences in their constitutions. The AUBTW and ASW, being multi-
racial, both admit Coloured and Asian members and their policy is 
one of protecting the artisan (of whatever colour) against the en-· 
croachment of semiskilled workers. Non-White artisans were to be 
admitted at the rate for the job, and they opposed further frag-
mentation and preferred the lifting of job reservation restrictions. 
The two unions also had membership motives in their 
support for the removal of restrictions. In June 1971 the AOBTW 
was reported to have 135 Coloured members in the Transvaal, and to 
be actively recruiting more Coloured members.( 27 ) The union has 
also gained certain members from the defunct Coloured, Malay and 
Asiatic Building Workers Union. In July 1975, the general secretary 
of the AUBTW stated to the writer that the union had 300 Coloured 
members in the Transvaal. It would therefore appear that any sig-
nificant inflow of Coloured artisans on the Witwatersrand could 
further increase the size and bargaining pcwer of the two multi-
racial unions vis-a-vis the BBV, hence it is in their interests to 
grant freer access to Coloureds into the industry. 
Unions have two weapons to control the entry of Coloured 
artisans.The first is through the admission to apprenticeship. The 
BBV has the power to impose a ban on its members training Coloured 
apprentices. Thjs has been done by the White artisan union in the 
(? 8) 
motor industry.'- In discussions with the general secretary of 
the industrial council and trade union leaders, it was stated 
that the BBV had not issued a directive to its members prohibiting 
them from training Coloured apprentices. The union certainly does 
not have this prohibition at its Durban bra~ch, where the ra~ial 
composition of apprentices has changed dramatically in recent 
years (see Section 8.4.4). 
Even if this ban were imposed, artisans from the other 
two unions (as well as non-unionised tradesmen) will still be able 
to train Coloured apprentices. In its submissions to the latest 
industrial tribunal, BIFSA stated that it had the full support of 
both the AUBTW and the ASW to indenture Coloureds in terms of the 
Apprenticeship Act in the Transvaal.( 29 ) As the number of Coloureds 
in these unions increases, this will decrease further the difficulty 
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Coloured youths.have in becoming indentured. It is perhaps sig-
nificant in this regard that when the latest industrial tribunal 
made its investigation, it found 15 Coloured apprentices in the 
employ of 2 054 contractors in the Transvaal in June 1973.< 3o> Of 
these, 10 were apprenticed in the painting trades, whilst 4 were 
apprenticed in electrical wiring. 
It would appear that the BBV regards a high minimum 
wage as a potential defence strategy by the union to maintain a 
White hold on artisan work in the industry. In October 1973 the 
general secretary stated that he would be prepared to allow.Black 
artisans into the industry provided that minimum wages were raised 
from Rl,40 to at least R2 1 00 and the rate for the job strictly en-
forced.C3l) There is evidence which strongly suggests that the 
union has pursued this policy at the latest negotiations in the 
industry (cf. Section 6.4.3.2). 
6.3.5 Long Term Employment Prospects 
If it is assumed that, on balance, trade union policy 
will have a neutral effect on the employment of Coloured artisans 
and apprentices, there remain only two important barriers which 
may hinder the absorption of more Coloureds into the industry. 
The first is the hiring practice of employers. It would 
appear that employers discriminate strongly in favour of Whites 
when it comes to hiring artisans. The latest industrial tribunal 
was apparently ~~t:rongly influenced in its final recommendations by 
such evidence from BIFSA : 
"The Federatic,n pointed out in the aforesaid letter 
that it by no means intended to leave the industry's 
existing White artisans in the lurch and that it was 
indeed prepared always to give Whites preference when 
it came to employment. Moreover, the Federation did 
not intend abandoning or relaxing its efforts to re-
cruit Whites, for whom there would always be sufficient 
jobs of a supervisory nature as well as jobs in the 
more popular fields of work". (32) 
It is perhaps this labour preference which will ensure the 'entry 
on a strictly controlled basis' to ~hich the industriaL tribunal 
referred. This contention is supported by the fact that BIFSA 
requested that the 1971 exemption be granted only in the wet trades 
- where shortages were ctippling - and where employers were in no 
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position to exercise a racial bias in recruitment. Thus Coloured 
workers in these trades have had beneficial factors working in 
their favour. 
The tenor of the new Determination reinforces this 
attitude. The Determination still reserves all skilled building work 
for Whites in principle (cf. section 6.3.3). There is also the 
caveat in the Determination that Coloured labour 
"is not at any stage and in respect of any work 
appointed, or permitted, to act in a supervisory 
capacity over a White employee". ( 33) 
Thus, the entry of Coloureds into the industry will 
be hindered by employers' practice of first ensuring (e.g. through 
job advert responses) that no Whites are available for employment 
before recruiting Coloured staff. Certain beneficial forces will 
ease this entry of Coloured workers, e.g. their lower wage demands 
and the fact that no maximum ratio of Coloured Workers is laid down 
in Determinatiori No. 28. 
The second factor affecting the utilisation of Coloured 
labour in the industry may be the shortage of Coloured labour in 
the Transvaal itself, i.e. even if the dernc-md for Coloured labour 
should increase substantially, there may be supply bottlenecks. 
The latest industrial tribunal did not : 
"foresee that, as a result of some relaxation of 
work reservation for which provision is being made 
in the proposed Determination, there should necess-
arily be a considerable inflow of Coloured persons 
to take up skilled jobs in the industry in the 
Republic, except perhaps to a limited degree in the 
Western Cape and also in Natal, where there are 
naturally large concentrations of Coloured persons 
and Asians respectively ••• As far as .•. both 
Coloured races in the Transvaal are concerned, there 
are housing problems and other restrictive factors 
in the light of which a sudden large-scale exodus of 
Coloured persons from other regions to the said 
province can hardly be foreseen"a (34) 
The point here is that the Transvaal does not have a big enough 
Coloured population to support a large building artisan labour 
force - as does the Cape Province or Natal -- which co-u ld gradually 
replace White artisans as they move out of the industry. Even a 
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significant inflow of Coloured artisans - working on a temporary 
basis - from other provinces is unlikely because of the accomo~ 
(35) dation shortage. 
Certain of the barriers on the supply side could be 
partially overcome. Firstly, the housing bottleneck could clearly 
be eased over a longer period. Secondly 5 a small measure of com-
pensation may be that a number of Coloureds presently employed 
in other Witwatersrand industries may choose to become apprenticed 
in the building trades. In 1968, for iristance, there were estimated 
to be 400 Coloured apprentices undergoing training for the fur-
. ( 36) 
niture industry at the Johannesburg Vocational School. Coloured 
artisans have traditionally predominated in the furniture, footwear 
and leather industry in the Transvaal.< 37 ) In other industries, such 
as engineering, their progress into the artisan category has been 
blocked. C3B) One social surveyC 39 ) of a Coloured township in 
Johannesburg in 1964 found that only 20,4 percent of the male working 
population was classified as skilled, whilst 53,4 percent were 
classified as eith2r semiskilled or unskilled. 
In the long-term, the need for Coloured labour in the 
industry could be reduced. Co:oureds are entering the industry as 
skilled artisans, while the whole dynamics in the Transvaal is 
toward the upgrading of semiskilled (cheaper) Africans. Thus, in 
the long-term perspective, the introduction of Coloured artisans 
is quite insignificant - it is merely an attempt to postpone th~ 
~:!:.adjustment, which will be more far-reaching. 
6.4 African Labour Utilisation in the Priv~._t_e Buildi}2g_IndustE.Y. 
6.4.1 Changes in the Labour Structure before 1974 
6.4.1.1 Exemptions from Determination No. 6 and the Bantu 
Building Workers' Act 
Job reservation Determination No. 6 only reserved two 
semiskilled jobs for Whites - the op~ration of power driven cranes 
and lorries over 3 tons in weight.Cl) This was despite the fact 
that the Transvaal agreement of the time set the wages for these 
two jobs at a low wage such that they were nominally non-White. 
The agreement classified vehicle drivers into 3 categories for 
wage purposes drivers of vehicles (a) up to 1 ton, (b) 1 ton 
to 3 tons, and Cc) 3 tons to 5 tons. The reservation of these jobs 
162. 
is significant because they are two of the most highly-paid semi-
skilled jobs in the industry. 
The evidence tendered to the earlier industrial tribunal 
was that the work of lorry driving was increasingly being done by 
Blacks. The tribunal felt that unless the process was stopped, the 
Whites still remaining in these jobs would be ousted. Table 23 
(based on a questionnaire dispatched by the tribunal) shows the 
declining proportion of Whites in the driver category in the firms 
surveyed in the Transvaal from 1955 - 1958. The tribunal argued that 
unless this process was reversed, the interests of semiskilled Whites 
would be harmed. 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Source 
Table 23 
White 
% 
28,2 
25,2 
22,6 
19,5 
R • 1 C "t' f n-·· . i.acia._._ omposi _ion o __ .r: i vers l:t}_ 
the Transvaal Building Industry 
1~-J 5 -· 1 9 5 8 • 
Coloured/Asian African 
% % 
15,6 56,1 
15,4 59,3 
l?. '9 63,3 
15,5 64,8 
Total 
% 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Verslaq en Aanbeveling van die Nywerheidshof ense 
10/7/1959, p.18. 
Since Whites were driving mainly the heavier class of vehicles, it 
was decided to reserve the driving of vehicles of over 3 tons in 
weight only. 
Subsequent events indicate that there were, in fact, no 
semiskilled Whites available for this work. At the wage rates 
normally offered for this job, employers found it impossible to 
recruit enough Whites. As early as May 1962 employers in Bloemfon-
tein were granted an exemption to allow Africans to drive vehicles 
of an unladen weight not exceeding 7 700 lbs. The same exemption 
was granted to employers· in the Transvaal in August of the same 
year.< 2> Although this reservation was not removed as between 
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White and African in Determination No. 28, this restriction has 
(3) 
nevertheless largely gone by default. Apparently,_ three firms 
surveyed during the course of the field-work stated that they did 
not require an exemption of any kind from the Department of Labour 
in order to employ Africans as drivers. The work of drivers is 
( 4) done exclusively by Africans in the industry today. 
At an early date, the Minister of Labour also delegated 
authority to Divisional Inspectors of Labour to grant exemptions 
from Determination No. 6 to individual employers for one year at a 
time to let Blacks drive cranes if no Whites were available for 
the jobs (employers have to check on this at the Department of 
Labour) _CS) The exemptions were granted on condition that employers 
continue endeavours to recruit and train Whites for such employment. 
A concerted effort has in fact been made by the organised 
industry, on behalf of employers, to recruit and train Whites as 
crane-drivers, in order to bring about the full~st possible com-
pliance with Determination No. 6. In 1969 BIFSA devised a scheme in 
order to train Whites as crane drivers. The costs of the stheme were 
borne by the National Development Fund for the Building Industry and 
in October 1973 this scheme h:::td already cost R2 800.< 6 ) The training 
was to be done on the premises of two major suppliers of cranes to 
the industry. MBA members were thereafter required to pay White crane 
operators 75 cents per hours during a two-week probationary period 
(this was in 1969) and thereafter Rl,00 per hour. The minimum rate 
of pay laid down by the industrial council was much lower. Up to 
October 1973, only 143 Whites on the Witwatersrand applied for the 
scheme. Of these 89 were selected for training or employment, 22 
failed to report for training, whilst 60 completed training and 
were placed in employment • Of these, 10 resigned, 37 deserted and 
6 were dismissed for valid reasons, leaving the industry with a net 
( 7) gain of a mere seven. Since 1971 the reservation of this oper-
ation has thus gradually gone by default and the Secretary of 
Labour announced in May 1971 that exemptions would be granted for 
an indefinite period. BIFSA has stated that it is not aware of any 
one instance where the Department of Labour has been in a position 
to offer the services of ~ White operator to replace a Black al-
ready in employment.<_7a) There are still some White crane drivers 
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in the industry today. (See Table 23). 
It may be noted here that the relative ease with which 
these exemptions have been granted has been partly due to ·the 
policy of the Department of Labour to grant exemptions where t~~y 
have had the backing of the industrial council. This has influenced 
the industry to attempt to extend industrial council control in 
( 8) 
recent.years. 
Certain changes have also been made to the Bantu Building 
Workers Act which have opened skilJ.ed work to Africans in urban 
areas other than in the townships. As we have seen, section 14 of 
the Act stated that no employer may, without the written permission 
of the Minister of Labour, employ an African upon skilled work in 
the private building industry in urban areas. The understanding 
between the Department of Labour and the building industry is that 
skilled work for the purposes of the Bantu Building Workers Act 
would not be interpreted to mean anything other than skilled work 
as defined by the industry in its industrial counci·l agreements •. 
Thus the adaptation to change through collective bargaining is not 
subject to formal exempti.on in terms of the Act as is job reser-
vaticn (thus slowing the process down).(g) According to the director 
of BIFSA, the Minister of Labour told the industry in 1963 that 
whatever could be agreed to with the unions as regards job advance-
ment, would be automatically ratified in terms of the Act. 
The Bantu Building Workers A~t was amended in 1955 
(Act No. 60 of 1955) and a new section - section 15 -·p~ohibited 
the employment of Africans on skilled work outside the private 
building industry Hl urban areas other than in Bantu areas. ( lO) The 
intention of section .15 was to prohibit Africans who had acquired 
skills from using them to do, for example, small repair and main-
tenance jobs that fell outside the scope of the industry (e.g. for 
private home-owners). Exemptions have subsequently been granted 
from section 15 and its blanket prohibition : (a) all persons are 
exempted (b~ilding firms included) with respect to the construction 
of garden walls and other garden features, pathways and drives 1 stone 
walls and servant's quarters, (b) the owner-occupier of a house is 
exempted from the Act· with respect to the renovation, repair and 
alteration of (but excluding additions to) any part of a house or 
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flat, and Cc) the owner of a business is exempted with respect to 
the renovation and maintenance of any building used by the firm 
provided that the African is in the regular employ of the firm and 
is not hired solely for that job. (ll) 'The private building industry 
was not affected in any way by exemptions from section 15. 
The exemption has opened many avenues of skilled employ-
ment to Africans, particularly in the field of renovation and 
maintenance. Although not a commonplace sight in the Cape, it is 
common in Johannesburg to see African builders working in suburban 
areas, building garden walls etc. Some of these skills have been 
acquired on-the-job at building firms, whilst other workers are 
trained Bantu Builders. There is no wage-regulating machinery for 
this work, and wages are determined through a private contract 
between the employer and the worker. 
6.4.1.2 Industrial Council Negotiations before 1966 
Until 1966, the Transvaal building industry was one of 
the few that had not undergone any radical structural change in its 
' labour force, in terms of a reclassification of work from skilled 
to se~iskilled labour. In evidence to the first industrial tribunal, 
employers said that certain work had been reclassified as unskilled 
in industrial council agreements because artisans were inclined to 
see it as boring.(l 2 ) In the Transvaal agreement of 4/8/1939, only 
8 unskilled and 5 semiskilled tasks were listed in the industry 
whilst in the agreemerit of 19/3/1958 there were 75 unskilled and 11 
semiskilled tasks.<l3 ) The industrial tribunal saw the increasihg 
number of semiskilled jobs as evidence of the weakening opposition of 
the unions to employer demands. However employers argued that there 
were still many tirne-consumi.ng and unnece::;sary tasks listed as 
artisan's work. 
The structu~e of the industry has thus been traditionally 
constituted of skilled labour in the one extreme and unskilled 
labour in the other extreme. The traditional crafts of building 
artisans in this country,till recently, have remained almost intact 
since the beginning of the century, when the labour structure of 
the industry was epitomised by the bricklayer and his 'handlanger', 
or unskilled helper, the latter doing all unskilled work on site. 
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In an industry such as building it is difficult to 
describe and list all unskilled jobs. Determination No. 6 was able 
to list as many as 90 unskilled tasks in the.industry, ranging from 
guarding of premises, loading and unloading of materials to mixing 
concrete by hand or machine (under supervision), washing down biick 
d t ·th bb · b h d · t · · · t - ( 13a an concre e wi scru ing rus es an assis.ing in various asKs. 
In several cases, the performance of tr.ese tasks by unskilled workers 
was conditional upon White supervision.Cl 4 ) Many of these tasks are 
associated with the carrying of materials and jobs ancillary to 
artisan work. Although the Transvaal agreement made no reference 
to race there was a nominal classification of work by wage rate 
with the effect that skilled work was implicitly reserved for Whites, 
whilst semi- and unskilled work was allocated to African labour. 
Determination No. 6 followed this classification of work. 
Much of the semiskilled work in the industry today was 
allocated to African labour before the series of fragmentation 
agreements concluded in the industry. Perhaps this can be best ex-
plained with reference to the five major groupings bf African workers 
on big building sites - excavation gangs, scaffolding gangs, shut-
tering gangs, concreting and stripping gangs. The scaffolding gang 
is responsible for erecting the platforms on which carpenters work 
when building and measuring shuttering, and also by plasterers 
when working on higher walls. The shuttering gang is responsible 
for building the tray-like structure (on the columns) with steel 
plating, into which concrete is poured, t.e. they are responsible 
for the placing and wedging of supports. They usually work under 
the supervision of a carpenter who does the measurements to ensure 
that the structure is straight8 The concreting gang is responsible 
for the pouring of concrete into this giant tiay, i.e. guiding 
the crane or concrete pump, placing of concrete and smoothing it 
down with flat sticks. The stripping gang is responsible for the 
removal of plates and supports when the concrete has hardened. 
Among the tasks classified under operative grade 5 in 
1972 were the employees in charge of : (a) labourers levelling and 
screeding concrete (under supervision), (b) labourers mixing con-
crete, (c) labourers erecting scaffolding (under supe~vision), 
(d) labourers stripping shuttering and (e) labourers fixing QC 
. (14a) decking plates. In 1966, when there were only 2 operative grades, 
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these five jobs were among the 10 tasks classified as ope~ative 
2 ( 15) s t. grade • ec ·ion leaders .in charge of these operations are 
classified under a higher operative grade. These five jobs are 
considered to be 
Section 6.4.4 on 
section leader in 
foreman said that 
arnongst 
African 
charge 
he was 
the most highly skilled on site (see 
worker training). One firm ranked its 
of shuttering with the site bossboy. The 
doing work which could virtually be 
classified as skilled ~ the only task which he could not do was 
plumbing (which had to be done by the carpenter). 
In addition to the above jobs, the work of driver, hoist 
operator and dumper driver was all allocated to African labour be-
fore the series of reclassification agreements in the 1960's. The 
work of crane driver and lorry driver (over 3 tons) was, as we 
have seen, subject to exemption by the Department of Labour •. 
By 1965 there were signs that the pressure in the 
labour market was at this stage already leading to contrav~ntions 
of legislation.Cl 5 ) In a memorandum drawn up in 1965, the MBA 
representatives on the industrial council stated that the shortage 
of labour meant that 'radical changes in the traditional labour 
struc~ure' were imperative. The memorandum continued that Whites 
simply were not available in sufficient numbers and even ~mprove­
ments in pay and working conditions could not entirely solve the 
( l 7) problem. 
The four unions on the indus-~ial council stated, in a 
replying memorandum, that 
"a radical change in the traditional labour structure 
is not necessary, but an improvement in the working 
conditions of the building industry is". ( 18) 
The point here seems to be that shortages are artificially created 
by management who refuse to increase wages in White categories in 
order to be able to reclassify the job. An important implicit 
assumption made here by the unions, it should be noted, is that 
skilled wages sh6uld be adjusted to respond to conditions in the 
White labour market alone. It implies no realisation of the wage 
elasticity of supply of White artisans. Etheredge suggests that this 
attitude has created a serious lag in other industries as well : 
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"Either there i. s a shortage or there isn't and very 
early on in discussions between management and unions 
common g rotrnd wi 11 have to be reached on this point 
so that meaningful negotiations can proceed". ( 19) 
6.4.1.3 The 1966 and 1969 Agreements 
The first significant fragmentation agreement in the 
industry was published in February 1966. The gist of the agreement 
was that artisans would be relieved of all routine skills still 
defined as artisan's work in the industrial council agreement. The 
tasks considered to be artisans' work were thus listed in the 
agreement. 
It appears that at the negotiations a wide range of 
operations - "hundreds" according to one BIFSA l)fficial - were 
removed from artisan work schedules as a ~es0lt of this process. 
It was deemed to be an impossible task to prescribe rates of pay 
for each and every job. Tasks readily appearing as operative work 
were paid as such. Anything else was paid unskilled wages, with the 
proviso that the unions could raise .any task overlooked and have it 
classified as semiskilled work. 
Job reservation Determination No. 6 was relaxed to enable 
the agreement to be implemented. The Department of Labour stipulated 
that (for one year), exemption would be given from the Determination 
to allow Blacks to perform any work in the industry other than that 
specified in the definition of artisan. However, in practice, the 
. h b d . d f. . t 1 ( 20 ) exemption as een grante in e ini e y. 
In 1966 the industrial council allocated all work in the 
industry into an artisan grade, two semiskilled grades (operatives 
grade 1 and 2) and one unskilled grade. In only three of the 20-
odd designated trades in the industry were important concessions 
made by the unions, i.e. concessions which led to the fragmented 
skill being reclassified as semiskilled rather than unskilled. In 
bricklaying, whereas an operative grade l had previously been al-
lowed to lay outdoor paving in slate, the agreement now permitted 
them to do it in granite and stone as well. The operative grade 1 was 
also allocated the work of jointing (cleaning away the mortar be-
tween two coarses of bricks).( 2 l) 
In plastering, operatives grade 1 were allocated the 
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operation 6f 'a rotating solid disc-type machine for screeding of 
cement or granolithic floors when such machj.ne is used preparatory 
to further finishing by an artisan'. Prior to the 1966 agreement, 
the only other semiskilled job in plastering was the supervision of 
labourers in the levelling and screeding of concrete (operative 
grade 2). The only other semiskilled workers registered as operatives 
d 2 . th t . . . 1 d ( 2 2 ) gra e in - e agreemen were various section ea ers. 
work 
The painting trade - because of the routine nature of the 
lent itself to job dilution. Artisans' work was re-defined 
as excluding "the application of the primary coat or where a primary 
coat is not applied, the application of the first coat of paint on 
. (23) 
all unpainted surfaces''· The work was, however, only graded as 
semiskilled in September 1968. 
Officials of the industrial council and BIFSA, as well 
as employers, were consulted in detail about the impact of the bar-
gain. They were unanimous that - given the shortages of labour at 
the time - the concessions made by the unions were of no practical 
help in alleviating the stresses in the labour market at the time. 
Given that the main work of bricklayers and plasterers is the laying 
of bricks and the application of plaster to walls res~ectively, 
concessions in these trades were not practical. The 1960 agreement 
listed only three tasks under operative grade l and ten under 
operative grade 2. 
According to news reports, one immediate effect of the 
implementation of the agreement - which led to White artisans re-
ceiving substantiaJ. increases in pay and fringe benefits - was the 
• T,Th"t t" (24) sacking of some n i-e ar isans. 
In 1969 further jobs were opened to Blacks in the industry 
as the result of industrial council negotiations. Operative work was 
divided into six grades, instead of the previous two. with aper-
- ( 2 5) 
atives grade 1 getting the highest semiskilled wage. In the brick-
laying trade, African workers were now allowed to operate a 
carborundum saw for brick cutting •. In the painting trade, operatives 
grade 2 could now do assorted things like applying lime wash to 
all surfaces, etc. Certain operations were also released in plaster-
. d 1 ~ trades.( 26 ) ing an o-c11er 
The most significant work opened to Africans in the 
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agreement was block laying ("blocks'' are approximately 1 cubic foot 
in size, made of cement and used in place of bricks). According to 
a government notice signed by the Minister of Labour in February 
1968, blocklaying did not require an exemption from the Bantu 
Building Workers' Act.< 27 ) The laying of blocks was not defined as 
a skilled trade, according to the announcement, because the work 
done and the instruments used were not considered as artisan's 
work. An artisan, however, would be used to set up a metal frame 
(or "jig") on the foundations, into which the blocks would be 
slotted by semiskilled labour. The jig is subsequently removed, and 
merely acts as a guide for the semiskilled worker. 
News reports stated that these concessions were important 
because blocklaying was less skilled labour-intensive than brick-
laying and was a substitute in the construction of houses. Appar-
ently Bester Homes, who were building hundreds of homes for ISCOR 
at Newcastle, were the first to apply this method. <2s) 
In the 1969 agreement, blocklaying was allocated to 
operatives grade 6. The task consisted of "laying of blocks not 
bedded in mortar or mastic", or the laying to a jig of blocks 
bedded in mortar or mastic (where no artisa~ 1 s tools,, i.e. trowels, 
are used in both cases) .< 29 ) The blocks referred to are of the inter-
locking kind used for wall construction. In an amendment to the 
Labourer's Agreement made in 1970 the laying of blocks in the con-
; 
struction of concrete floors and concre·!_c, roofs was opened to 
operatives - again where no artisan's tools are used.< 3o) 
6.4.1.4 The Impact of Negotiations on African Semiskilled 
Employment. 
We may enquire what impact the reclassification agree-
ments had on semiskilled employment up to 1974. We should note 
whilst the 1966 Main Agreement listed 13 semiskilled jobs (under 
operative grade 1 and 2), the 1972 Non-Artisan Agreement already 
made provision for roughly 50 semiskilled jobs (under 6 operative 
grades).< 3oa) With the shortages of White artisan labour increasing 
all the time, we would expect (i) an increase in the ratio of 
operatives to artisans (as White artisans were left with more and 
more supervisory work) and (ii) an increase in the absolute number 
of operatives. 
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Table 23 is the most detailed information available on 
semiskilled employment in the industry. It shows the number of workers 
in each grade in the industry from 1970-1974. Figures for operatives 
grade 5 and 6 were unobtainable but apparently they are the smallest 
operative grades. The information in Table 23 supports the hypo~ 
thesis that the ratio of semiskilled:artisan employed should have 
increased. Between 1970 and 1974, this proportion rose substantially 
from 14,9 percent to 38,4 percent. In fact, the absolute number of 
operatives also increased - from 1 692 to 3 062 (Table 23). 
Artisan 
Cr.Driver 
(White) 
Opern 
Grad€. 1 
Oper. 
Grade 2 
Oper. 
Grade 3 
Oper. 
Grade 4 
Subtotal 
Opers. 
Ratio 
Opers o: 
Artis. 
(%) 
Unskld 
Ratio 
Opers.: 
Unskld 
(%) 
Source 
----
Table 23 
Jan. Nov. 
1970 1971 
Oct. June 
1971 1972 
11340 11370 
57 96 
198 278 
408 1573 
866 n/a 
220 160 
1692 2011 
14,9 17,6 
33119 34706 
5,1 5,7 
Industrial 
Employment in the Witwatersrand 
building Industry 1970 - 1974. 
,July Nov. May Nov. May 
1972 1972 1973 1973 1974 
Oct. April Oct. May Oct. 
1972 1973 1973 1974 1974 
10964 9663 10050 9763 7963 
112 112 137 139 116 
389 177 233 205 190 
2271 1141 1649 1584 1748 
251 338 425 426 353 
26 700 820 899 771 
2937 2356 312 7 3114 3062 
26,7 24,3 31,1 31,8 38,4 
40777 31515 41506 37812 37293 
7,2 7,4 7,5 8,2 8,2 
council stamp sales. 
In order to conclude that fragmentation agreements 
% 
Change 
1970-
1974 
- 29,8 
+103,5 
4,1 
+328,4 
- 59 '3 
+250,4 
----
+ 12 '6 
----
ha•Je 
172. 
,-
\ 
opened up semiskilled jobs to Africans, we need to look at the ratio 
operative:unskilled labour. If the proportion operatives:artisans 
has in~reased, then it should also be true that the proportion 
operatives:unskilled workers should also have risen. This proportion 
did show a small increase - from 5,1 percent to 8,2 percent - but a 
substantially smaller one than the operative: artisan one. Further-
more, the de facto proportion operatives:unskilled probably fell 
sharply, since the de facto growth in unskilled employment was 
probably far greater than that shown in Table 23 (See Section 5.1.2). 
Thus the evidence in this regard is inconclusive. 
However, the large absolute increase in the number of 
operatives between 1970-1974 must also be explained. In order to 
conclude that this has been due to increased semiskilled employ-
ment opportunities made available by job dilution, we need to know 
more about the jobs classified under each grade. Until 1975, Black 
crane drivers were classified under operative grade 1 whilst drivers 
of trucks over 3 500 kgs were classified as operatives grade 2. 
l\.mongst the jobs classed as operative grade 4 were dumper driving, 
and hoist operating.C 3 l) All these ~re common jobs on high-rise 
building sites. The point here is that whilst the increase in op-
eratives .in certain grades is quite high, e.g. operatives grade 2 
and 4 show large increases, this is largely attributable to the 
increase in the number of hoist operators, dumper drivers and truck 
drivers used. 
There is thus no conclusive evidence that the increasing 
absolute number of operatives and the increasing proportion oper-
atives: artisans shown by Table 23 has been due to the industry's 
j_ncreasing use of operatives to relieve artisan shortages. There 
are two feasible explanations for this. Firstly, the package of 
skills reclassified at the fra~mentation agreements were not a 
significant proportion of artisans' work and this prevented a 
further increase in the ratio operative: artisan. Many important 
artisan functions were also being channelled into work contraventions 
by unskilled labourers during this period (see Section 5.3.4) •. 
This prevented an increase in the de jure ratio operatives:artisans~ 
Secondly, the practice of one firm surveyed was to 
classify its workers as unskilled and tt1en pay them on a pro rata 
basis for semiskilled work performed. This was done because many of 
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the jobs reclassified did not occupy operatives full-time. The ' 
industrial council agreement lays down that employees who on the 
same day perform two grades of work, where the work is performed 
for three hours or less at the higher grade, be paid on a pro rata 
b . (32) i::r . t 4 asis. r.owever, ti1e large number of job reservation con raven.:-
ions at the time probably influenced some firms not to pay semi-
skilled rates at all. 
Finally, to get a broader perspective of the progress that· 
has been made in the reclassification of artisan work in the building 
industry, we may compare the ratio operatives:artisans in building 
to the higher proportion in the whole industrial sector. Table 24 
shows that the latter ratio was roughly 8:1 in 1969 (Column 4, Table 
24) • 
Artisan/ 
Apprent. 
Super-
visor 
Subtotal 
Artisan/ 
Super-
visor 
Operator 
Semi-
skilled 
Subtotal 
Operator 
/Semi-
skilled 
Other 
Total 
Ratio 
Table 24 
( 1) ( 2) 
Racial Composition of Industrial 
Labour in South Africa in 1969. 
T • ooo). 
Racial Composition % 
(3) (4) ( 5) (6) ( 7) 
White Colour./ African Total White Colour./ African 
Asian Asian 
70 8 0 78 90 10,0 
15 3 4 22 68,2 13,6 18,2 
85 11 4 100 
65 168 252 485 13,4 34,6 52 0 
' . 
36 287 323 11,1 88,9 
-·--
65 204 539 808 
118 33 48 199 59,3 16,6 24,1 
268 248 591 1107 24,2 22,4 53,4 
Op./semi-
skilled: 76 '4 1854,5 13475,0 808,0 
art./ 
2.2_Vr.% 
Source S.Biesheuvel, 11 Black Industrial Labour in Sot-1.frica" ,S.A~J.E~ 
Vol.42 1974, p.311. 
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We note that, even in 1974, the building industry was well behind 
the whole industrial sector in 1969. The inference here is that 
because there have been no traditional work patterns in many manu-
facturing industries, many new industries - helped by technolog~cal 
progress - have de noyo been able to establish occupational divis-
ions which are ~till being implemented in the building sector. In 
the following sectior1 further important changes in this regard are 
discussed. 
6.4.2 The 1974/1975 Agreement. 
6.4.2.1 Background 
The negotiation of the 1974/75 agreement came about as a 
result of the failure of the two previous agreements to bring any 
meaningful relief to employers. By contrast, when the new agreement 
was publicised, it was stated that "the settlement is one of the 
most important agreements that has been made in the industry for a 
long time".c 33 ) An MBA spokesman described it as "a major break-· 
through, affecting every building trade, with the possible exception 
of painting, in which considerable concessions have already been 
d II (34) ma e • 
Under the normal negotiating procedures of the industry, 
the industrial council calls for proposals before the new agreement 
expires. The Transvaal industrial council called for proposals in 
August 1972, and the first were receivec in November 1972. Given 
the demands of employers for substantial concessions from the 
unions and union reluctance to fragment the trades any further, the 
general secretary of the industrial council realised that negotiations 
would be difficult. Thus, a small two-man sub-committee was appoin-
ted (Gert Beetge representing the four unions). After making a 
report, the main negotiating committee got together. At the end of 
1973 it was reported that tentative agreement had been reached.c 35 ) 
It was in fact not until October 1975 that the agreement was finally 
d f bl . t. ft 1 t tl . f t. t. ( 36 ) rea y or pu ica:ion - a er a.mos iree years o nego ia ions. 
6.4.2.2 Content of the Agreement 
The agreement rearranged all semiskilled jobs in the 
industry into three operative grades - operatives grade 1 to 3 -
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with operatives grade 1 receiving the highest wage. The general 
secretary of the industrial council stated in discussion that the 
industry had switched back from 6 to 3 operative grades for 
"administrative reasons 11 • This clearly gi·v-es employers fewer categ-
ories into which they can pigeon-hole semiskilled workers and less 
leeway in distinguishing in pay between jobs. The implications of 
this will be discussed in Section 7.3. 
Important aspects of artisan work -- previously reserved -
were re-allocated to operatives grade 1 in the agreement. In ten 
trades, important concessions were made by the unions : block and 
brick setting, carpentry and joinery, drainlaying, floorlaying, 
glazing, metal work, plastering, structural carpentry, stonework and 
tiling. In bricklayina, the agreement permitted operatives grade 1 
to set, in mortar, blocks, bricks, slabs and/or stone in walling 
( 3 7) intended to be covered by plaster. This is a significant con-
cession, since stockbricks (i.e. those covered by plaster) are 80 
percent of all bricks laid. The agreement reserved for artisans 
"setting out; determining levels; ••• plumbing angles; tuck pointingno 
( 38) 
In plastering_, operati·1es grade 1 were allowed to render 
mater~al to rough surfaces, rule off and do preliminary finishing 
t t f . 1 t 11' d f" 1 f" . . . 1· th t• <39 ) prepara ory -o ina . rowe ing an . ina ·1.nisning DY . e. ar is an e 
In practice, this means that operatives will be able to do all 
plastering on walls whilst the artisans will merely come along 
afterwards and do finishing off, i.e. re.":Jving blemishes etc. with 
a steel trowel. 
In structural-car2entry, operatives grade l were allocated 
th bl -1· h ' t . . th t ( 40 ) h. 1 t t . e assem y o.c s ut ering in - e agreemen , w J_ s - ar-:isans 
were left with the tasks of "marking out; setting out; plumbing and 
levelling of columns and beams; lining up of shuttering for con-
f . II ( 41 ) I t . l" t. ' 1 . tt d t 1 cre-:ing • n ~l ing, opera i ves graoe are permi - e o app .y 
mortar, cut and fix tiles, whilst artisans are responsible for 
setting out.< 42 ) 
Without exception, all mechanical and repetitive work in 
the artisan's job was reclassified as semiskilled work, whilst 
artisans were implicitly only left with supervisory work. 
One of the important features of the agreement is that 
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the employmemt of operatives in the industry is being controlled 
by an official ratio - operatives grade 1 : artisans - laid down 
by the industrial council. This feature of the agreement is analysed 
within the context of employment safeguards in Section 6.4.3.l. 
The agreement also reversed the industry's previous ban 
on two working practices in the industry - labour-only contracting 
and piecework. 'l'he Non-Artisan Agreement of 13/10/72 stated : "No 
employer shall give out work on a labour-only contract basis" and 
nthe giving out b(l\ employers or the performance by employees of 
k · 0 kb · · 11·b·td" c42 a.). war on a piece-wor asis is pro il i-e • 
It was decided to legalise labour-only subcontracting in 
view of its widespread use in the industry previously. By controlling 
and monitoring the move~ents of these subcontractors, the industrial 
council could more easily check on the employment conditi6ns of 
their employees and thus safeguard against labour exploitation. An 
onus is placed in the new agreement on main contractors to inform 
the council within seven days of the employment of a labour-only 
contractor. This includes details such as the exact location of 
the building site, etc. Furthermore, all labour-only contractors 
are obligated to register as 3uch at the industrial council at the 
( 43) beginning of each year. 
reasons 
The decision to re-introduce piecework was made for two 
the first is because a payment-by-results scheme makes 
payment dependent upon the amount of work completed. Thus the 
artisan is not paid per hour, irrespective of the amount of work 
done, which could help to combat the practice of scarce artisans 
turning in a poor productivity performance because of their scarcity 
value. 'l'he agreement also contains a minimum wage requirement, i.e. 
that the earninas of a pieceworker in toto exceed the minimum wage 
. ( 4Ll) for artJ_sans. 
The second reason for the introduction of piece-work is 
that labour-only contractors (who also work on a piece-work basis) 
have earned high wages, using African labourers to boost performance 
by allowing them e.g. to lay bricks. Thus artisans in regular em-
ployment did not have this freedom to use these Africans legally 
or to use piece-work systems while labour-only contractors did,giving 
them unequal access to improved earnings. Thus the introduction of 
operatives and piece-work was strongly backed by some union members 
wanting the freedom to improve their performance. 
6.4.3 The Bargaining Structure and the Agreements 
An Assessment 
6.4.3.1 Employment Safeguards 
The series of agreements negotiated between 1960 and 
1975 have also led to union demands for the backstop of a redun-
dancy agreement. Implicitly these demands also include undertakings 
to the effect that White wages will not be reduced, Whites will not 
be sacked and that retraining facilities will be available to give 
Whites opportunities to move into higher-paid jobs. 
One major fear of the building unions has been that 
major reclassification agreements have generally followed building 
booms, i.e. when conditions in the labour market are not as tight. 
To allay these fears, the Minister of Labour announced in 1968 
that the Department of Labour was approving such agreements on 
condition that, should a recession take place, such jobs were to 
be re~lassified as White.< 45 ) 
The 1975 Main Agreement made provision for a s~stem of 
controlling (at industrial council level) the ratio of operatives 
grade 1 to artisans. We recall that negotiations released the most 
significant aspects of the artisan's job to operatives, e.g~)the 
general secretary of the industrial council spoke of the ''terrible 
problem" in negotiations over bricklaying because there was nothing 
substantial left to hand over except the actual laying of bricks. 
The agreement thus made provision for controlling the number of 
operatives in the industry. 
( 46) The plan as developed is that every three months 
the industrial council will ascertain the shortage of artisans -
a ratio operatives grade 1 : artisans would be set in accordance 
with the slmrtage. Thus there will be a ceiling on the number of 
operatives to be employed. All firms have to get an individual 
exemption for each operative grade 1 employed (see following para-
graph) , whilst the total number of exemptions granted by the in-
dustrial council will be in accordance with the fixed ratio at the 
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time, as laid down by the industrial council. 
The procedure, according to the latest agreement~ is 
that every operative grade 1 employed must be registered with the 
industrial council within seven days of being employed as such, the 
onus being on the employer to send an application form to the in-
dustrial council. The industrial council can refuse an application 
or send a certificate of registration. It originally had the power 
to withdraw a certificate without notice, although this clause 
providing for immediate dismissal was vetoed by the Central Bantu 
Labour Board and the normal period of notice for the industry now 
applies. However, operatives grade 1 still h~ve a rather insecure 
employment tenure in the industry. 
Thus, it appears that whilst many sk~ll clusters are 
negotiable on the part of the unions, this only applies to booms. 
In a slump the registered unions want to preserve such work for 
themselves. By 1976 the indu~try was in a recession with the con-
sequent heightening of replacement fears. 
The unions - as one of the parties to the industrial 
council - have part power in determining the numb~r 0~0 operatives 
in the industry. This would lend weight to the argument that this 
operative system is not a forward-looking step but merely an attempt 
to protect union members against encroachment. The need for such 
controls became greater when the unions - under pressure from 
management - had to modify their concept of the rate-for-the-job 
so that inflated rates of pay were not perpetuated amongst op-
eratives grade 1. 
Another guarantee - this time in the form of a prefer-
ential employment agreement - was offered by the. MBA. According to 
officials at the industrial council, this is not going to be written 
into the agreement but has been accepted as an industrial council 
resolution. The resolution states : 
"The parties to the Council have agreed to guarantee 
preferential employment for a period of 20 years as 
from 1/1/1975 or until earlier retirement to all 
skilled employees except those working 1) under an 
exemption of any determination made by the Minister 
in terms of Section 77 of the Act, and 2) in trades 
into which persons registered in categories other 
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than skilled employees have been given an opportunity 
to assist thrcugh the ratio sys tern" o (4 7) 
According to news reports, the industry stated at the time that it 
had a Rl million unemployment fund to guarantee full back pay to 
( 48) . 
unemployed artisans for twenty years. However, accordJ_nJ to 
BIFSA officials I spoke to, unemployed artisans are only entitled 
to such pay if the industry is availing itself of operatives -
working in the same trade as that of the unemployed artisan -
provided through the ratio system at the time. 
If the system works as intended, the unions will have 
no alternative but to agree to increase the ratio operatives 
grade 1 : artisans 1 given that White artisans are leaving the in-
dustry so rapidly (Section 5.3.1.5) and that the inflow of Coloured 
artisans is not expected to be compensatory. With slight re-
interpretation, the purpose of the ratio agreement may be to foster 
this process of adjustment in the labour market with a minimum of 
friction between the unions and management. That is, the extent to 
which the ratio changes will be determined by the pace at which 
White artisans leave the sector. This precludes the possibility 
of retrenchment of artisans in accordance with the maximum feasible 
operative grade 1 : artisan ratio on site. 
Whether the wage set for operatives grade 1 will retard 
their use by employers is very difficult to predict a priori. How-
ever, the normaJ. employment effect of high minimum wages are 
exacerbated by factors such as employer prejudice (where two races 
occupy one job) and lack of training, both of which have more im-
pact in the short-than in the long-run. 
The rapidity of change appears to be such that BIFSA is 
planning - for the near future - to establish a training channel 
(for Whites only) such that they can circumvent apprentice training 
and the artisan strata altogether. In a newspaper interview, the 
director of BIFSA stated : 
"the industry was working on C!- plan to cut down the 
period of apprenticeship training, and was also 
intending to set up a scheme under which selected 
recruits would be trained specifically as charge 
hands without ever going through traditional artisan 
training ••• this should help solve the manpower 
shortage - it will be training for a proper purpose. 
At the moment training is constructed on a broad 
J.80e 
field; people are trained for things they will never 
need to do in practice ••• the new scheme will make 
the industry more attractive as a career by allowing 
immediate possibilities for specialisation and super-
visory functions' 1 4 He added : "The likelihood is that 
the new charge hand training will be available to 
Whites entering the industry. Coloured people and 
Indians, where the law a.llows it, will go through the 
reconstructed and reduced period of artisan training''.(49) 
6.4.3.2 Wage and Fringe Benefit Gains 
One important consequence of the series of agreements 
negotiated in the industry has been the payment of increased wages 
and fringe benefits to artisans. There is strong evidence that -
whilst operatives' ~ages have also been improved because they have 
taken over jobs from Whites and retained part of the higher earn-
ings - White wage increases at negotiations have exceeded pro-
ductivity gains. The unions have tried to portray this as an 
attempt to coax White workers back to the industry; however it has 
increasingly been seen as one manifestation of the power which the 
registered unions have to.block the occupational mobility of Black 
workers on terms other than their own. 
This feci.ture of fragmentation agreements (in industry) 
was discussed by the SPROCAS Economics Commission, which reported 
that 
"The result of negotiations between mana9ement and the 
representatives of White and occasionally Indian and 
Coloured trade unions regarding the 'dilution' of 
certain jo~ categories is that the represented workers 
receive incrRased benefits as do the employers who are 
now able more 1 rationally' to utilise their African 
labour force in these diluted jobs"$ (SO) 
Before looking at the precise details of the negotiations, 
we must consider the wage and fringe benefit structure of artisans 
in the industry. These fringe benefi 1cs fa 11 into four major 
categories : a) the holiday.fund - a weekly contribution made by 
employers only to compensate artisans for loss of earnings during 
builders' holidays; the accumulated contributions are collected 
at the end of each year by artisan~; b) medical aid and c) the 
pension fund. The latter consists of three different payments. 
First is a pension scheme. Second is the death benefit, a cash pay-
ment Co£ c·Lirrently up to R4 000) to the dependents of an artisan j_f 
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he dies whilst still working in the industry. The last is the 
permanent disability benefit, a monthly payment made to those per-
manently disabled whilst working in the industry. The fourth cat-
egory, d) consists of a group of four funds - the sick fund, un-
employment stabilisation fund, inclement weather fund and tool 
insurance fund. These funds were established to compensate artisans 
a part of the earnings lost due to unavoidable circumstances. 
The last two categories, c) and d) are collectively 
referred to as the benefit fund. Contributions to medical aid and the 
benefit fund are shared with the artisan (although employers still 
pay about 80 percent of the total weekly contribution). Contributions 
to the holiday fund are made solely by employers. These contributions 
are shown in Table 28 (Appendix 1, .Section 7). 
At reclassification agreements the emphasis has been on 
improving union members' fringe benefits rather than their minimum 
wages. Improvements in wages flow naturally fro~ competition be-
tween employers for labour and, given the large amount of wage drift 
in White wages, ~tis unlikely that there would be any overall im-
provement in the position of the artisan if minimum wages were in-
creased. Furthermore, artisan wages in the industry have been on an 
automatic cost-of-living adjustment since the early 1950's. 
Fringe benefit contributions and payments are set at 
negotiations and usually run for the length of an agreement; there 
is no automatic adjustment mechanism. Thus the increase in thes~ 
fixed payments a.re a priority when a new agreement ·is negotiated. 
The level of benefits is considered highly ~elevant in the building 
industry because they often compensate for unavoidable occupational 
hazards of the industry, i.e. loss of earnings due to unemployment, 
wet weather, injury, etc. 
As far as the writer is aware, 1966 was the first frag-
mentation agreement in the industry where the unions received 
benefits for allowing the fragmentation of jobs. Thus it most prob-
ably set a precedent in the building industry and possibly in in-
dustry generallya The concessions granted by the MBA to the unions 
were mainly in the form of fringe benefits such as improved pensions, 
medical aid and sick benefits. To finance this, employers' weekly 
contributions to the benefit fund were trebled from Rl,68 before the 
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agreement to R4,89 after it. (Table 28). Whereas the ordinary hol-
iday fund allowance for artisans was 7,25 cents per hour at the time, 
the agreement introduced a special holiday bonus (for artisans only) 
which was 10,2 cents per hour, thereby more than doubling holiday 
pay for artisans. (See Table 28). It was estimated that this would 
give every artisan an extra R200 in holiday pay at the end of every 
( 51) year. 
One of the biggest concessions made was in regard to the 
benefit fund. Payments under category (d) referred to above - the 
wet weather, unemployment stabilisation funds etc. - have always 
been restricted to a percentage of wages. For example, if an 
artisan was off sick, he would be remunerated a fraction of his 
wages by the fund but under the rules of the funds would not get 
his stamp. The biggest carrot in front of the trade unions at the 
1966 negotiations was the offer that, for example, if an artisan 
were off sick, he would earn part wages as well as the full stamp, 
i.e. there would be no loss of continuity in his benefits if he was 
not working. It has been estimated that the cost of all the con-
cessions mentioned above to employers amounted to an additional 
R8,00 per artisan per week.( 52 ) There was also a small increase in 
minimum wages. 
It is not clear what concessions the unions gained from 
the 1969 fragmentation agreement; however, over the entire period 
from 1966 to 1974 benefits continued to rise, whether or not in the 
context of such bargains. The cumulative rise over this entire 
period was, however, not as great as the increases granted in 1966 
alone. 
An important change introduced in the 1975 Main Agree-
ment was the restructuring of artisan benefits. Till this time, 
artisans earning substantially different wages were being paid the 
same stamp because only one set of benefits is laid down for each 
occupational grade in the industry. It was decided that the weekly 
contribution to benefits by employers (and the value of the stamp) 
would be determined by the average wage earned by an artisan. This 
was a particularly important innovation for foremen, since no 
special minimum wage.is set for them (although they always earn more 
than the best-paid artisans) and they get the artisan stamp. 
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The minimum wage of artisans was increased from Rl,52 to 
Rl,76 in the draft of the new Main Agreement whilst the value of 
the artisan stamp immediately prior to it was Rl9,70 per week. The 
new sliding scale adopted for stamps was as follows : artisans 
earning between Rl,76 and Rl,97 per hour became eligible for the 
lowest artisan stamp value, i.e. R27,39. Artisans earning between 
Rl,97 and R2,43 earn a stamp valued at R31,19. (Such artisans are 
now called "master artisans" in the industry) , whilst those earning 
(53) . 
above R2,43 earn a stamp worth R35,79. This last category are 
referred to as supervisors, since they are by and large foremen. 
Table 28 gives greater details of changes in fringe 
benefits, and shows that all categories of benefits were raised 
substantially. 
When the Main Agreement was eventually published in 
October 1975, the artisan minimum wage was Rl,92 (by virtue of a 
rise in the cost-of-1.iving index in this interim period). The 
Agreement stipulated that on 1/11/1975, 1/5/1976 and 1/11/1976 
(the dates on which half-yearly adjustments based on increases in 
the cost-of-living are made to artisan wages), increases of 20 cents, 
25 cents and 30 cents per hou~ (respectively) over and above the 
cost-of-living allowance were to be granted.< 54 ) 
It appears that artisans will benefit greatly from this 
three-tier system of stamps. According to the general secretary of 
the BBV, in October 1975 only 19 percent of all artisans in the 
industry were on the minimum scale whilst 46 percent and 35 percent 
were in the middle and top brackets respectively.< 55 ) According to 
the general secretary of the AUBTW, his members on the middle stamp 
are now taking home R800 holiday pay (bonus plus ordinary holiday 
pay) .. 
Those artisans who will benefit most from the increased 
wages and fringe benefits negotiated are clearly those whose earn-
ings qualify them for the middle or top stamp. If an artisan wage 
hierarchy - in which White artisans earn higher _?.v~g.s wages than 
Coloured artisans - is established, then White artisans will benefit 
most from the increased stamp values negotiated. There is also a 
status attachment here, since these artisans will be referred to as 
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"master artisans" whilst this will not apply to those earning lower 
artisan wages. 
. ( 56) The Star estimated that the effect of the stamp 
increases (i.e. fringe benefits alone) in the draft agreement 
would be to raise the cost of building the average home by R280. 
With these increased contributions from employers have 
gone increased benefits. For example, inclement weather benefits 
used to be Rl,00 per working hour after the first four working 
hours per week lost due to inclement weather (the first four hours 
lost are not compensated) • In the new agreement this amount was 
raised to Rl,50 per working hour. The sick benefit, which used to 
pay R3,20 per working day for the first 65 working days in any cycle 
of one year, had its payments increased to R7,00 for the first 15 
days in any cycle of one year and thereafter R3,20 for another 50 
days.CS 7) The only other major change in the ruies of the stabil-
isation fund was the 20 year employment preference clause. 
The unions have also gained certain rule ch~nges as a 
result of bargaining. For example, t'he amendment to the Main Agree-
ment in 1970 provided that all overtime in excess of one hour per 
day on weekdays and up to 5 p.m. on Saturdays was to be remunerated 
at a rate of one-and-one-third times ordinary wages, whilst any 
overtime after 5 p.m. on Saturdays, or on Sundays; public holidays 
and builders' holidays was remunerated at one-and-6ne hal~ times 
(58) . 
ordinary wages.· These rates had in fact been adjusted upwards 
from one-and-one-quarter and one-and-one-third respectively in the 
amendment. In the 1975 Main Agreement, these rates were raised to 
one-and-a-half and two respectively.C 59 > Whereas builders were 
previously only bound to give two working days' notice to workers 
who had been with them for more than two days (no notice period was 
required for workers who had less than two days' service), the new 
agreement provided that no artisan may be given less than five working 
days' notice after the completion of 65 working days' service.) C5o> 
It should be pointed ou~ that the extent of job enrich-
ment has not set an upper limit to the wage settlements made between 
the unions and the MBA. The redundancy agreement referred to in 
Section 6.4.3.l should further have lessened the constraint that 
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real prod0ctivity increases exert on trade union demands for wage 
increases. Given the strong preference that employers have for 
White artisan labour - as well as the redundancy safeguard - the 
brunt of any employment cutback resulting from a wage-productivity 
comparison could well be borne by Coloured artisans. 
The unions would appear to be in a particularly powerful 
position to achieve wage increases at fragmentation negotiations. 
BIFSA, in its submissions to the latest industrial tribunal, 
stated 
"Labour, having benefited materially from spiralling 
premium wages, is now determined to entrench its 
position by "sellingn the protection afforded by 
work reservation - which most if not all of the 
trade unions regard as a dismal failure - for a min-
imum wage far in excess of prevailing average wages. 
This unrealistic approach to negotiations uninten-
tionally arises out of work reservation and amounts 
to exploitation of Government policy as formulated in 
the Riekert Report ••• It goes without saying that 
the virtual right of veto conferred on the trade unions 
by this policy will have disastrous consequences for 
the economy as a whole". ( 61) 
It added 
"It is submitted with all due respect that in a1: 
organised industry like the Building Industry, the 
term 'uncontrolled dilution' is a misconception and 
that work reservation, instead of curbing dilution, 
has placed an unnecessary and inflationary premium 
on the dilut_i_on process". (62) 
The.wage and accompanying benefit increases pressed for 
at negotiations may well be a minimum income requirement (as 
insurance against White wage deflation) demanded in return for 
concessions on the entry of Black workers to the skilled trades. 
In this context, the increased rate of overtime pay negotiated at 
the latest agreement may also be interpreted as an attempt to 
compensate for anticipated loss of overtime earnings for artisans. 
due to easier labour market conditions in the future. 
It is possibly tautological - but nevertheless worth 
repeating - that the bargaining power of the unions at reclass-
ification negotiations increases the freedom they have to win the 
best deal for their members. In the context of the latest negot-
iations, the unions have instituted a programme for protecting 
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their earnings - and share of employment - in the indu~try. The 
type of payments negotiated, e.g. increased pension payments, etc., 
reflect the increased average age of the labour force~ 
It is likely that the package deal bargained for will 
set up pressure to speed up the withdrawal of White artisans from 
the sector. There are two inter-related reasons for this. Firstly, 
it is argued that the only sound basis for wage increases in this 
context is job enrichment. It is likely that the conclusion of the 
latest negotiations (with the introduction of increased wage scales) 
is not coterminous with White job enrichment, because in this in-
stance the negotiations have largely given, legal recognition to 
the prevailing occupational structure. In effect, this could imply 
that White job enrichment was compensated by the market as it 
occurred, i.e. as the factor of production White labour became more 
scarce in the 1960's and 1970's, its marginal productivity was 
rising all the time and this was reflected in increased wages. 
Secondly, to trie extent that these wage increases cannot 
be compensated for by retrenchment of White artisans(~ 3 )Csee foot-
note) employers may well attempt to reduce costs in other areas, 
e.g. by a reduction in information costs incurred in ~2cruiting 
White labour. This could be reflected, for example, in decreased 
efforts to recruit White apprentices by employers. Should this 
occur, it will slow down the rate of increase in the White artisan 
labour force and speed up their exit from the sector. 
6.4.4 African Training 
Although the focus of this study is on occupational 
mobility of Black workers, it is important to describe the efforts 
of the industry to train Black labour. This will help to give a 
' 
more dynamic perspective on the upward shifting of the colour bar. 
The aim in this section is to emphasise two thoughts. Firstly, how 
the shortage of skilled labour has manifested itself in African 
worker training and the problems to be overcome. This corresponds 
with the view that the industry is 9radually shifting its attention 
from overcoming the bottleneck in supplies of skilled White labour 
to overcoming bottlenecks in the supply of Black semiskilled labour. 
Secondly, it attempts to indicate the extent of training of Black 
labour in the ·industry, i.e. employer demand as a crucial deter-
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minant of the training facilities, and the scope for skill 
acquisition. Comprehensive information on training in the industry 
was obtainable both from BIFSA, which is handling employers' train-
ing needs, and also through interviews with some of the larger firms 
which instituted training schemes for African workers several years 
ago. 
We will begin by attempting to give a micro-perspective 
of the needs of the firm and the problems involved in training be-
fore looking at the extent and nature of formal training facilities. 
6.4.4.1 The Benefits of Training 
It was brought home again and again in discussions with 
offici~ls in the industry that its attitude to Black labour is 
changing from one of 'benign neglect' to a more positive attitude 
which can crudely be summed up as 'we need you'. (This is evident 
from the empirical investigation discussed in previous sections and 
will become more evident in this section) • Spandau describes the 
former attitude as follows : "as long as tr.e worker performs the 
assigned job satisfactoriJ.;_Y (irrespective of whether he's an old or 
k ) I I J • l 1 t b • • f 1 th • b t • • ( 64 ) new wor er 1e s un_i~e y o e given in -orma on- e-JO raining. 
He argues that industrial skills amongst Africans hav1=- been acquired 
mainly through learning-by-doing in local industry and therefore 
cannot even be categorised as on-the-job trcining, since" by on-the-
job training I understand a training process which takes place 
while the worker is actually engaged in producing the firm's 
tr (65) product • 
In the building industry, this 'learning-by-doing' has 
- more often than not - meant that n~w workers are assigned to one 
of the gangs 6n site, e.g. a shuttering gang, and would be instructed 
by the bossboy or occasionally by a White foreman. But as Steenkamp 
has said : "training of Africans has for too long been left in the 
hands of foremen or supervisors who are often either unsympathetic 
or incapable of teaching others". ( 66 ) 
Another factor which emerged from the field-work was· that 
promotion was often based on length of service with the firm or 
acquaintance with the foreman. Promotion of African workers depended 
on the foreman's judgement, and he would often choose someone who 
could speak English or Afrikaans rather than someone with inherent 
ability. 
The industry has also been losing its semiskilled workers 
at a rapid rate. This is seen to counter efficiency and therefore 
higher wages in the semiskilled grades. As the ihdustrial relations 
manager of Roberts Construction has said 
"Basically, what costs the money is turnov-er in labour. 
Among Blacks, in the period April 1974 to March 1975,· 
this stood at 62 percent of the total work force in the 
contracting industry - peaking at 101 percent just after 
Christmas when workers failed to report back after 
builders' holidays ••• What it all boils down to is that 
the industry is having to replace well over half its 
labour force every year. And it costs at least R750 to 
replace a White worker and RlOO to replace a Black worker 
in terms of advertising, training, induction and what 
have you. So at a conservative estimate the industry is 
losing R3 million a year due to labour turnover". (67) 
This high labour turnover would seem to be due to two 
problems faced by the industry. Firstly, there is the "hire and fire" 
philosophy of employers in the industry and the inadequate vision 
of foremen when it comes to knowing which workers to lay off, al-
thous~ even medium-sized firms surveyed did have some rudimentary 
plans to transfer key Black workers to other sites when work on one 
site came to an end. According to the Murray and Roberts survey of 
Black hourly-paid labour in the industry, labour turnover is lowest 
amongst medium-sized companies and highest among the largest con-
tractors, possible because in medium-si~ed firms management is 
. (68) 
more in touch with events on site. 
However, another important factor emerged which may 
provide a different explanation of the phenomenon of high labour 
turnover. The largest firms would appear to have a higher turnover 
in skills because they move from rural to urban areas and cannot 
move their labour force with them. "Raw" recruits are often hired 
on the spot and trained for one particular job. For example, 
Roberts Construction were awarded the contract to build the culverts 
for the Sishen-Saldanha scheme, a job which lasted almost three 
years. Labour was recruited in the area, trained on site but then 
released at the end of the contract because their skills were 
specific to the project. Thus labour turnover not only rose but there 
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was also wasted training to some extent. 
On the termination of the worker's twelve month contract 
he is required to return to his homeland, report to the tribal 
labour bureau, and there await re-employment. This procedure would 
give weight to those protagonists of the argument that the migrant 
labour system in South Africa is extremely inefficient; there is a 
high labour turnover which militates against workers acquiring skills 
and training. Apart from the fact that twelve months is gen~rally 
too short for a worker to become fully proficient in his occupation, 
or just as he is acquiring the skills he is forced to leave the job, 
it is further argued that employers will not be prepared to invest 
in human capital (i.e. in the form of education and on-the-job 
training) if the workers are ?nly temporary resources. 
We have already noted the inefficiency inherent in the 
practic~ of rewarding length of service by promotion. This appears 
to be symptomatic of a view taken by supervisors in the industry 
that Black workers are an indifferentiated mass of temporary mig.i;:-ants 
with little or no difference in aptitude. The experience of some 
large mining houses in aptitude selection has shown this to be an 
inefficient practice and will be discussed later in this section. 
As one building industry chief says : "It is not so much ~ question 
of training the labour as training the supervisors to uie the labour 
(69) properly". Yet, such inefficient practices perpetuate the view 
that African workers are untrainable, that they are expendable 
labour units, rather than people with a capacity for internalising 
skills. Although this former view was denied by builders spoken to, 
one quickly gains this impression whilst on a building site obser-
ving working practices. 
By all accounts, formally training workers in certain 
rudimentary work in the industry has led to substantial increases in 
productivity. One major Transvaal contractor has shown that, after 
training "raw" African recruits from the homelands for one week 
prior to sending them on site, a 25 percent reduction in labourer 
requirements for the same output o.ould be achieved.(?O) This is in 
accord with recent research work in South Africa which, says Spandau, 
has shown that the African's quality as a skilled worker is closely 
t . d t h" 1 1 f' . . ( 7 l) ie o is eve o Lrainingo 
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A very important factor in productivity is the improve-
ment which occurs on a site as organisational problems get sorted 
out and operatives get accustomed to familiar tasks. In one study 
cited by the Phelps Brown Commission in the United Kingdom, it was 
shown that the difference between average labour requirement for 
work early in the sequence of construction and the average when a 
steady tempo of work had been achieved was found to be about 8 
percent for conventional construction and 12 percent for prefabricated 
construction.( 72 ) In one Cape Town firm, a short induction course 
held prior to workers going on site simply taught the labourers care 
and handling of tools, kinetic handling methods for building mater-
ials and the different types of equipment on site. These consider~ 
ations seem to be equally if not more true of semiskilled labour, 
except that the initial training period (i.e. on-the-job) is longer. 
The training manager of Murray and Stewart (Eastern Province) has 
shown that a 50 percent increase in output can be achieved by any 
five-man team after a four-day course in formwork, scaffolding or 
1 lf". C 73 ) s .:::ee ixing. . 
The features just described may, incidentally,have im-
portant implications for wage and employment policy since contractors 
are able to respond to increased wages in the unskilled and semi-
skilled grades by instituting simplified training and then reducing 
their labour complement. 
6.4.4.2 The Content of Training Schemes 
Following on what has been said above, t_he industry has 
had within its capability the ability to devise training schemes 
embodying the following characteristics : a) they are within the_ 
bounds of government policy, i.e. they impart skills that African 
workers are legally allowed to do; b) the schemes are of fairly 
low cost whilst the returns (if the workers have had no training 
experience before) are high; and c) they may employ some form of 
systematic selection procedure to sqrt out those most adaptable 
to skilled work and those who will respond most rapidly to train-
ing. We may consider each of these characteristics in turn. 
These trainin~ schemes have been able to proceed in 
construction without.any large-scale relaxation of occupational 
barriers to Africans because there has been little organised train-
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ing even for those jobs long since opened to Africans. Such jobs 
include shuttering, scaffolding and steelfixing. A survey carried 
out by the Building Industries' Recruitment and Training Fund a 
few y~ars back asked employers to rank semiskilled labour in order 
of greatest shortage. Significantly the results show that training 
is still needed in those jobs Africans have been doing for many 
years .-
1. Shuttering hand r Mixer driver o. 
2. Scaffolding hand 7. Compressor operator 
3. Artisan's assistant 8. Dumper driver 
4. Crane driver 9. Vibrator operator 
5. Hoist driver 10. Excavation hand 
11. Steelfixing hand. 
Thus training would first and foremost appear to be necessary in 
jobs where there is already an effective demand for these skills. 
Apart from the fact that training can provide relatively 
high returns, training pe;iods are also relatively short. The longest 
off-the-job training period for any grade of Murray and Stewart's 
(.74) 
semiskilled workers is three weeks. The short length of forrnal 
training periods is of course due to the fact that the skill, once 
correctly taught initially, is perfected by repetition on the job. 
The shortness of off-the-job training is obviously one factor re-
ducing the cost to the firm of providing facilities: Murray and 
Stewart's training centre at Epping serves all its building sites in 
the Western Cape .. Although the writer has no sound basis for making 
the following observation, the cost of establishing these facilities 
appears to be quite low - R35 000 in the case of the Epping centre. ('7S 
In fact, in some cases, training on a large site - e.g. at Palaborwa 
or Sishen-Saldanha - has been carried out from one caravan especially 
equipped with training facilities. Costs of maintaining these train-
ing centres are far higher - RSO 000 annually in the case (once 
( 76) 
again) of Murray and Stewart's Epping centre. 
However, in its efforts to encourage training of labour 
the government has extended its tax concessions to permit the 
following to take place : 
"Any employer (except mining) incurring training ex-
penses in respect of Bantu workers shall be allowed 
as a deduction from his income for that year of 
assessment an allowance equal to 100 percent of such 
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training expenses". ( 77) 
Expenses mean remuneration of instruction personnel, trainees' 
wages, rent, maintenance and insurance on premises and any travell-
ing expenses. However, the scheme has to be approved and registered 
by the Department of Bantu Education before the firm becomes el-
igible for tax concessions. In the border areas firms are able 
t Rl 25 f h d t t . . (77a) A d. t o recover , _ o eac ran spen on raining. ccor ing -o 
the Financial Mail, till August 1975 236 applications for these 
schemes were made (in all industry) of which only 61 were approved~ 79 > 
The fact that these concessions came into effect in April 1974 
whilst the biggest firms in the industry - e.g. the Murray and Rob-
erts group - have been conducting their schemes since 1972< 79 ), 
would seem to lend weight to the argument that the costs of these 
training facilities are not very high. 
Systematic selection procedures are important if they 
have not been used before and if the firm is to maximise the output 
from its labour force. Since formal training schemes entail sel-
ection off site, selection is out o~ the hands of foremen and can 
be based on objective criteria of capability. This has been a 
feature of Black labour utilisation on the mines from 1946 using 
psychological tests tailor-made for the gold mining industry.(SO) 
On the mines, such selection procedures have been used to sub-
divide African workers into three principal groups : labourers, 
machine operators and semiskilled workers, and supervisors. 
Systematic selection procedures have been adopted by the 
r1 d R - J • • t t t d t . . ( S l ) B . 11 ·urray an onercs group since i- s are ,raining. asica y, 
Black training is divided into four channels (or modules), preceeded 
by initial selection in the homelands (by aptitude testing) to weed 
out the "very dull!!. The first module is a one week induction 
course, which is the general labourer's course already mentioned. 
Workers are then selected for training in the group two module -
_.; 
the four basic group skills in the industrv - concreting, scaffol-
ding, shuttering and steelfixing. The third channel consists of 
training as dumper drivers, bulldozer operators and crane drivers. 
The length of training in these two modules varies from 
three days (e.g. in steelfixing) to three weeks (e.g. in crane-
driving). Apparently whilst the dropout rate is almost zero in 
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lower level tasks like steelfixing, it is as high as 85 percent 
at more complex levels like crane-driving. 
The last module is another ~ndividual skills channel 
t t . tl t . . f b d . . . ( 82 concen ra-ing on -1e ·raining o gang asses an Junior supervisors. 
From interviews with employers and the Bantu Labour 
Officer for the Southern Transvaal, it became apparent that contract 
labour procedures were not leading to the loss of semiskilled workers; 
rather it was the worker's own decision not to return to the firm or 
the firm which laid him off. The contract labour system has been ex-
tended to allow the following to take place. If after the twelve 
month period of contract labour has ended, the employer is satisfi~d 
with the worker's ability and thus requests his service for another 
contract, and if the worker himself agrees to that request, then the 
employer, after applying to the local labour bureau, issues the 
employee with a "call-in-card". The African worker on returning home 
will take the card to the tribal labour officer and will be given 
automatic permission to enter into a new service contract with the 
same employer. Needless to say, such practice does not militate 
against acquisition of skills nor the efficiency of the worker. The 
statu+:ory return home amounts (in cases where the "call-in-card" is 
used) to little more thari a three week holiday. 
Apart from the need to institute training schemes, there 
must be equal pressure on employers to conserve their trained semi-
skilled labour resources since it is thi~, rather than the costs of 
the actual training, which is a costly factor in training. The 
problem areas in this regard have already been outlined and include 
1) the cyclical work load of the industry; 2) the fact that de-
centralised management (at site level) does not take into account 
any manpower planning; and 3) the fact that workers are often 
trained for one job only and then released because these skills are 
redundant on other jobs. The firm is powerless if the worker him-
self decides not to renew his con~ract with the firm: however, 
studies in the industrial relations (works and liaison committees, 
etc.) and industrial psychology milieu would be necessary to sort 
this problem out. 
As has already been noted in Section 5, some firms have 
allowed overheads to rise during slump conditions by retaining their 
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most valuable workers. Roberts Construction in Natal is trying to 
control the problem by instituting a control board at its training 
headquarters to prevent trained men from being discharged when work 
at a particular site comes to a close.(SJ) Murray and Stewart are 
one step further - they estimate that within the next three yeais 
all their construction labour will be registered, i.e. their skills 
and aptitude are being listed as a prelude to more intensive man-
power planning and in anticipation of making use of a personnel 
(84) 
computer. 
6.4.4.3 The Extent of Training 
Until two years ago, the training schemes described above 
were conducted by very few firms in the industry. The Building 
Industries) Recruitment and Training Fund survey referred to earlier 
found that 85 percent of 73 firms (consisting of large, medium and 
small contractors) surveyed in 1974 did not do any training of 
non-artisan labour. Of the remainder (eleven firms) only three 
ran organised training schemes. Since it is the larger firms who. 
were doing training at the time, it is estimated that these schemes 
covered from 20 to 30 percent of all Black workers in the industry. 
However, in response to another question all the con-
tractors said they would use training facilities if they 0ere made 
available at industry level. The Witwatersrand industry has made two 
significant moves in this direction. The first is the decision by 
BIFSA to make use of the public - in se:'.Tice training centres for 
semiskilled labour.CBS) These centres are established for employers 
with common training needs and cater for all categories of em-
ployers. They are meant to cater for African workers in 11 White" 
areas and are strictly limited to semiskilled (operative) and un-
skilled training. They fall under the ultimate jurisdiction of the 
Standing Committee of the Department of Bantu Education on which 
government departments, registered unions and employer organisations 
sit. Each centre is run by its own governing body consisting mainly 
of employers. The buildings and basic equipment costs are to be 
borne by the government but the operating costs are to be met by 
the industries which the centres will serve. Each centre is to have 
a hostel accomodating.approximately 150 trainees - employers will 
pay RlO - Rl5 per week per student and R3 per week accomodation 
expenses. These fees are tax deductablc sir:ce employers qualify for 
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the same tax concessions as those availabJ.e for private training 
schemes. Apparently these courses are to be run by competent 
trained instructors.' 86 ) 
Eight of these centres have been planned. The building 
industry is already making use of the one in Bloemfontein, and 
courses in steelfixing, shuttering and similar skills are being 
offered. The Witwatersran~ building industry will be well served 
since three are planned in this area alone : in the Vanderbylpark/ 
Vereeniging area, in Benoni and Pretoria. Only two of these centres, 
namely Bloemfontein and the West Rand centre at Krugersdorp are 
already functioning. Whilst the buildings of the Vaal Triangle, 
Port Elizabeth and Pinetown centres are ready, the centres in 
Pretoria and on the East Rand will only be operational at the end of 
1976. CB 7 ) 
The second significant move on the part of the industry 
to provid~ non-artisan training facilities was the decision by 
BIFSA to build ~ training centre on land purchased at Springs to 
cater only for employers and employees in the building industry.CBS) 
This facility falls under the category of private in-service training 
centres •. Employers using it w~_ll qualify for the same tax concessions 
granted to employers conducting their own training schemes, provided 
(again) that the centre is registered by the Department of Bantu 
Education. The costs to employers will be mainly trainees' wages 
and travelling expenses, since all other costs are apparently to 
be met by BIFSA. (Sg) The centre is to be built with funds raiseci. 
by the employee levy of the Building Industries' Recruitment and 
Training Fund. 
One big advantage of these centres seems to be that they 
have the flexibility to incorporate into their training programmes 
work reclassified as semiskilled at industrial council agreements. 
Apparently centres on the Witwatersrand have already employed 
supervisors to give training to the operatives grade 1 in brick-and 
blocklaying, carpentry and glazing.C 9o) This will ease the supply 
of semiskilled workers in the short term in response to employer 
demand when labour utilisation rules change at council negotiationsa 
This will ease the problem of "dynamic shortages" in the supply of 
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trained semiskilled labour. One of the barriers to the training of 
Black labour has been that employers have not wanted to build 
training facilities pending the outcome of industrial council 
negotiations. 
Thus in the final analysis it would appear that the 
industry's attitude to the training of Black labour has changed 
significantly in the past decade. Furthermore, whilst legal barriers 
to Black advancement do not inhibit aptitude or negate it, they may 
perpetuate this view of Black workers among employers. With proper 
selection and training) the industry will be able to make a smooth 
transition into the future. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The major de jure changes in the occupational structure 
discussed in Section 6 represent a breakthrough for African semi-
skilled workers - and to some extent Coloured artisans - into the 
Witwatersrand building industry. In the case of the semiskilled 
grades, operatives will take over certain jobs from Whites and 
retain part of the 11igher earnings. The re-allocation of work from 
skill~d to semiskilled labour is an important structural change 
occurring in the industry. It was argued that this job dilution 
will be an important constraint on the long-term demand-for 
Coloured artisans. 
This lengthy section has attempted to construct a pattern 
of de jure African - and to a lesser extent Coloured - occupational 
advancement in the Witwatersrand building industry from 1966 on-
wards. Official colour bars in the industry have been periodically 
lowered by job fragmentation, i.e. re-defining artisans' work and 
creating new semiskilled positions. This has, in many cases, only 
given legal recognition to the prevailing occupational structure. 
The unions have devised strategies to protect their 
earnings as they move out of the sector. The colour bar has in 
fact been bolstered after negotiations by the rate for the job and 
ratio requirements. In time, the ratio system will virtually con-
fine the work of White artisans to key operations and supervisory 
functions. New and separate channels for White workers only are 
being devised (with the colour bar intact) to entrench their position 
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at the supervisory level. 
It was argued that the wage increases won by the unions 
at negotiations have not been balanced by commensurate job enrich-
ment as a result of job dilution. This derives from the power of 
veto that the registered unions have at reclassification agree-
ments. In this context, the "rate for the job" is envisaged as a 
minimum wage and accompanying conditions of employment which would 
price out of the market competition from Coloured artisans and 
prejudicially affect building costs. The analysis suggests that 
the interests of White workers must be balanced with the interests 
of the economy by eliminating the scope for unrealistic bargaining 
afforded by undue protection. 
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SECTION 7 
LABOUR MARKET CHANGES AND 
TRENDS IN THE EARNINGS 
PATTERN 
206. 
7.1 Introduction 
This section looks at trends in the wage pattern of 
the Witwatersrand building industry in the period covered by this 
study. Section 7.2 discusses the White wage pattern. The increa~es 
in White wages on the Witwatersrand are highlighted by comparing 
them to those in other regions where the industry operates. A com-
parison is also made with White wage increases in other sectors of 
the economy over the period. 
Section 7.3 looks at the structure of African wages in 
the industry and the increases in wages that have occurred. This 
is done by reference to minimum wage increases, wage drift and 
inter-industry comparisons. Consideration is also given to wage-
setting for jobs reclassified as semiskilled at industrial council 
negotiations. Section 7.4 discusses African fringe benefits. 
In Section 7.5 the different movement of the average 
White and average African wage in the industry is analysed up to. 
1972, and an explanation is given of the differential movement. 
Since this analysis has important implications for policy, Section 
7.5.3 is devoted to an analysis of the trends found. 
It should be noted at the outset, that the wage gap 
chosen for analysis and referred to above is the proportion that 
average Black earnings bea.r to average White earnings and not the 
absQ_lute gap in rands .. The latter measuce is confusing because it 
is proportionately smaller - and thus appears to be narrowing - at 
higher levels of income. 
It should also be pointed out that the terminology used 
to describe the different components of wages is that used in the 
publications of the Department of Statistics. With only a few ex-
ceptions, the tables in this section are drawn from this source. 
The Department uses these measures of wages : (l) Minimum wage rates 
refer to minimum wages plus prescribed cost-of-living allowances 
onlyo In all cases they refer to those le.id down by the industrial 
council in the relevant area. Minimum weekly wages are based on. 
maximum weekly ordinary hours prescribed by the council. 
Aver~ac,;_tual wage rates include actual market rates, i.e. 
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minimum wages (including the cost-of-living allowance) plus "wa9e 
drift". Overtime plus all other allowances are excluded. Average 
earnings are based on total gross earnings of an employee before 
any deductions - e.g. tax - are made and include average actual 
wages, overtime earnings and employer contributions to all fringe 
benefits (including holiday pay). 
Average~hourly and average weekly earninq~ are based on 
avera.9.§;_ ordinary and overtime hours worked and not maximum ordinary 
and maximum overtime hours prescribed. 
7.2 White Wage Pattern 
7.2.1 Inter-Industry and Inter-Sectoral Comparison of 
Earnings Growth 
We may begin by comparing the wage movements of White 
workers in construction and other sectors in the period covered by 
thestudy. There is evidence of some improvement in the relative 
position of White workers in construction during the past decade. 
For instance, in 1961, annual White cash earnings in gold mining 
(R2 478) were well ahead of those in both manufacturing(R2 030) 
and construction(Rl 926). In 1973, however, the monthly average 
gross cash earnings of Whites in construction was R408, versus 
R385 in manufacturing and R396 in gold mining.( 2 ) 
Horner calculated that the real annual percentage 
increase per capita in White wages from 1960 - 1967 was 5,9 per-
cent in construction, as opposed to only 4,9 percent, 3,3 percent 
and 2,2 percent in manufacturing mining and central government 
respectively.( 3 ) According to the Department of Statistics' Quar~ 
terly Bulletin of Statistics, the average annual real wage increase 
of Whites in construction in the period 1962 - 1973 was 5,7 percent 
whilst that of Whites in manufacturing was only 4,6 percent.( 4 ) 
All these trends support .the assertion that the rate of 
growth of White wages in the 1960's and 1970's was higher in con-
struction than in other large sectors. 
A further comparison can be made, this time between the 
earnings of artisans in building, civil engineering and electrical 
contracting. It is generally the case that artisan wages in civil 
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engineering exceed those in building, whilst those in the elec-
trical contracting and building sub--sectors are closer together 
(even though there are separate industrial council agreements). 
As far as pay structures in rural areas are concerned, 
artisans required for major civil engineering projects in rural 
areas have to be recruited from the large urban areas. For instance, 
Richards Bay has relied on artisans recruited from Durban. Although 
artisan wages in civil engineering are determined by the S.A. 
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors, the kind of contractor 
who works at Richards Bay or Sishen-Saldanha will most likely de-
mand the same conditions of employment as previously. Skilled wages 
in these rural areas may even be higher if the artisans are reluc-
tant to live and work on isolated sites in rural areas. 
With regard to fringe benefits, civil engineering em-
ployers generally buy the building industry stamp, so that artisans 
do not lose continuity in their pensions, holiday fund etc~ when 
they move between the two industries. 
Table 25 shows the average wages per hour of White 
artisans in the Witwatersrand building industry and the civil 
engi1.eering industry in February 1973. The table indicates substan-
tial differences in the wages of the civil engineering and the 
building industries. 
* Table 25 : Averages Wages of .~rtisans in 
the Transvaal (February 1973). 
-------------------------·--·-------
Buildirn; 
R/hr 
Civil Engineering 
R/hr 
Carpenters 
Bricklayers 
1,69 
1,58 
1,92 
1,84 
* - including overtime but excluding all allowances and fringe 
benefits. 
Source : 1) Dept. of Statistics (20/11/1973), Wages in the 
Civil Engineering Industry Feb.-Aug. 1973. 
2) Dept. of Statistics {31/8/1973), Wages in the 
Building Industry Feb.-May 1973. 
These differences in earnings suggest that artisans - because of 
the unpleasant nature of civil engi.neering work - discount fairly. 
heavily the perquisites offered by civil engineering contractors. 
Two points must be borne in mind about the figures 
presented in this section. Firstly, the average White 'construction' 
wage is calculated by including, inter alia, white-collar and 
professional/technical workers and is therefore not the same as 
artisan earnings. Secondly, within the same context, the average 
artisan wage in construction is probably somewhat higher than that 
in building and electrical contracting, and somewhat less than that 
in civil engineering (Table 25). 
7.2.2 Evolution of the Skilled Wage Structure 
Conditions in the White labour market were described in 
Section 5. The most relevant information on skilled wage movements 
in the period 1962 - 1972 is shown in Table 26. 
Table 26 : Wage Trends for White Artisans and Foremen 
in the Witwatersrand Buiic'i"ino 1-ndustrv 1962--
1972. CR/week). 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
196 7 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
% Iner. 
'62-
1 72 
Artisans ( 1) 
(A) 
Minimum 
Wage 
33,00 
33,20 
33,20 
34,80 
36,80 
36,80 
39,60 
40,00 
45,60 
46,40 
50,40 
52,7 
(B) 
Average 
Earnings 
42,39 
46,36 
52,08 
54,44 
61,31 
59,62 
66,53 
73 ,67 
91,49 
91,23 
93,03 
119,0 
Foremen 
(C) 
Minimum 
Wage 
33,00 
33,20 
33,20 
34,80 
36,80 
36,80 
39,60 
40,00 
45,60 
46,40 
50,40 
52,7 
( D) 
Average 
Earnings 
54,79 
57,22 
63 ,OB 
65,62 
71,84 
76,99 
85,64 
95,79 
107' 74 
107,36 
115,91 
111,5 
Note (1) weight~d average for all trades. 
( E) 
Col.(B) 
(A) (3) 
128,4 
139,6 
156,8 
156,4 
166,6 
162,0 
168,0 
184,1 
200,6 
196,6 
184,5 
56,1 
( F) 
Col. (D) 
(CT(%) 
166,0 
172,3 
190,0 
188,5 
195,2 
209,2 
216,2 
239,4 
236,2 
231,3 
229,9 
63,9 
Sources (1) Dept.of Statistics, Report 01-22-02,pp.2,3,5 & 12. 
(2) Dept.of Statistic3, Report 01-22-06,pp.2,3,5 & 12. 
(3) Dept.of Statistics, Report 01-20-01,pp.51,52,54 & 61~ 
The most striking feature of Table 26 is the vast gap between 
minimum weekly wages and average weekly earnings of artisans and 
foremen in the industry over the period. Wages negotiated on the shop 
floor were far in excess of the minima laid down at industrial coun-
cil negotiations. The gap is far wider for foremen since their mar-
ket rate of pay is much higher than that of artisans, though they 
have the same minimum wage. 
Some comments may be in order : Firstly, overtim~ earn-
ings and wage drift (together with fringe benefits) account for the 
difference between minimum wages and average earnings. The growth 
of the first two are important reflections of increasing scarcities 
in the labour market. We find that, between 1963 and 1966, the gap 
between the minimum wage and average earnings of artisans grew by 
27 percent (column E) whilst an increase of 32,6 percent was regis-
tered between 1968 and 1970. 
Secondly, the minimum wage increases (column A) incor-
porate, inter alia, increases in the consumer price index since 
artisan wages have been on an automatic cost-of-living adjustment 
from the early 1960's. The increase in average earnings of artisans 
appea.c quite out of proportion with this increase. 
Thirdly, the gap between average earnings of artisans 
and foremen tends to narrow in boom periods. For instance, the per-
centage difference in their average earnings decreased from roughly 
55,3 (column F minus c6lumn E) in 1969 t0 34,7 percent in 1971. A 
similar trend is noticeable for the period 1964 - 1966. One ex-
planation for this could be that additional foremen were recruited 
from the ranks o:f artisans, which could have made supply conditions 
more elastic than those in the artisan labour market, where re-
course had to be made to the external labour market. 
We now have to look in some greater detail at the com-
ponents of the gap between minimum wages and average earnings. It 
has been shown that - between 1962 and 1972 - the components wage 
drift, overtime and fringe benefits grew from 28,4 percent of total 
artisan earnings to 84,5 percent (Table 26, colu~n E). As regards 
wage drift, its proportion to artisans 1 average earnings rose from 
6,4 percent in 1962 to 11,9 percent in 1965 and 16,6 percent in 
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We can consider overtime as well~ Table 27 shows the 
proportion of overtime earnings in average earnings for White 
bricklayers/plasterers and carpenters from 1962 - 1972. A rising 
proportion of overtime to average earnings indicates that overtime 
earnings were exerting upwaid pressure on the minimum-wage-average 
earnings gap. The last two columns in Table 27 are important in 
this regard. 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Table 27 Proportion of Overtime in Ave~ge Earnings 
of White Artisans on the Witwatersrand 1962-
1972 CRiweek). 
Overtime Earnings 
( 1) ( 2) 
Bricklayers/ Carpenters 
Plasterers 
0,52 
3,49 
5,94 
7 '2 7 
6,14 
5,48 
9,02 
11,51 
16,35 
16,11 
14,79 
1,44 
4' 26 
7,53 
8,48 
8, 28 
5,75 
1,10 
17 '20 
24,33 
19,94 
16 '46 
Average Earnings 
( 3) ---m----
Bricklayers/ Carpenters 
Plasterers 
40,49 
45,42 
50,38 
53,29 
59,28 
58,98 
65,68 
70 ,41 
91,76 
93,86 
95,83 
43,00 
47,03 
52' 78 
55,21 
62,39 
60,65 
69,33 
80' 38 
98,22 
96,03 
9 7' 34 
( 1) 
-( 3) 
(%) 
1,2 
7,6 
11,7 
13,6 
10,3 
- 9·, 2 
13,7 
16,3 
17'8 
17,1 
15,4 
Sources (1) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-22-02, pp.8-9. 
(2) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, pp.57-58. 
(2) 
(4) 
(%) 
3,l 
9,0 
14,2 
15,3 
13,2 
9,4 
16,0 
21,3 
24,7 
20,7 
16,9 
In six out of ten yearly intervals (i.e. 1968-1969 etc.) - in both 
trades - the proportion of overtime earnings to total earnings rose. 
Needless to say, this proportion was rising in the boom periods in 
the industry. The amount of overtime, however, worked by carpenters 
tended to be higher. For instance, in 1969, overtime constituted 
21,3 percent of average earnings and only 16,3 percent for brick-
layers. 
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We may also consider the place of fringe benefits in this 
process. Table 28 (Appendix I,Section 7) - referred to in Section 6.4 
- shows the increase in artisan fringe benefits between 1963 and 
19750 Column 4 shows that employers' weekly contributions to the 
benefit fund increased from Rl,68 in 1963 to R5,02 in 1975 - a 
threefold increase. Table 26 shows that - between 1962 and 1972 -
artisan average earnings only increased by 119,0 percent. 
It is also possible to get an idea of the increase in the 
value of fringe benefits from Table 29 (Appendix II, Section 7). 
Column (1) shows that between December 1969 and July 1975 the weekly 
artisan stamp increased from Rl3,79 to R30,80 (or 123,3 percent) 
whilst the minimum wage over this period increased from Rl,04 to 
Rl;76 (i.e. an increase of 69,2 percent). 
7.2.3 Regional Comparison of Earnings Growth 
We will now look briefly at the rate of growth of White 
artisan earnings in different regions. Table 30 shows the growth 
in average weekly earnings of White artisans in six regions from 
1962 - 1972. Column (1) indicates that in 1962, average earnings in 
the different regions were clustering within a narrow range, whilst 
by 1972 the regional earnings gap was far wider. 
Table 30 : Average Earninos~ of White Building Artisans 
in Different Reqions, 1962 - 19 72. ( R/week) ~ 
( 1) (2) ( 3) (4) C51- ( 6 ) ( 75 ( 8) 
1962 1966 Iner~ 1969 1970 Iner. 1972 Iner. 
62-66 69-70 62--72 
% % '!~ 
Cape 
Penin. 39,10 4 7 '60 21,7 56,52 60,71 7,4 68,48 75,l 
Port 
Eliz. 36,18 48,45 33,9 58,79 60,84 3,5 67,45 86,4 
Durban 41,89 54,21 29,4 67,21 71,72 6,7 82,58 97' l 
Witwat. 
ersrand 42,39 61,31 44,6 73,67 91,49 24,1 93,03 119,4 
Bftn. 38,06 49,99 31,3 71,61 69,82 -2,4 80' 77 112,2 
Pretoria 41,16 58,36 41,7 69,62 83,15 19,4 89,62 117,7 
* - weighted average for all trades. 
Sources : (1) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01--22-02' p.5. 
( 2) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-22-06, p.5. 
( 3 )' Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, p.54o 
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Column (8) shows that the growth in average earnings of artisans in 
the two inland provinces exceeded that .in Durban and the Western 
and Eastern Cape. Between 1962 - 1972, average earnings on the Wit-
watersrand increased by 119, 4 percent whilst the sa.rne increase for 
Cape Town and Durban was 75,1 percent and 97,l percent respectively. 
Column (6) reveals that the differential rate of growth 
of white artisan average earnings can largely be explained by the 
'big push' which occurred in wages on the Witwatersrand between 
1964 - 1966 and 1969 - 1970. For instance, in 1969 ~ 1970, these 
earnings grew by 24,l percent and 19,4 percent on the Witwatersrand· 
and in Pretoria respectively, but only by 6,7 percent in Durban 
and 7,4 percent in the Cape Peninsula. 
The differential increases cannot be fully explained by 
differences in minimum wages. Table 31 shows differences in artisdn 
minimum wages between regions in 1962 and 1972. The gap in minimum 
wages between regions is narrower than the gap in average earnings. 
Table 31 Minimum Wage for Building Artisans 
1962 - 1972. (R/week). 
1962 1972 
Cape Peninsula R 29,59 p.w. R 44,39 
Port Elizabeth 31,47 39,20 
Durban 33,00 47,60 
Witwatersrand 33,00 50,40 
Bloemfontein 32,00 45 ,oo 
Pretoria 33,00 50,40 
p.w. 
Sources (1) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-22-02, p.2. 
(2) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, p.51. 
For instance, in 1972 the gap in minimum wages between the Wit-
watersrand and Cape Peninsula was R6,0l, whilst the gap in average 
earnings was R24,55. 
In the 1930's, minimum 0ages for building artisans showed 
a greater divergence between centres than they did in 1972. For 
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instance, in 1934 the minimum wage in Cape Town was 2s.8d. per hour 
versus Johannesburg (3s.6d.), Bloemf0ntein (3s.3d.), Durban (3s,2d. 
and Port Elizabeth (3s.) ( 6 ) 
Part of the divergence in average earnings can be ex-
plained by different amounts of overtime worked. Table 32 shows 
the average amount of overtime worked by White artisans in diff-
erent regions of the country. We would expect those regions with 
the greatest imbalances between demand and supply to have the 
highest overtime levels. 
Table 32 
Cape Peninsula 
Port Elizabeth 
Durban 
Pretoria 
Witwatersrand 
Bloemfontein 
* Average Overtime Worked By White 
Artisans. 1962 - 1972. (Hours per 
vjeek) • 
1962 1964 1966 1968. 1970 
3,1 4,8 4,1 3 '7 3,2 
1,4 4,4 4,5 2,9 2,4 
~ 2.i.~ ~ 6,3 5,3 
o,8 5,6 3,0 4,2 5,0 
1,3 6,9 6,0 6,5 
.19' 2_ 
0,7 6,0 5,1 7,6 7, 1 
1971 1972 
3,5 2,1 
3,4 3,9 
5,5 6,0 
4,9 4,2 
§_i2_ ~ 
6,5 5,4 
* weighted average for all trades. 
Sources . ( 1) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-22-02, p. 7. . 
( 2) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-22-06, p. 7. 
( 3) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, p.55. 
The table shows that from 1970 to 1972, the average overtime per 
artisan was highest on the Witwatersrand •. However, in the period 
1964 - 1968, it was only surpassed by Durban and Bloemfontein. 
In summary, although strong cyclical swings occurred 
in every region, there were important differences in trends be-
tween regions. The dramatic increase in artisan average earnings 
on the Witwatersrand in 1969 - 1970 was greater than that in 
other regions. Overtime, too, was greater on the Witwatersrand 
in later years. 
Differential wage increases can be partly explained by 
labour rigidities in various areas. For example, on the Witwaters-
rand the exceptional wage increases can be explained partly by the 
reluctance to bring about significant de i ur~ changes in the labour 
market until 1975. Clearly, the rapid increase in wages cannot 
wholly be explained from the supply side. For instance, at least 
part of the wage increase may be attributable to the time-lag 
between increased employer demand for labour, the decision to in~ 
crease wages and the movement of White labour from other sectors. 
With the spurt in the rate of growth of the industry in the mid-
1960' s, the bottleneck in apprenticeship prevented an elastic 
response in supply~ But it could be argued further, that even 
allowing for the time-lag required, the response in terms of res-
ources appropriated tc education, particularly of Blacks, has been 
inadequate. 
Finally, the evidence presented suggests a reason for 
the registered unions having concentrated on fringe benefit im-
provement at negotiations. The rate of grov1th of average earnings 
has far exceeded that of minimum wages, therefore the unions have 
sought - through industrial council bargaining - to keep fringe 
benefits in line with the growth in average earnings. 
7.3 African Wage Pattern 
7.3.1 Wage Structure in Black Grades 
Table 29 (Appendix II) gives the most detailed infor-
mation on the wage structure in the de jure Black grades in the 
industry~ Presently, all semiskilled and unskilled work in the 
industry - except for a handful of White crane drivers - is done 
by African workers. 
The occupational structure in Table 29 does not include 
certain ad hoc jobs performed by Africans in the industry, e.g. 
clerks, storemen, bossboys, etc. Furthermore, the wage structure 
is that laid down by the industrial council. As will be shown in 
Section 7.3.5, the de facto grading of workers by individual firms 
may be different. If these ratings were taken account of in the 
table, the de facto aggregate occupational wage structure would be 
different. 
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Operatives grade 1 are the most highly-paid African 
workers whilst labourers are the lowest paid. Lorry drivers have 
their own wage hierarchy, and their wages are interspersed between 
the various operative grades. 
One important feature of the African wage structure is 
that different categories of workers - i.e. workers earning diff-
erent minimum wages - earn the same stamp. For example, the wages 
gazetted on 29/12/1969 provided the same fringe benefits (i •. e. a 
stamp of R3,20) for three classes of lorry drivers, and a stamp 
valued at R3,00 for operatives grade 2-5. Thus the wage structure 
is more dispersed than the benefit structure. 
A distinction is made in Table 29 between workers 'on 
construction' and those in workshops or facto:i::-ies. Wages in work-
shops are set lower than on site. This is because the workshop 
labourer works indoors and is sheltered, while the work is not as 
strenuous as on site. The demand for labour in workshops also 
tends to be less seasonal and intermittent, with consequent great;:er 
income security for the worker. 
A distinction is also made between 'area A' and 'area 
B', wi1ere area B refers to some of the outlying districts and 
towns within the jurisdictional area of the industrial co0ncil (such 
as Klerksdorp, Witbank, Brits and Krugersdorp) and 'area A' refers 
to towns such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Boksburg, Brakpan and 
Benoni. The Department 0£ Labour has takfm the attitude that if 
wages in area B are too high, labour will be attracted away from 
agriculture to the smaller outlying towns classed as area B. The 
Bantu Labour Officer admitted that the Department has apparently 
asked the engineering industry to do the same. This distinction has 
not been made in the operative grades because of the smaller 
numbers ~nvolved. 
7.3.2 Wage Increases in Black Grades 
We will now discuss the trends in minimum wages of 
labourers and two semiskilled categories - drivers of vehicles 
from O - 1300 kg and hoist operators. Although the minimum wages of 
all semi-operative grades are published, the writer - on the basis 
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of trends in minimum wages in all grades from Table 29 - has 
taken these to be representative of the most important wage in-
creases from 1962 to 1972 in all semiskilled grades. 
The choice of the two categories is convenient because 
they are the only tw0.semiskilled categories in the industry for 
which information on overtime earnings, average earnings and 
average actual wages is available. 
Table 33 shows i) the increase in minimum wages, and 
ii) the ratio of average weekly earnings to minimum weekly wages -
for the three categories referred to above - in the period 1962 -
1972. With regard to the increase in minimum wages, columns (1), 
(3) and (5) are particularly important. 
Table 33 : Waqe T~ends for Drivers ( 0-:-)300 kq.) , Hoist 
.Q.perators_ & Laboure!s in the VJitwatersrand 
Bui_ldi!!_g _ _Industry__l.962 _ _::__!~2. 
Year ( 1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) ( 6) 
Drivers Hoist Operators Labourers 
Min.Wage A* Min.Waae A* Min.Wage A* 
(c/p.h.) M (c/p.h:) M (c/p.he) M 
-----
1962 36,5 134,4- 28,0 124,3 17,5 107' 8 
1963 36,5 145 ,o 28,0 125,9 17,5 144,4 
1964 36,5 l,:.'W,8 28,0 138,2 18,5 119,3 
1965 36,5 156,4 30' 5 138,4 20,5 122,1 
1966 36,5 156 '5 31,5 12912 21,0 J.18,6 
1967 36,5 144,9 31,5 127,3 21,0 117,9 
1968 36,5 155,2 31,5 128,7 21,0 123,4 
----------· ·--~----------,--.. ----~--% Iner. 
62-68 0 12,5 20,0 
.. --·~---- --------
1969 36,5 155,8 33,5 129,3 23 ,o 128,1 
1970 36,5 162,4 35 ,o 145,7 ;~4 7 5 137,4 
1971 36,5 170 '0 35,0 159,3 24,5 155,7 
1972 41,0 166,6 41,0 141~5 28,0 149,6 
---·-o/ Iner. /0 
68-72 12,3 30,l 33,3 
----- -------
* A 
M Averaqe Weekl.Y: Earnings Minimum VJeekly Wage 
Sources ( 1) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-22-02, ppol7-18. 
( 2) Dept. of .Statistics, Report 01-22-06, pp.17-18. 
( 3) Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, pp.66-67. 
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The minimum wage increases can be div~ded into two periods. In the 
six years 1962 - 196B, thi:.~ increases tn r.-:inimum wages in two cat-
egories were small, whilst in the case of drivers there was no in-
crease. In the period 1968 -· 1972, minimum \-;age increases - partic-
ularly between 1971 and 1972 - were far more rapid than in the . 
previous one., 
The acceleration that began in 1971 in African minimum 
wages in the industry has been maintained,. Further significa.nt 
wage increases were announced in 1972. Minimum wages have risen 
substantially since then (Table 29). 
These increases have been largely due to the stipulation 
in the 1972 Non-Artisan Agreement that all non-artisan minimum 
wages - from 4/5/1973 and thereafter half yearly on the first pay 
day in November and May each year - were to be adjusted by an amount 
equivalent to the rise in the consumer price index.(?) Apparently 
because of a gentlemens' agreement among employers, these increases 
were brought fo.rward to mid--1972. It should be noted that artisan, 
minimum wages have been subject to the same adjustment at least 
as far back as the 1950.'s. 
This measure is not the same thing as the compulsory 
cost-of-living allowances, published under War Measure No.· 43 of 
1942, which were frozen~by the government in 1953. These allowances 
were on an official minimum scale and were made compulsory for all 
workers in industry receiving a weekly 1.rr2.ge of less than 74/-- a 
week. These allowances were on a sliding scale and were relatively 
higher for lower wage earners, and therefore were probably an im~ 
portant factor in the reduction of the ratio of Black to White 
wages which occurred between 1939/1942 and 1945/1946. 
The effect of the automatic adjustment in the Witwaters-
rand building industry can be quite clearly seen from Table 29. We 
may compare the increase in minimum wages in two grades from 
29/12/1969 to 16/1/1976. For instance, labourers' minimum wages in-
creased from 24 to 53 cents per hour, i.e~ an increase of 121 per-
cent. In the case of crane drivers, (classed as operatives grade l) 
minimum wages increased from 54 to 101 cents per hour, or an increase 
of 98,1 percent. These increases are in marked contrast to those in 
the period 1962 - 1968~ 
( 
' 
' I 
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7.3.3 Wage Drift in Black Grades 
A significant feature of Table 33 (shown in Section 
7.3.2.) is the extent to which average weekly earnings exceeded 
minimum wages in the period 1962 - 1972. For example, column (2) 
shows that, by 1972, the proportion of drivers' average weekly 
earnings to their minimum weekly wages was 16G,6 percent. Moreover, 
this proportion increased steadily from 1962 to 1972, despite the 
fact that minimum wages increased sharply from 1970 onwards. A 
similar pattern is found in the other two grades. 
This gap between minimum wages and average earnings 
was not entirely due to compulsory fringe benefits. In 1972 the 
ratio of average actual wages per hour to minimum wages (p.h.) - or 
'wage drift' - was 134,0 percent for drivers, whilst it was 113,l 
percent for hoist operators and 117,1 percent for labourers.CB) A 
discussion of the causes behind these adjustments is deferred to 
Sections 7.3.5 and 7.5. 
In conclusion, reference may be 1nade to the distribution 
of labourers in the industry according to their average weekly earn-
ings. This is shown (for 1972) in Figure I, which is based on in-
formation from the Department of Statistics. The figur2 shows that 
there is a fairly even distribution of earnings within the unskilled 
occupational grade. 
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FIGURE I: Frequency Distribution of Labourers according tci 
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7.3.4 Inter-Indu~try and Inter-Regional Wage Comparisons 
In this section, African wages in the building industry 
will be compared with : i) those in other sectors of th~ economy, 
ii) those in civil engineering and electrical contracting and 
iii) different regions where the building industry operates. 
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According to the Department of Statistics' Quarterly 
Bulletin of Statistics, the average annual real wage increase of 
Africans in construction in the period 1962 - 1973 was 8,0 percent 
d t 3 6 t . f t . (g) as oppose. o , percen in manu-ac.uring. · 
It is noteworthy that - since the African wage increases 
began in the Witwatersrand iridustry in the early 1970's - the rel-
ative position of building labourers on the Witwatersrand vis-a-vis 
other industries appears to have improved. Table 34 shows average 
hourly earnings of labourers in various industries on the Witwaters-
rand in 1968 and 1972. It is interesting that whilst building wages 
were - amongst those shown - the lowest in 1968, by 1972 the relative 
position of the industry had improved considerably. 
Year 
1968 
1972 
* Table 34 : Average Hourlv Earninqs of Labourers og 
the Witwatersrand 19b8-1972 \Cents oer hour). 
- ·-
Printing/ 
Newspaper 
30,l 
39,1 
Building 
24,3 
45,9 
excluding overtime. 
Engineering Commerce Electrical 
Contract-
~~~~-~-~-~~-i~n_g__~·~--
26,7 26,3 28,6 
39,8 39,9 48,7 
----·-----·--------
Source : Department of Statistics, Report Ol·-20-01. 
Secondly, African wages in building may be compared with 
those in civil engineering and electrical contracting. A feature 
that emerges when making such a comparison is that civil engineering 
wages are lower than those in both building and electrical contrac-
ting. The reason for the difference is partly beca0se each industry 
has its own wage-regulating machinery, and also th~t the underlying 
demand and supply conditions for Black labour diff~r. For instance, 
semiskilled and unskilled wages in civil engineering,are laid down by 
the Wage Board and each determination sets a minimum wage for each 
I province. The inadequate wage status of Black workers in civil en-
gineering is largely due to the fact that, because they work j_n 
rural areas, infl11x control does not work in their favour in that 
the supply of Black labour in rural areas would outstrip demand 
because there are so few industries in these areas. 
' I 
• 
-I 
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Table .35 shows the gap in wage,s between building and 
civil engineering labourers in 1972/73. It is interesting that in 
every province, labourers in civil engineering earn less than their 
counterparts in the urban building industry. 
'I'able 35 £:.verage Actual _Wages of i,a})ourers in th<:;, 
.§.!:l=.-!J-.S-~:.0...9. f;: Ci vi 1 Engi_ne!=.!'J:.Q.9_ Industries. 
-----------------------------
Civil Enqineering 
(Februar~ 1973) · 
Building 
(September 1972) 
Cape Province 
Natal 
26,0 ·c/hr 
26,0 
36,5 c/hr 
30' 7 
Cape Pene 
·Durban 
Bftn. 
W/Rand 
Orange Free State 
Transvaal 
23,0 
22,0 
24,8 
32,8 
Sources (1) Dept. of Statistics, Report Ol-?.0-01, p.67. 
(2) Dept. of Statistics, Wages in the Civil 
Engineering Industry February-August 1973. 
The wage gap between building and electrical contracting 
is not nearly so marked. Table. 36 shows average earnings of lab---
ourers in the building and electrical contracting industries in the 
Cape Peninsula and on the Witwatersr~nd from 1968 to 1972. For in-
stance, in 1972 on the Witwatersrand, average weekly earnings of 
building labourers were Rl8 1 86 whilst those in electrical contrac-
ting were only R18,43. Table 36 however shows that this.parity is 
due largely to the narrowing effect of the large wage increases in 
the Witwatersrand building industry from 1969 onwards. 
Table 36 : Avera~arnings :::>f Laboure_£~in_!:h_e B~ilsl:i-ng_ 
& Electrical Contractino Industries. (R/week). 
-....:.--....... 
---~~~--~----~~~-~~ Cape Penfnsula 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Source 
v1"i bv<::>. tersrand 
·----------------------Building 
11,67 
13,26 
15,lG 
17,18 
18,86 
Electrical Building 
Cqp tract irl:'l..---------
13, 66 
15,35 
15,90 
16,49 
18,43 
14 '91. 
14,68 
16,09 
17,4E 
18~58 
Electrical 
Cont r?J.C t ir1g __ _ 
17,85 
16,76 
18,78 
20' 14 
21,61 
Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, pp.67 and 73.· 
Finally, an inter-regional comparison of unskilled wages 
can be made for the building industry. Two trends are identifiable 
t.\ ,.. . 
I 
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in this regard. Firstly, the wage incre2.ses on the Witwatersrand 
have eliminated the wage advantage in the ecrly 1960's of building 
labourers in other regions. Table 37 shows the proportion of aver-
age weekly earnings of building labourers in major centres to 
those on the Witwatersrand in three different years. The change in 
areas like the Cape Peninsula, Port Elizabeth and Durban is striking. 
Table 37 
SoUJ: ces (1) 
---... -..- ( 2) 
( 3) 
Index o:f t::verage Week_l:i Ec.r:ninos of Labourers 
in Different _Regions 1962 - 1972. Av-~_Eaqe. 
Witwatersrand = 100. 
D(-:pt. of Statistics, Report 01-22----02' pel8. 
D2pt. of Statistics, Report 01-22-06, p. 3:-8. 
Dept. of Statistics, Report 01-20-01, p.67. 
The information in the table shows that the relative 
position of building labourers on the W~~watersrand has ~mproved 
substantially since 1962. 
The level of unskilled .:nj~n~mu~ wages in the industry 
also differs substantially between regions. Table 38 shows - in 
descending order - the level of these wages in all areas where 
building industrial councils operate (including the O.F.S. Gold-
fields). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 .. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
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Table 38 Mi_nimum_~aqes of Building L~)O'J~ers_ in a.lJ.:: 
Industrial Council Areas in 1974. (C/Hour) 
Cape Peninsula 42c 9. Bloemfontein 28c 
Durban 42c 10. Worcester 2 7c 
Pretoria/ 11. 0. I11 D s" Gold fields 27c 
Witwatersrand 40c 12. G rci.hams town 22c 
Boland 35c , ') Natal/Northern J. .:> • 
Pietermaritzburg/ Areas 2lc 
Natal Midlands 33,Sc l4e Queenstown 21c 
Port Elizabeth 32c 15. South West 
East London 29c Africa 12--20c 
Kimberley 29c 
Source Building and Allied Industries' Official Handbook 
197Ll/ 7r· 
_._ ... .) . 
The differences between regions evident from Table 38 are reminis-
cent of those between the building and civil engineering industries 
in different provinces (Table 35) .. The regional pattern revealed .in 
Table 38 is also partly due to differences in labour market con-
ditions .. 
The trends revealed in Section 7.3.4 may serve to clear 
up certain inaccuracies which arise when wage comparisons are made 
between construction and other sectors. Evidence has been presented 
which suggests that average African earnin~s in building exceed 
those in civil engineering. Thus, officj~l statistics on African 
earnings in the constructio~ sector may be lower than African 
earnings in the building industry. For example, an industrial 
census in the late 1950's found that average earnings of Africans 
in bui l?inli were £ 162 annual ~-Y compared 1td th an indus tri21l average 
of £156. 9~1e problem is exacerbated by the fact that African earn-
ings are seldom-if ever-disaggregated in official statistics into 
the three industries comprising the sector. Official comparisons 
are shown in Table 39. 
'Table 39 
1 . Printing R98 p om. 7. Food R65 p .1111!. 
2. Commerce/ 80 Central govt. R59 
Finance R76 9. SoA.R. & H. R54 
3. Furniture R75 10. Gold Mining R21 
4. Metal Products R75 11~ Coal Mining R21 
5. Construction R71 
6. Manuf·acturing R70 
Source Race Relations Survey 1973, pp.223-260. 
The evidence in this section suggests that the building industry 
may be closer to the top of the industrial wage hierarchy than the 
position shown for the construction sector. 
7.3.5 Wage Determination and Wage-Setting in Black Grades 
One important overall trend noticeable in the minimum 
wage pattern of Black workers in the Witwatersrand building industry 
in the period studied is that minimum wages in key Black grades 
have retained their proportionality to artisan minimum wages. This 
trend is, however, reversed by artisan wage increases at re-
classification agreements. 
Clearly, this has partly been an attempt to prevent i.:.oo 
big a gap opening up between different grades in th~ industry. This 
was the reason given by the director of the Witwatersrand MBA for 
the 1972 wage increases granted to workers.Clo) It appears that -
in the absence of disparate wage increases at reclassification 
agreements - the cost of living adjustment to Black wages will 
help perpetuate this pattern. 
The maintenance of differentials - or even their 
narrowing ·- is particularly characteristic of the operative grades. 
'I'his can be deduced using the data in Table 29. In the 1966 Main. 
Agreement, the percentage of the operative grade 1 minimum wage to 
that of artisans was 45,5 percent. By 25/10/1971 this percentage 
had risen to 53,2 pe~cent while by 29/10/1973 it was 57,6 percent 
(Table 29). The minimum wages published in the latest Main Agree-
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ment and Non-Artisan Agreement (Table 29) show that by the end of 
1975 this proportion had dropped back to 55,7 percent. In the case 
of the lowest operative grade (i.e. operative grade 2 prior to 
1969, operative grade 6 from 1969 to the end of 1974 and operative 
grade 3 thereafter) the proportion of their minimum wages to that 
of artisans' increased from 48,1 percent on 29/12/1969 to 53,2 
percent in the latest agreements (Table 29). In the case of un-
skilled workers, this proportion increased from 23,0 percent on 
29/12/1969 to 26,4 percent on 30/4/1973 and to 27,6 percent in the 
latest agreement (Table 29). 
The ratios calculated from the latest agreements do not 
include the 75 cent irtcrease in the minimum hourly wage of artisans 
(i.e. o"ler and above the cost-of-living a.llowance) which was to be 
granted within one year of the date of publication of the agree-
ment (see Section 6.4.3.2). If this increase is included in artisan 
wages, the reversal in the ratio for operative grade l:artisan 
after the 1975/1976 reclassification agreement would be far more 
marked. 
The evidence in Section 7.3.3. was that these minimum 
wages have been subject to c<Y1siderable wage drift. This is due 
largely to the bargaining power inherent in the skill acquisition 
by semiskilled - and even unskilled - building workers. Certain 
specific examples o:f this pay-productivity 1ink arose during the 
course of the field-work for the study. There was great dissati~­
faction with the industrial council rating system ~n at least two 
firms consulted on the Wi bva ter srand .. 
we have already noted that section leaders in charge 
of various gangs on site do very responsible work. In the 1972 
Non-Artisan Agreement, section leaders were classified as oper-
atives grade 5.(ll) The two firms both paid all their section 
leaders operative grade 1 wages, since they were regarded as key 
workers on site. Steelfixers, too, were regarded by one firm as 
another highly-skilled and crucial team of African workers on 
site~ They are responsible for building the wire mesh (which re-
inforces the concrete) into the shuttering, just before the con-
crete is poured. The.impression of the manager of one firm was 
that they have to work with great speed and accuracy (often at 
night) so that th~ concrete can be poured the next day. These 
workers were also paid the equivalent of operative grade l wages 
even t[\ough the agreernent classified steel fixers as operatives 
( 12) grade 5. 
Yet another example concerns one of the larger home-
builders in the country at the time. The firm had a thatching sec-
tion which applied this finish to most of the homes it built. Since 
thatching is not a building trade, White apprentices have never 
been trained, neither are minimum wages laid down for such work in 
industrial council agreements. However, the African in charge of 
each group of work9rs was said to earn R30 per week and his assis-
tant R24 - rates comparable to those being paid to operatives grade 
1 in the industry at the time (February 1975). 
A more general reason behind the need to retain exper-
ienced semiskilled workers is the high cost to the building industry 
of having to replace its labour force due to high labour turnover 
(see Section 6.4.4.l). 
The above discussion raises an interesting hypothetical 
question, viz. whether wages in the semis~illed and unskilled grades 
in the industry should be left unregulated by the industrial council. 
The argument here is that the freeing of wages from regulation may 
in fact improve the allocation of labour resources. The argument 
is difficult to support on two grounds. FirstJ.y employers in buil-
ding have monop~0ny power and have the most to gain from unregulation. 
On the supply side, workers are ill-inform€d about rates of pay 
for similar work in other parts of the industry. Wages for com-
parable work may be lower, for instance, in one part of Johannes-
burg than another sir1ce - under official contract labour procedures -
workers cannot move from one firm to another without first returning 
to the homelands to be re-contracted. This is a powerful argument 
against unregulated wages. 
Secondly, wage regulation may increase worker efficiency. 
It appeared during field-work that.it was generally the bigger· 
firms paying above ind us trial counci 1 rates. This is perhap~. because 
these firms have~ taken a. J_onger-term view of the need to retain 
their more skilled African workers. Coercing employers to pay a 
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minimum wage may make more sluggish employers see the ttue long-
term scarcity value of their employees~ rrhat judgements about 
workers differ was evident from the considerable gaps in the wages 
of similar grades of workers on different si.tes within one firm 
surveyed during the field-work. It appeared that these variations 
occurred mainly because of the individual foreman's judgement. In 
discussions and interviews with representatives of lilrge construc-
tion firms, it became apparent that in most instances all pay ad--. 
justments emanated from the foremen, who in most cases had absolute 
authority. 
7. 4 African Fringe Bene fits 
7.4.1 Government-Administered Fringe Benefits 
We have already noted that artisans in the Wit0atersrand 
building industry have had a pension fund, sick pay, benefit fund 
and medical aid. In most cases these funds were ~nstituted in 
the early 1950 1 i. Till 1969, Black workers in the industry were 
only covered by two large state-run schemes - the Workmens' Com-
pensation Act and the Unemployment Insurance Fund. 
All Black workers in the building industry are covered 
by the Workmens' Compensation Act. Employers pay the entire con-
tribution and are assessed according to the risk involved in the 
relevant category of work. The Unemployment Insurance Fund is an 
income stabilisation measure arising out of the needs experience1 by 
a workforce to insure against some risk of reduced or no income. The 
Fund covers most private industry in the country but excludes agri-
cultural workers, foreign migrants, domestic servants and S.A.R.& H. 
employees, among other~.<l 3 ) Furthermore, any worker earning under 
RlO~SO per week is not covered by the Fund. At current (1972) 
building wages all Blacks in the industry are covered by the scheme -
however this was not the case in, say, 1962. The weekly contribution 
to the Fund is split equally between ·employer and employee but the 
bigger builders in the industry usually pay the full contribution 
(the contribution is usually only l cent per week). 
7.4.2 Industrial Council Fringe Benefits. 
Ttie only fringe benefit sch2me established for Black 
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workers in the Wi twa-i::er~3rand. bui ld:Lnq i .. ndu:3 try before 1969 was 
the Holiday Fund payments which date back to the 1950's. Contri-
butions to the Fund are made by employers and are meant to com-
pensate for loss of earnings during the annual holiday period. 
A Pension Fund for all non-artisans in the industry was 
established in 1969.(l4 ) The Fund has three components - a lump 
sum death benefit, a minimum permanent disability grant and a 
pension plan. When the scheme was introduced in 1969 it was on the 
basis of t cent per hour contribution each by employer and employee. 
An employee ceases to be eligible for the death benefit at 60 years 
of age. The benefit is payable to one or more of the member's 
dependents. The benefits payable in June 1975 were R2 000 for the 
highest grades (operatives grade 1 and 2 etc.) and R750 for the 
lowest grade. Workers a=e covered for the death benefit 12 months 
after leaving the industry. 
To qualify for the permanent disability benefit, the 
member must sub~it satisfactory medical evidence before the age of 
55 that he is permanently disabled. The minimum benefits payable in 
June 1975 were R400 (highest wage grade) and Rl50 for the lowest 
. ( l S) Tl . t . . 11 . . ~. f b . ld. . graae. iis.paymen is espec1a y s1gn1r1cant _or ui ing in 
view of the dangerous work associated with the industry. Payments 
from this Fund become operational where the provisions and payments 
are more favourable than those of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The pension plan is closely modelled on the artisan 
scheme instituted for Whit<.~ worker:s, and hence re':i_u-ires little 
explanation. One aspect of the scheme is of particular interest 
in view of the fact that many African workers in the industry are 
contract workers who 6ften do not return to the same employer. The 
se.heme has been extended to allow for the following : if a member 
leaves the industry before he qualifies for a pension he can take 
a cash refund of his contributions within five years of leaving 
the scheme. Otherwise he may leave it in the scheme and continue 
contributing until retirement and get the normal pension. If a 
pension is not claimed within five years of the member leaving 
the industry, his contribution becomes part of the capital of the 
scheme. By the nature of the industry, many workers have failed to 
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collect their contribution::: in the five year period after leavinC) 
the industry. A major complaint of one off.i.cial at the industrial 
council was that during the annual holiday period some workers 
would stay at home for up to six months. Often they would not collect 
their stamp books from their employer and if they returned - to· a 
different employer - their contribution would have to begin again 
since they had no proof of previous contributions. For these rea-
sons the capital of the scheme has apparently grown rapidly in the 
past few years, with a simultaneous rise in the benefits paid. The 
current contributions entitle, e.g. labourers, to an annual pension 
payment of R496. 
(16) 
The Sick Pay Fund - introduced in 1969 - provides greater 
short-term benefits to Black workers than either the death benefit 
or pension plan. The scheme is funded by at cent per hour con-
tribution per worker (all non-artisan grades). This amounts to a 
small weekly contribution of 10 cents and is 11sually paid entirely 
by employers. Under the rules of the scheme, a member is entitled 
to sick pay if his period of absence from work is for a period of 
not less than four consecutive days. Payment to one member cannot 
be made for more than 65 days in any on~ year (in a cycle of one 
year from the day on which the illness began). At the beginning 
of 1975 the highest operative grades were being paid R2,~a per 
- . - h. 1 J -L b . ' Rl 00 ( l 7 ) A t. t worK1ng aay w lisc . a·ourers receivea ~ J • r isans were a· 
this stage paid R4,00. According to the ILO Medical Care and Sick-
ness Benefits Convention, sick pay shouJ.C achieve at least 60 per-
cent of total earnings.(lB) Douwes Dekker notes that payments in 
sick pay schemes for Africans average about 45 percent of the 
minimum wage.(lg) In the case of the Witwatersrand building indus-
try, both these standards are not achieved. Although artisan bene-
fits are no higher proportionately, it should be noted that they 
are covered by a medical aid scheme. 
7.4.3 Rationale for the Fringe Benefit Pattern 
An important provision of both schemes is that the 
worker is not eligible for benefits unless he has a fairly stable 
record of employment in the industry immediately prior to the loss 
of income. For the sick fund, the member must have contributions, 
i.e. stamps, for at least 13 consec~tive weeks prior to the ill-
( 
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( 20) , \- . 1 l b . d , . l ness, althoug.n apparently tins ru_ e 1as een waive . .oy t1e 
industrial council. Under the death benefit, the member must have 
16 stamps in the 20 months preceeding death and one stamp in the 
12 months immediately preceeding death. Similar provisions apply 
to all artisan benefits. The provisions are intended to discourage 
workers from the widespread practice in the industry of taking un-
paid leave during the contract,and also to work a full number of 
hours every week in order to earn the stamp. The pension plan also 
encourages return to the industry because there is reduced pay-out 
if the worker leaves the industry before retirement. We should note 
that the benefits do not discriminate against workers moving be-
tween different firms in the industry. 
As long as the industry's Black employees were doing 
mostly unskilled work tnere was clearly little incentive for em-
ployers - as a means of stabilising the labour force - to spend 
money on fringe benefits. African workers in the industry are pre-
dominantly migrants. Mobility between the tribal home and the 
employer as well as mobility between employers is high. Fringe 
benefits involve cost and administrati•re problems, the solution of 
which may not show worthwhile returns. However, the writer would 
argue that the increasing sca~city of White skilled workers, which 
places a premium on the stability of trained and experienced African 
workers, introduces urgency to the consideration of fringe benefits 
such as sick pay, pension plans, employer-built hostels and medical 
benefits. 
It is interesting that when the industrial council intro-
duced the two funds on a non-compulsory, trial-run basis in the 
three years before it became legally binding, most of the larger 
firms participated voluntarily. Roberts Construction announced in 
1973 that it was voluntarily introducing a non-contributor::Y pen-
sion scheme-guaranteeing a mini.mum pension of Rl5 per month for 
the lowest~paid rural worker - covering its 17 000 Black workers~ 2 l) 
To qualify for the pension the employee must have had at least ten 
years' service with the company. 
The seriousness of the industry's intentions is also 
illustrated by the fa,ct that it was one of the first to introduce 
these schemes. According to Douwes Dekker, only 11 percent of 
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African workers covered by industrial councils in June 1972 were 
( 22) . 
covered by sick pay :funds.. In the same year, 391 106 of the 
African workers covered by industrial council agreements had a 
pension fund, of whom roughly 200 000 were in engineering and 
. . . ( 2 3) 
allied industries. Apparently only the SEIFSA industries in-
troduced these schemes before the building industry in the Trans-
( 2 4) . 
vaal. According to a recent survey of the engineering sector. 
by the Institute of Personnel Management, 36 percent of all firms 
surveyed were already providing medical aid cover for their Black 
( 2 5) 
workers. 
7.5 Comparison of ~arnings 
In this section we want to look at the relative in-
crease in African and ~.:'hi te wages in the industry over the period 
studied. Coloured workers are excluded from this comparison. Un-
fortunately it is impossible to accurately compute the average 
African wage in the industry. This is because - as pointed out in 
the introduction - there is no published information on average 
earnings in all the de jure Black grades. Thus, wage increases ir1 
certain key Black grades are used for comparative purposes. 
It is possible to show the rough order of magnitude of 
the average Black wage. On the basis of the minimum wage infor-
mation in Table 29 and employment figures shown in Section 6.4.1.4, 
it is calculated that in the pericrd May-October 1974 the averag~ 
minimum weekly Black wage in the industry (assuming all artisans 
White and all operatives and unskilled Black) was 26,8 percent of 
the average White wage~ The absolute figures were R21,60 and 
RB0,43 respectively. Further, van der Horst estimated that in 
1947/48 average annual African salaries and wages were 20 percent 
of those of their White counterparts' in the Southern Transvaal 
building industry. The figure for all private industry in the 
. . th 2 5 t ( 26 ) region in . e same year was percen • 
7.5.1 The Wage Gap on the Basis of Minimum Earnings 
We begin by looking at relative movements in minimum 
wages. Evidence was presented in Section 7.3.5 which showed that 
minimum wages in certain key Black grades have kept pace with 
artisan minimum wages over the period studied. Figure II shows, for 
I 
i j 
~ . 
-
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the period 1962 - 1972, the percentage of minimum weekly wages in 
three Black grades to artisan minimum wages. We note that only in 
the case of drivers did this proportion show any marked decline 
over the period. 
- --- .. ------ ---·-· ----
111 
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One important point to note from Figure II is the 
marked drop that occurred in these proportions as a result of the 
1966 negotiations. For instance, in the case of hoist operators, 
the proportion fell from 38,5 to 37,6 percent. This drop also 
occurred when the new minimum wage schedules were published in the 
1975/76 agreements (Section 7.3.5). 
7.5.2 The Wage Gap on the Basis of Total Earnings 
Figure II also shows for the period 1962 - 1972 the wage 
gap on the basis of average weekly earnings - excluding overtime. 
In general, it shows that this gap increased sharply in two grades 
but remained the same for the unskilled grade. The gap increased 
markedly in all three grades in the two periods 1964 - 1966 and 
1969 - 1970. We should note, however, that the gap was not only 
increasing but that in all the years it was much wider than that 
based on minimum wages. In 1962 for instance, the percentage of 
the unskilled minimum weekly wage to the artisah minimum-weekly 
wage was 23,8 p~rcent whilst the gap based on average weekly earn-
ings was 18,7 percent (Figure II). This suggests that the immediate 
effect of a more comprehensive definition of wages is to widen the 
wage gap perceptibly. 
We may also consider whether there was any differential 
increase between artisans and other grades in fringe benefit pay-
ments. Table 40 shows weekly statutory fringe benefits of drivers, 
hoist operators and labourers as a percentage of weekly artisan 
fringe benefits. We note in particular that this percentage fell 
sharply in two grades in 1966 when the fringe benefit pattern for 
artisans was greatly improved (Section 6.4.3.2) • This trend was 
partly reversed from 1969 when non-artisan fringe benefits were 
introduced on a compulsory basis by the industrial council. 
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Tabl2 40 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
(Artisan = 100) 
·----·-~ 
Drivers Hoist Operators Labourers 
16,3% 11,3% 0% 
16,1 8,0 0 
20,4 8,5 0 
41,0 14,3 0 
7,9 2,9 0 
5,4 o,5 0,6 
5,2 2,1 0 
5,5 4,6 o,7 
8,0 11,8 3,3 
15,l 21,l 18,3 
16,4 19,4 11,9 
These figures were calculated 1) by subtracting average 
actual weekly wages from average weekly earnings, and 
then 2) by subtracting weekly overtime earnings from the 
result obtained in (1). 
Sources 1) Dept.of Statistics, Report No. 01-22-02. 
2) Dept.of Statistics, Report No. 01-22-06. 
3) Dept.of Statistics, Report No. 01-20-01. 
These percentages were substantially reversed by the 
stamp increases announct~d as part of the new 1975 Main Agreement, 
as can be seen from Table 29. In the artisan grade, the stamp 
value immediately prior to the Agreement was Rl9,63. Assuming the 
average stamp earned by artisans after the Agreement was R30,61, 
the increase in the stamp value was 55,9 percent. The comparable 
increases for non-artisans were far lower operatives grade 1 -
22,8 percent; lorry drivers 3 500 kg plus - 28,7 percent and 
J.abourers - 17,7 percent. 
The overtime component was not included in Figure II. 
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From 1968 onwards, overtime earnings were a higher proportion of 
the minimum wage of artisans than any of the other three gr~des. 
This can be clearly seen from Table 41, which shows weekly overtime 
earnings as a percentage of the minimum weekly wages for bricklayers/ 
plasterers, drivers, hoist operators and labourers. 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Table 41 Wee)-cly Overtirne_Earn.J:.0.g;~ -~ a Percentag_£ 
of _Minimum Weekly_ Was:_~~__j"_or _ _!'.'_our Grades 
·in Fne lJ,11··t1;·-,,·tersran 1:i P.·1i· 1(~i··1c· Indus·try_ 
....._ ... ·- ··- \JC:. - - ...... _,,\._,. __ .,.,_ ..... ~. ~--' 
1%"2 - 1972-. -
Bricklayers/ Drivers Hoist Labourers 
Plasterers Operators 
1,5% 12,8% G, 7% 7,5% 
10,5 21,5 20,2 11,6 
17,8 22,5 2 ~ r 
_-:.,.i_?.. 14,9 
20,8 24,4 2~Q_ 15,6 
16,6 2 5 '0 18,8 .16' 1 
14,8 15,5 16 i2 11,5 
24 5 
_.L:::.. 23,7 15,2 15,8 
28 t.2 21,3 14,4 19,7 
35,8 23,8 18,4 23,9 
34 7 
..::::....:::.._ 25,1 19,9 24,3 
29,3 22,1 16,l . 21 z 7 
-·-------
Sources 1) Dept. of Statistics, Ee.port No. 01--22-02. 
2) 
3) 
Dept. 
Dept. 
of Statistics, 
of Statistics, 
Ec-:port No .. 01-22-06. 
Repo.:-t No. 01-20-01. 
This trend of increasing re la ti ve overtime is analytically eqtn v-
alent to an increase in White wages as a result of artisan labour 
shortages. 
One aspect of overtime rates of pay is extremely impor-
tant. In the Witwatersrand building industry, artisans move onto 
overtime rates of pay after 40 'ordinary' hours whilst non-artisans 
only earn overtime after 44 ordinary hours (similar rules apply in 
( 2 7) 
most other building industrial council areas in the country) • · 
This means, in effect, that White overtime earnings are earned in 
a shorter period of time than it would take non-artisans to earn 
the same proportion of their minimum weekly wage. 
7.5.3 Analysis of Trends 
Two significant trends in the wage gap emerge from the 
previous analysis. Firstly, the gap between White artisans' average 
weekly earninqs and that of African workers in the operative grades 
widened considerably in the period 1962 - 1972. If overtime earn~ 
ings (which constitute roughly one-fifth of average weekly earn-
ings) are included, the gap between artisans and labourers also 
increases. The analysis suggests that if minimum wage differentials 
are based, e.g. on a job evaluation study or reflect attempts by 
government agencies to prevent artisan and operative/unskilled 
wages from falling out of alignment, then the market distorts 
these differentials quite considerably. The second significant 
trend are the diff~rential increases granted in minimum wages and 
fringe benefits to artisans vis-a-vis non-artisans at reclassifi-
cation agreements. The evidence suggests that the narrowing in the 
minimum wage ahd fringe benefit pattern up to 1972 was reversed by 
the series of wage agreements in 1975/76. 
'l'he earlier sections in this study - which highlighted 
certain patterns of adjustme~t in the Witwatersrand building in-
dustry labour market - may now be applied in order to give a 
tentative unified explanation of the above wage trends. 
With regard to the White artisan wage increases that 
occurred, they can be largely explained - on the supply side - by 
the fundamental assumption on the part of the registered unions 
that skilled wages must respond to conditions in the White labour 
market; In this context, the series of administrative adjustments 
to skilled labour shortages was also an important delaying factor. 
The smaller wage increases in the Cape Peninsula and Durban during 
this period point to the dampening effect on White wage increases 
brought about by the entry of Coloured artisans. Finally, the 
strong employer preference for White artisans must also be counted 
here as an inflationary factor in White wage increases. 
On the demand side, the wage increases that occurred 
can be explained by.dynamic shortages, i.e. the bottleneck in 
White apprenticeship juxtaposed with the rapidity with which extra 
artisans were required during the two building booms in the period 
studied. 
An important aspect of the reclassification negotiations 
was the vulnerability of the better-paid White workers, owing to 
the gap in earnings and the danger of job fragmentation and under-
cut ting by workers not subject to the colour bar~ The evidence in 
section 7 suggests that the White unions - equipped with the power 
of veto - have forestalled the anticipated drop in living standards 
by pushing for increased minimum wages, to the extent of even in-
creasing existing wage differentials. 
With regard to Black wages, the lower level of wages and 
wage increases can be explained by the lower productivity of their 
labour exacerbated by an elastic supply curve of labour vis-a-vis 
that of White labour. As Wilson has pointed out, whether or not an 
increase in labour productivity (i.e. a rightward shift of the 
MRP schedule) c~uses the wage rate to rise - and by how much -
(28) -depends entirely on the elasticity of supply of labour. We have 
seen that there are only two cases in which Blacks and Whites 
officially do the same jobs iD building - at the artisan level and 
as crane drivers. When BIFSA introduced its White crane drivers' 
scheme in 1969, most MBA members on the Witwatersrand were paying 
(29) these workers Rl,50 per hour. The minimum wage laid down for 
Black crane d~iv~rs ( 30) in 1972 was R0,73 per hour (i.e. operative 
grade l wages). In 1974 the special stamp for White crane driverJ 
was Rl5,55 per week (Rl9,63 for artisans) C3l), whil~t that of 
operatives grade 1 (under which grade is included crane drivers) 
was R6,04. Thus the wage of crane drivers had to be raised very 
considerably in order to attract Whites to the job. 
The problem is compounded - on the demand side - by 
the fact that some building employers have con.siderable monopsony 
power, e.g. in the case of the Bantu· Administration Beards wl10 
a~e the only legally-approved employers of African building artisans 
in urban areas. 
The wage data also suggests that the registered unions 
have made little or no commitment to move away from the inflated 
wage structure brought about by the wage inflation 0£ the 1960's 
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and 1970's. The high level of wages have been perpetuated in the 
wage structure of ·the 1975 Main Agreement. It could be pointed out 
here that the series of adjustments to the colour bar in the Wit-
watersrand building industry have merely raised the threshold at 
which job reservation begins to apply. Evidence presented in 
Section 6 suggests that Whites moving out of the artisan ranks will 
be absorbed in protected occupations higher up, where the system 
of administrative adjustment to White labour shortages will pres-
umably be perpetuated. 
Finally, it has been shown that White artisan earnings 
on the Witwatersrand are seriously out.cf alignment with potential 
skilled labour supply, i.e. Coloured and African to the building 
industry. If one underplays the monopsony power of employers and 
the fact that in:flux control has been used selectively to create 
a high-wage urban African labour force, th2r, Black vwges in the 
industry are possibly more in line with fur:.damental forces in the 
labour market. 
To state the argu~ent slightly differently: it is tempting 
in South Africa to attribute the large wa9e differentials between 
White and Black groups as being due to inherent power differences. 
The existence of such power does not necessarily vitiat~ the.doc-
trine that wages are equal to marginal revenue product. It is 
reasonable to conclude that given the lack of training, skills, 
motivation and the constraints of the c~lour bar, that Black wages 
tend to quality with a very low MRP (compounded by a highly elastic 
supply of Black labour). For South Africa, this writer would eval-· 
uate the effects of White unions on Black wages as operating partly 
through their attempts to keep the Black MRP schedule down (colour 
bar, political power, etc.). The conclusion is that the MRP 
schedule must be raised, through better t~aining, education, job 
advancement, health services - in fact a.ny factor that will raise 
productivity (which may of course be a rise in wages per se). 
Given the tightness of the South African labour market, it is 
possible that wages will follow productivity upwards. If they do 
not, and a large and obvious gap between MRP and wages opens up, 
then more weight must be given to the power· of some group in keeping 
wu.ges down. 
241. 
7.6 Conclusions 
One major difficulty in Section 7 was the interpretation 
of the wage data presented, i.e. the wage trends shown may quite 
easily be interpret2~l to mean more th2.n one thing. Undue weight 
was therefore not given to the interpretation of the tables. Hciw-
ever, it was felt that they were broadly suggestive of the pattern 
of adjustment outlined in Section 7.5.3. 
Section 7.2 concluded that White wages in construction 
have increased relatively faster than those in other sectors of 
the economy in the past decade. With regard to the Witwatersrand 
building industry, it was shown that those components of average 
earnings which strongly reflect shortages in the labour market, 
i.e. overtime and v..rage drift, sharply increased their proportion 
of White artisan earnings in the period 1962 - 1972. The widening 
gap between White building artisans' earnings on the Witwatersrand 
and in other regions was also pointed out. 
With regard to Black wages, two important trends emerged. 
The first is the rapid increase in non-artisan minimum wages in 
the industry, beginning in 1969, firstly through ad hoc adjustments 
but currently as a re~ult of =egular obligatory cost of living 
adjustments. 
It is significant that recent data has shown that -
from mid-1972 to the end of 1975 - Black wage increases in con-
struction exceeded those of Whites, whilst in the period 1963 -
. ( 32) . 1972, the rate of increase was almost the same. 
The second trend pointed to was the high lev~l of wage 
drift occurring in non-artisan grades in the industry, even after 
substantial increases in minimum wages. These increases were 
linked to the high costs of recruiting and training non-artisan 
labour. These costs were also seen as one of the reasons for the 
introduction of a non--artisan fringe· benefit pattern. 
The data presented in Section 7.5 showed that whilst 
the gap in minimum wages remained relatively constant between all 
grades until 1975/76, the proportion that average earnings of hoist 
operators and drivers· bore to those of artisans declined sharply in 
the period 1962 - 1972. Another study has found a similar trend. 
P ·~ 11< 33 ) t ._.,~-d - I-' t • f' k'll _, k·11 d ULSe s u~~e. compardLlVe movemen-s in :ne s i eu:uns i e·. 
wage differentials on the basis of minimum wages ('official 
differentials') and average earnings ('earnings differentials') 
for numerous industries covered by Wage Board determinations from 
the 1940's to the ecii:ly 1960's. He found that the narrowing in 
official differentials (which was apparently Wage Board policy in 
the period) was not accompanied by a similar narrowing in the 
. d . .c:f t. - ( 34 ) H 1 . d th. . d d t . earnings lL eren ia1. e exp aine is in epen en movement 
as being related to the growth of the South African economy over 
the period and the artificial barriers erected.to protect White 
workers. 
Finally, the difficulties encountered in calculating 
the average Black wage precluded any detailed analysis of the 
overall movement in Black and White wages in the Witwatersrand 
building industry over time. This is unfortunate, since more gen-
eral conclusions would then have been possible. 
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APPENDIX II 
TABLE 29 b - Full Occupational Wage Structure of Non-Artisans 
on 16/01/76 
l Occup~tion ---·---1 f~/p. h. 
1) Operative Grade 1 1,07 
(for the first 6 months as such) 0,88 
2) Crane driver 1,07 
3) Lorry 4 500 kg + 0,92 
4) Operative grade 2 0,88 
5) Lorry 0 - 4 soo kg 0, 72 
6) Operative grade 3 (on C\.<J) 0,57 
7) Operative grade 3 (not on CW) 0,50 
8) Labourer C.l\rea A/on on 0,53 
9) Laboun:~r (.!\re a 1\/not on CW) 0,44 
10) Labourer (Area B/on CW) 0,43 
11) Labourer (f1rea B/not on C\:J) U,34 
12) Employee engaged on ;:iatrolling 3,95 
prernifrns and guarding property p/day 
NOTES: 1. Area A/Area S distinction and construction work/ 
not on construction work dinstinctions (see 
section 7.3.1). 
SOURCE: 
2. The minimum wage for artisans 1;Jas R 1.,92 effective 
from Main Agreement, G.G. 17/10/1875, Nd 4875. p.7. 
Non-Artisans Agreement. G.G. 16/01/1976, No 4962, p.9. 
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FOOTNOTES SECTION 7 
See, for example Dept. of Statistics, Report No. 01-20-01, 
p.xvi. 
(2) F. Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines, p.169. 
Also Race Relations Surv~ 1973, pages 224 and 408. 
( 3) J .A. Horner, _!3J:.ack Pay and P roduc~ti vi ty in Soy th Africa, p. 4. 
( 4) Information obtained from an unpublished mirneo through th(:; 
U.C.T. School of Economics. 
(5) Dept~ of Statistics, Report No. 01-22-02, pp.2-3; Dept. of 
Statistics, Report No. 01~20~01, pp.51-52. 
(6) van der Horst, S.T., "Equal Pay for Equal Work," .S.A.J.E. 
Vol.22 No. 2 1954, p.193. 
(7) Non-Artisan Agreement, G.G. 13/10/1972 No. 3678, p.10. 
(8) Dept. of Statistics, Report No. 01-20-01, pp.66-67. 
(9) As in Footnote (4). Similar trends are revealed by Horner, 
J.A., op.cit., p.4. 
( 9a) Information from van der Horst, S. T ~, African vJorke..:.~s i_n. 
'Towns, p.65. 
(10) Rand Daily Mail 2/6/1972, p.9. 
(11) Non-Artisan Agreement, G.G. 13/10/1972 No. 3678, pp.7-8. 
(12) Ibid., p.7. 
(13) Financia~-M~i1=_ 7/3/1975, pp.785-786. 
(14) Amendment of Main Agreement, G.G. 19/12/1969 No. 2589, p.3. 
(15) Information obtained from the general secretary of the 
industrial council. 
(16) Amendment of Main Agreement, G.Go 19/12/1969 No. 2569, p.3~ 
(17) Ibid., p.4. 
(18) Thomas, W.H. (ed.), Labour P~rspectives on South Africa, p.196. 
(19) Ibid., p.196. 
(20) Information from the general secretary of the industrial 
council a 
( 21) Race Relations Survev 1973, pp.247-248. 
. ---...!... 
(22) Thomas, W.H., op.cit., p.195. 
(23) Ibid., pp.196-198. 
(24) Information from the general secretary of the industrial 
council .. 
(25) Sunday Times (Business Times) 23/3/1975. 
( 2 6) van der Horst, S.T., "Equal Pay for Equal Work, rr S.A.J.E. 
Vol.22 No. 2, p.207. 
(27) Building and Allied Industries' Official Handbook 1974/75, 
pp.253-284. 
(28) Wilson, F., 11 Unresolved Issues in tl:e South African Economy: 
Labour , 11 S . JL J : E • Vo 1 . 4 3 No • 4 , 19 7 5 • 
(29) Information from the general secretary of the industrial 
council. 
(30) Non-Artisan Agreement, G.G. 13/10/1972 No. 3678, p.10. 
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SECTION EIGI-U 
OCCUPA'rIONAL MOBILITY OF THE COLOURED PEOPLE 
IN THE WESTERN CAPE BUILDING INDUSTRY 
249. 
8 .1 'l1 he Re la ti ve Pcsi tion of Coloured Labcur in South Africa 
- -------... ' ---------
We may begin by looking at the role of the construction 
sector in the economic life of the Coloured labour force. Table 42 
shows the percentage of Coloured male employment accounted for by 
various sectors. The last column of Table 42 shows which sectors 
have absorbed the increase in employment from 1951 to 1970, and 
gives an indication of the present pattern o:f adjustment of the~· 
Coloured labour force. 
Agric o, 
forestry, 
fishing 
Mining & 
quarrying 
Manuf ac-
Table 42 : Breakdown of the Coloured Male 
Labour Force 1951 - 1970. 
- , 
1951 1960 1970 
Number % Number % Number % 
94115 33,0 114820 30,5 107940 23,6 
3750 1,3 4405 J. ' 1 7350 1,6 
turing 44642 15,6 57927 15,4 97260 21,3 
Electricity 
gas & water 1552 0,5 
Construe-
ti on 
Commerce 
& Finance 
Transport 
& Commun-
ication 
Community, 
social & 
personal 
services 
Unemployed 
& unspec. 
386'.28 13,5 
23104 8,1 
14091 4,9 
32815 11,5 
32854 11,5 
2902 0,8 
39909 
38948 
1~3 
\ ,, 
10,6 
10,4 
4,4 
57946 15,4 
3000 0,6 
76 ]_20 
58650 
269'.)0 
1,... 7 
--0' . 
12,8 
5,9 
50190 11,0 
29100 6,4 
Total econ-
omically 
active 285551 100,0 375868 100,0 456560 100,0 
% of Overall 
Increase in 
Total Colour. 
employment 
(male & female) 
1951 - -19~/0--
'7 !'I I' .L...c 
1,2 
34,0 
0,5 
13,1 
20,5 
4,6 
17,1 
4,5 
100,0 
Source H. van der Merwe and C.J. Groenewald (eds.), Occupational 
and Social Change among Coloured People in South Africa~ 
p"56. 
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In 1970, agriculture was still the sector employing the 
largest amount of Coloured male labour. However, between 1951-1970 
its relative share decreased notably whilst from 1960 the total 
amount of Coloured male labour has also declined. Thomas(l) points 
out that this is likely to be maintained and, in fact, accelerate 
in the future, impJylng increasing urbanis2tion and more male 
labour available for employment in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors (i.e. urban employment). Mining is relatively insignificant 
as an employment sector for Coloured males (only 1,6 percent in 
1970) and is likely to remain so, based as it is in the northern 
provinces where the Coloured population is numerically under-repres-
ented. 
The manufacturing sector is the most important source 
of employment for Coloured male labour after ag:.:-iculture, having 
increased its share of employment from 15,4 percent in 1960 to 21,3 
percent in 1970. However, in contrast to agricuiture, it is currently 
the most rapidly growing employment sector for Coloured people. 
Manufacturing is followed closely by construction, which 
accounted for 16,7 percent of Colouied male employment in 1970. It 
is noteworthy that whilst manufacturing is a much larger sector 
than construction, it does not employ manv more Coloured males than 
construction doeso 
Following agriculture, manufacturing and construction, 
the tertiary sector i~ the largest employer of Coloured males. It 
also has rapidly expanding employment opportunities for Coloured 
males. The main growth sector is commerce where employment (male 
and female) virtually doubled from 41000 to 80000 between 1960 
and 19 70. ( 2 ) 
The manuf2_cturing, construction and tertiary sectors 
accounted for 51 percent of Coloured male employment in 1970, 
whilst construction alone accounted for 21,8 percent of all non-
agricultural male employment in that year. These three sectors also 
absorbed about 70 percent of the increased economically active 
between 1951 and 1970. 
Thornas( 3 ) argues, largely on the basis of similar trends 
to those revealed by Table 42, that secondary industry, construction 
and commerce are the three major areas for the future dynamic growth 
of employment opportunities for Coloured people, although this will 
depend partly on the regional growth pattern of the Western Cape 
where the Coloured population is concentrated. Labour studies can 
justifiably c'oncentrate on the p respects for occupational rnobi li ty 
of the Coloured people in these sectors since upward mobility should 
further increase employment opportunities here. In Section 8 we are 
considering the scope for advancement in the building industry only. 
We must now consider the occupational advancement of 
Coloured labour in the economy in order that their role in the 
building industry may be put into perspective. Table 43 shows the 
occupational structure of the Coloured male labour force and the 
major: changes from 1960 to 1973. 
Table 43 : Occupational St.i;:_uc\ure __ of Coloured 
Male Labour 1960 - 1973 
1960 1970 1973 
·-------
OOO's % OOO's cl OOO's % /0 
( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) (6) 
.,. __ ,. ___ 
White collar 50 r.· 
.:,I' J 15,5 82,1 17,l 87,4 16,7 
Management 0,3 0,1 0~4 0,1 o,7 0,1 
Proff. & 
technical 6,5 1,7 10,6 2,2 10) 5 2,1 
Skilled & 
s/skilled 
services 32,3 8,4 48,9 10,2 56,1 10,5 
Unskilled 
services 20,4 5' 3 22,2 4,6 20,1 3,7 
Blue collar 161, 4 42,1 208,2 43,6 228,0 43,3 
Artisans 18 '7 
' 
4,9 29,9 6,3 40,4 7,8 
.S/skilled 53,8 14,0 79,2 16,6 90,0 17,3 
Unskilled 8819 23,2 99,1 20,7 97,6 lo "' u, I 
Agriculture 90,0 23,5 105,0 22,0 105,0 20,2 
Unspecified 72,6 18,9 82,5 ]_ 7 ' 3 i00,4 19,3 
Total econ. 
active 383,5 100,0 477,8 100,0 520,8 100,0 
----------------·--·-·--------···---
Source Adapted from the Repo~t of the Theron Commission, 
.RP 38/76, p.85~ 
For the purposes of this study, we may concentrate on the occupat-
ional structure at the blue-collar level. In 1973 almost half of 
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all economically active Coloured males were classed as blue-c~llar 
workers. Their upward progress within this strata has been slight 
- in 1973 only 17,7 percent of Coloured male blue-collar workers were 
classed as artisans, whereas 39, 4 percent and 42, 8 percent were. 
classed as semiskilled and unskilled workers. The barriers to the 
entry of Coloured labour into the artisan category appear again at 
the interface between blue collar and white collar jobs, and explain 
the under-representation of Coloured males at the white collar level. 
A C ·11· C4 ) h . t d s i .1ers ·as po1n e out, the vast majority of the 
urban Coloured population may be classed as a blue collar working 
class dependent upon the earnings of semiskilled and unskilled wage 
earners, although a rapidly growing minority may be classified as 
lower middle class white collar workers. 
8.2 The Relative Position of Coloured Labour in the Building 
Industry 
The ratio of Coloured to White artisans differs widely 
from one industry to another as the following figures (for 1973) 
show : electrical trades (1:567), metal and engineering (1:37), 
haird~essing (1:32), motor trades (1:19), printing (1:10), diamond 
( t: ) 
cutting (1:10), food (1:17), building (1:2) and furniture _(l:0,8) J, 
In 1974 out of a total of 111 218 new apprenticeship contracts 
registered in the country, 83 1 2 percent were in respect of Whites, 
whilst only 12,1 percent and 4,5 percent were in respect of 
r 1 d d A · t · 1 c 6 ) ,ri f- · t- th t ~o oure s an s1ans re spec i ve y. . 11ere ·ore i _ appears - a 
most sectors, the progress of Coloured males is blocked at the 
artisan lev~l. Table 44 shows the racial composition of bJilding 
apprentices and artisans in South Africa in recent years. These 
figures are not limited to private construction only. 
in 
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Table 44 J-<a0_i~ Com_£osi t j::S?_!2 ___ 9_f 131:}.i lding Tradesmen 
=md ADpre~-t-icpc 1Cl69 lq'7r, 
_:-_.:.._.----J.:- ..... - ~::._::..:;:..._-_.. ,,_. _ _::..--=.:.,.:::_--::. • 
_____ ... __ 
Artisans Apprentices 
-------
White Coloured Asian White Coloured 
---------·------
Manpower Survey 
No.8(30/4/1969) 
% 
Manpower Survey 
No.9(30/4/1971) 
% 
Manpower Survey 
No.10(27/4/1973) 
% 
Manpower Survey 
No • 11 ( 2 5 I 4/ 19 7 5 ) 
% 
3!±300 
69,0 
40400 
66,4 
37600 
59,8 
33700 
54,0 
Source As indicated. 
14800 
29,7 
18100 
29,7 
22600 
35,9 
25400 
40' 7 
1500 3300 2900 
1~2 50,7 44,6 
2300 3900 4400 
3' 7 42,3 47,8 
2600 3900 5000 
4,1 39,7 51,0 
3200 3700 3300 
s,1 48,0 42,8 
1."' [~A/, i~:Jr_ - ~ , c_/_" 1:/ A 
-- ·· ··: c~ t ~~- ~-J~ ..... \ 
I 
Asian 
--·---·--
300 
4,6 
900 
9,7 
900 
9,1 
700 
9,0 
There has been a remarkable increase in the proportion of 
Coloured and Asian artisans in the labour force whilst, from at least 
as early as 1969, the number of Coloured and Asian apprentices has 
exceerted the number of Whites. This latter tren~ is to be expected 
since it is this ration which brings about change in the racial com-
position of the artisan labour force. It will be interesting to see 
whether the 1975 reversal of the trend will continue in the future. 
Table 45, which shows the av~'r:age monthly gross cash 
earnings of Coloured employees in selected sectors supports the 
contention that the upward mobility of Col.oured labour has been 
relatively greater in the building trades than in other sectors. 
Table 45 
Central government 
Construction 
Furniture 
Printing 
Finance & Commerce 
Local Authorities 
Source : 
.I 
R.212 
R.186 
Rl86 
Rl 73 
Rl54 
Rl37 
Mining ( 19 7.4) 
Manufo.cturing 
Wholesale Trade 
Prov. Adminis. 
Retai 1 Tr2,de 
Hl30 
Rl23 
RJ.18 
Rl16 
R 92 
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Coloured people also dominate the artisan ranks in the furniture 
and printing industries. 
The large proportion of Coloured and Asian artisans is 
due largely to their occupational mobility J.ti the coastal provinces. 
This conclusion may be drawn from Table 46. The figures are based 
on a sample of buiJding contractors in the three regions cited, 
and shows the nwnber and percentage of White 1 Coloured and Asian 
artisans (including .general foremen, foremen and leading harids). 
Table 46 : Racial Comobsition of an.Artisan 
sampTe-Tn three ,4reas on 29/6/1973. 
Natal (all industrial 
council areas) ( 1) · 
Port Elizabeth & East 
London (all industrial 
counci 1 areas) ( 2) 
Western Province & 
Worc2ster (all industrial 
council areas) (3) 
White 
2822 
35 ,6% 
1098 
26,3% 
1028 
10,9% 
Coloured 
2631 
32,2% 
3017 
72,1% 
8023 
85 ,0% 
Asian 
24 72 
31,2% 
67 
1,6% 
384 
4' 1% 
Total 
7925 
100% 
4182 
100% 
9435 
100% 
-----· ------- ·------· 
(1) Based on a sample of 1026 employers. 
(2) 423 employers. 
(3) 812 employers. 
Source Report of the Industrial Tribunal 31/10/74, pages 
2 7, 40 and 44 ~ 
In the period 1960-1973, whilst the total number of artisans in 
Port Elizabeth increased from 1 448 to 4 145, the proportion of 
Whites declined from 49,5 percent to 18,2 percent.<Ga) The rapid 
entry of Coloured and Indian artisans in Durban will be discussed 
in Section 8.4.4. 
The dominance of Coloured and Asian artisans in the two 
coastal pro1.rinces contrasts with their virtual absence in the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State. From 'l'able 46 we see that Coloureds 
have made the greatest progress in the Western Cape - their dominance 
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in fact stems back many years whilst the upward mobility of 
Coloureds and Indians in Durban and the Eastern Cape has been more 
recent. 
A study with some historical perspective of the mobility 
of the Coloureds in the Western Cape industry may have the following 
benefits : a) it may locate problem areas that have arisen in the 
occupational mobility -Of Coloured labour and show how (or in fact 
whether) they have been overcome. This may have relevance for areas 
e.g. Durban, which still have a relatively high proportion of Whites 
in the labour force, and b) it may provide further insight into the 
dynamics of absorption of Coloureds into occupations once closed 
to them, and c) the analysis may be generalised to the building in-
dustry in other parts of the country and to other industries to see 
whether the same forces that have worked in the Western Cape may be 
occurring elsewhere. 
Section 8.2 looks at the development of the barriers to 
a fuller utilisation of Coloured labour in the Western Cape building 
sector as well as assessing the impact of these barriers ta Coloured 
mobility. Section 8.3 deals with the practical effect of these 
rneas·1res over time and assesses the current utilisation of Coloured 
labour in the industry. 
8.3 Barriers to the Full Utilisation of Coloured Labour 
in the Western _s=ape Building Indu_stry. 
8.3.1 Job Reservation Determination No. 13. 
By all accounts, conventional barriers have had a much 
greater impact on the employment of Coloured artisans in the in-
dustry than statutory barriers (hereinafter after 'statutory 
barriers' refer solely to job reservation Determination No. 13.( 7) 
Chronologically too, the conventional colour bar in the industry 
preceded the job reservation determination. However, we will begin 
by discussing statutory restrictions since they have often been 
cited as a reason for the poor utilisation of labour. 
The scope of Determination No. 13 was not wide and only 
applied to particular.trades still dominated by Whites in the West-
ern-Cape. There was no blanket ban on the employment of Coloured 
people on skilled work as was the case with job reservation De-
termination No. 6 in the building industry of the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State. 
The industrial tribunal, investigating the Western Cape 
industry stated in its report that it was reluctant to reserve .for 
White artisans trades where Coloured workers predominated or even 
had a large share of employment, since this could have a disruptive 
effect on Coloured employment.CB) A strong possibility existed that 
a multiracial trade could be reserved for Whites even though no 
Whites would come forward to do the work. Coloured artisans have in 
fact been predominant in some of the skilled trades in the Western 
Cape industry for over 100 years. The racial composition of the 
labour force in various trades in the Western Cape is shown in 
Table 47. A close study of the table sug9e.sts that there were only 
six trades in Cape Town in 1959 where White artisans were predominant. 
Table 47 Racial Composition (%) of Artisans in 
the Boland, Cape T·own. anci Worcesterin 
1959. ---
White Coloured 
Bricklayers,brick-
layer-plasterers 
Carpenters,carpenter 
joiners 
Joiners 
wood machinists 
Shopfitters (Wood) 
Shopfitters (Metal) 
Electrical wiremen 
Glaziers 
Painters 
Plumbers 
Polishers 
Reconstructed Stone 
& Terrazzo workers 
Stone masons, letter 
cutters & stone 
dressers 
Wall & floor tilers 
--------------------
15 
·1 r 
.L:J 
85 
95 
95 
9'..) 
15 
10 
35 
25 
40 
98 
40 
l 
l 
60 
60 
85 
2 
10 
95 
40 
5 
10 
90 
90 
50 
2 
2 
40 
20 
c 
85 
85 
15 
15" 
5 
5 
~­
.) 
85 
90 
65 
75 
60 
2 
60 
--------------·-------
----··~------
B 
9-9 
99 
40 
40 
15 
98 
90 
5 
60 
w 
·95 
90 
10 
10 
50 
98 
98 
60 
80 
(l C - Cape Town; (2 B - Boland; (3 W - Worcester. 
Source : Repol:t by the Industriai Tribunal 22/1/1962, p.36~ 
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Determination No. 13 (in terms of Section 77 of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956, as amended) applied to urban 
areas in the magisterial districts of Durban/Inanda/Pinetown, 
Pietermaritzburg/Richmond (Natal) , Vryheid/Dundee/Estcourt/New~· 
castle, East London, Port Elizabeth, Albany, Queenstdwn and Cape 
Town/Wynberg/Simonstown/Bellville/Paarl/Wellington/Stellenbosch/ 
Somerset West/Worcester. The following building trades were re-
served for Whites in the Western Cape (broadly the last set.of 
areas ): stonemasonry, marble masonry, joinery (in workshops), 
woodmachining (in workshops), electrical wiring, letter cutting 
and stone decorating, shop office and bank fitting. Artisans in 
these trades prob~bly account for no more than 10 percent of the 
artisan labour force. 
Similar trades were reserved in each of the other areas, 
although this depended to some extent on local conditions. In 
Natal, additional trades such as bricklaying 1 plastering and car-
pentry were reserved for Whites. This tended to make the determin-
ation a highly complicated measure. 
'Urban area' was defined in the Determination to exclude: 
"any Native area, any area which on the date of De-
termination has been declared in terms of Section · 
20 of the Group Areas Act, 1957, to be a group area 
for occupat5.on and/or ownership by members of the 
Co loured group"~ ( 9) 
Thus Coloured artisans were free to practice the reserved trades 
in Coloured group areas although this was a somewhat minor con-
cession. 
There were further complication exemptions, most of which 
were to prevent further disruption of the status quo. Any Coloured 
or Asian artisan err.ployed on reserved work on or prior to the elate 
of publication of the Determination was totally exempt :from it. 
Furthermore, a Coloured or Asian person already indentured in a 
reserved trade on the date of publication of the Determination was 
exempted from its provisions on the completion of his contract of 
apprenticeship or for any contract 0£ service. 
Finally, the provisions 6f the Determination did not 
apply to people indentured in terms of the Apprenticeship Act 
(1944) whilst such person was serving on apprenticeship. This means 
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in theory that a Coloured apprentice may serve his time w~th an em-
ployer in an u:cban area (as defined above) but on qualification 
may only seek work in a Coloured gro0p area. In its practical 
workings, all parties to an apprenticeship contract in a desig-
nated trade in any of the reserved occuoations where the prospective 
applicant is Coloured are advised before sig11ing it that employment 
in this area in such reserved occupation is prohibited and that 
application for exemption (to the Department of Labour) has to be 
made • .c l.1. the apprentice is to continue in employment after qualif-
ying as an artisan. 
The impact of the Determination was clearly further 
lessened by these exemptions. A number of ad hoc exemptions were 
subsequently granted. These will be discussed in Section 8.4.2. 
In fact, one might be criticised for underplaying these barriers, 
since the impact of the: Determination may h.ave influ.enced employers 
not to promote workers into jobs where there was actually no legal 
work reservation. This is pointed out by van der Horst -
"while they (the job reservation determinations) have 
not in fact prevented the increasing employment of 
Coloured persons in an increasing variety of positions 
higher up in the industrial ladder, they have never-
theles~ almost certainly had an inhibitory effect''· (10) 
$.3.2 The Apprenticeship Act 
If one reduces to a factor of minor importance these 
legal barriers, then almost the full extent of the rem2.ining barr-
iers are attributable. to non-specific but nevertheless very rea~ 
barriers to Coloured mobility. The two main barriers in this regard 
are those associated with the Apprenticeship Act and, secondly, 
discrimination practiced by employers, independently or under 
pressure from White working staff. They will be dealt with in this 
order .. 
The minimum education standard laid down by the building 
apprenticeship committee for entry to the trades (in 1930) was 
Std. 6.(ll) In 1927 in the entire Cape Province the number of male 
and female Coloured pupils in Std. 6 was 785, whilst the comparative 
figures for Whites was 13 128. ( 12 ) Furthermore, many of the Col--
oured students who attained Std. 6 wished to become teachers. 
Thus, on the basis of the educational qualification 
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alone, Coloured people were heavily disadvantaged in thej_r attempt 
to become indentured. Leslie points out that ·- \vhilst in the ea.rly 
days of apprenticeship committees exemption was sometimes granted 
to Coloured boys who had not attained the minimum education 
standard - by 1929 the Cape Town committees were far more rigid· in 
their requirements. He argued further that the contemporary view 
was that in trades such as bricklaying, painting and plastering, 
the educational requirement of Std. 6 was considered unnecessarily 
high and simply created unnecessary scarcity. In the light o~ this 
opinion, the education requirement must have proved particularly 
frustrating to unqualified Coloured youths who felt excluded for 
an unnecessary reason. This feeling was probably bolstered by the 
fact that in 1930, in the Cape Town area, 90 percent of all brick-
layers and plasterers and 40 percent of all carpenters were 
Coloured.Cl 3 ) 
In 1927 there were 282 White but only 56 Coloured building 
apprentices at the Cape Technical College. By 1928 the number of 
Whites had increased to 404 whilst the number of Coloureds inden~ 
tured was only 72.Cl4 ) In 1946 out of 661 apprentices at the Cape 
Town Technical College, only 86 attended the Coloured section. 
Nearly all of the 661 were building apprentices. At the time, how-
ever, Coloured artisans outnumbered Whites in the occupations of 
bricklaying, painting and plastering.ClS) 
The passing of the Apprenticeship Act has created other 
barriers to the entry Of Coloured people to the skilled trades. 
The Cape Coloured Commission (U.G.54,1937) pointed out that by the-
tirne Coloured boys reached the required education standard, many 
exceeded the age limit prescribed before which app:centice.:ship 
must have begun (the Act at the time laid down that one may not 
become an apprentice if on the termination of the contract he would 
be over the age of 26.(lS) They also pointed out that the necessary 
facilities for Coloureds attending technical classes were in some 
instances absent or only available in part~ In 1926 for example 
none of the large urban centres except Cape Town made adequate 
. ( 17) provision for technical college facilities for Coloured studencs. 
In order for a firm to be allowed to take an apprentice, 
it has to satisfy the apprenticeship committee it co.n give him 
\_ 
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regular work and work of such a nature as to cover all aspects of 
the trade in which he was indentured. According to the Cape 
Coloured Commission this immediately weakened the chances of 
Coloured youths being indentured at all because their best chance 
of becoming an apprentice was with Coloured builders who were few 
and far between: the few Coloured builders were small contractors 
h th d • .d t r • t ' 1 t • . . • . f- I • J ( 18) w 10 us i no ri- ~~e appren-1cesn1p commit_ee s requiremencs. 
At the time of the Commission's report, Whites in large 
and increasing numbers were desiring apprenticeship in the trades. 
The employing class, being very largely White, preferred taking on 
Whites as apprentices: in the words of the co~nmission 11 this pref-
erence for one of the same race or colour is on the whole considered 
natural by Europeans in South Africa''·(lg) Thus most White employers 
at the time had a strong preference for White apprentices - a sig-
nificant point. Evidence was also submitted to the Commission that 
the apprenticeship committees were in fact exercising their in-
fluence to persuade employers to indenture White rather than Col--
oured men but the Commission was of the opinion that the charge had 
not been substantiated.( 20) This is an important point because in 
practice an apprenticeship committee may refuse an apprenticeship 
to a Coloured person for very slight reasons, e.g. separate toilet 
facilities for the various race groups at the place of e~~loyment. 
The Department of Labour often insists that Coloured apprentices 
work apart from their White counterparts and that separate 
facilities be instituted for them. 
Certain other barriers created by the operation of the 
Apprenticeship Act but not affecting the building industry have 
b . t d t - t 1 Th C . . ( 21) W. ~ h d t een poin-e ·o ny ·-ne .eron omm1ss1on. i~ regar o 
apprenticeship committees, it pointed out that whilst Coloureds 
may serve on these committees, very few have done so. The building 
and furniture industries were noted as two exceptions in this re-
gard. The Commission pointed out that some o:f the White sub-comm-
ittees are unsympathetic to Coloured aspirants.( 22 ) 
Thus the first very real barrier which potential 
Coloured artisans encountered were those associated i..\ri th th<~ 
Apprenticeship Act. The evidence and opinions presented suggest 
that the Act has fostered institutions which have the power to 
discriminate against potential Coloured artisans. There is certain 
factual evidence that lt has had this effect. 
The setback to Coloured people in this regard, however, 
never drastically changed the racial composition of the building 
trades in favour of Whites in the following decades. By all accci11nts, 
from research and interviews, the wet trades particularly have re-
mained predominantly Coloured and Malay. The writer considered this 
to be an important contradiction to resolve since it may offer 
valuable insights into the dynamics of Coloured occupational mob-
ility. 
Factors such as barriers at the apprenticeship level 
juxtaposed with prominence in the artisan labour force imply that 
many Coloured people are being employed as artisans without having 
undergone formal apprenticeship. This factor has already been 
mentioned as being of some importance in the building trades by 
( ') 3) 
van der Horst. ~ In 1972 in the Cape Peninsula building industry, 
2 291 (or 16,9 p/cent of the 13 522 Coloured artisans receiving 
holiday fund payouts at the end of the year were employed as artisa~s 
but had no evidence of qualifications. Of the 929 White artisans 
emplo 1 ecc 2~y the time, only 29 (or 3 percent) were in a similar 
position. The earlier Industrial Tribunal reported that otit of 1 500 
Indian workers employed as artisans by Indian Master Builders in 
. C25 Durban in the early 1960's, only 750 were in fact qualified artisans. 
The lower incidence of unqualified Whitr:~:: is probably due to the 
easily established fact that building apprenticeship committees at 
least in the recent past have often admitted White youths who do 
t ' th . - d t. l. f. t. ( 2 6 ) no· nave ,e requirea e uca ion qua. l ica ion. 
According to the first industrial tribunal~ even in 
trades requiring a high degree of skill, such as electrical wireman, 
employers were able to train unskilled Coloured workers on-the-job 
. . . _ . ( 26a) 
and then support their application for electrician's licences. 
This was deemed to be unfair competition with Whites who had to 
complete an apprenticeship before they c6uld obtain a wireman's 
licence. According to one employer giving evidence to the tribunal, 
there were 33 Coloured electrical wiremen in the Cape Town area at 
the time who had reached artisan status without undergoing a term 
of apprenticeship.< 27 ) The fact that the unions have accepted the 
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artisan status of the unqualified Coloured workers has eased their 
entrance to the skilled trades, since employers are likely to re-
gard union membership as sufficient evidence of skill. 
8.3.3 Conventional Barriers on the part of Employers and 
White Workers. 
The second important factor to retard the employment of 
Coloured artisans in the building industry has been colour pre-
judice on the part of employers. In evidence before the Cape 
Coloured Commission, one master builder 
"stated that the efficiency of the Coloured man was 
good ••• but he was of the opinion that colour pre-
judice was at the root of the objection to the em-
ployment of Coloured persons". ( 28) 
Whilst there was also much evidence to the contrary, the Commission 
heard evidence in Cape Town : 
"that the Coloured people were not as efficient as 
Europeans, that they were irregular in their time 
keeping •.• that they were less interested in their 
work, that many European employers preferred to em-
ploy members of their own race, and that in view of 
the fact that wages were fixed at a certain standard, 
many employer~ 9shov1ed a preference for engaginq Europeans". ( ) 
The Commission found that the general tendency of White public 
opinion at the time favouring the employment of Whites, the fact 
that the great majori.ty of employers were White, and the lack of 
compulsory primary school education for Coloureds, all influenced 
the employer in commerce and industry to employ Whites. 
Employers also appear to be heavily influenced by the 
reaction of their White workers to the employment of Coloured 
workers on similar work. The earlier industrial tribunal found that 
employers in Cape Town seldom made use of Coloured artisans in 
their joinery or shop, office and bank fitting workshops for fear 
( 30 ) 
that their White staff would leave their service. Today, as 
far as the writer- is aware, there is only one joinery shop in Cape 
Town where White and Coloured joiners work separatelyo Apparently 
the five White joiners (all over 60 years old) employed by this 
firm occupy one room whilst another room elsewhere in the building 
is full of Coloured joiners. The arrangement was apparently de-
manded by White workers and not instituted by management. 
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In this connection, the Factocies, Machinery and Building 
Work Act, and the regulations issued in terms of it, requiring that 
members 0£ different racial groups may only be employed in separate 
places of work and must be provided with separate rest rooms, c~n­
teens, lavatories and entrances, has been advanced as a fact fa~­
ouring the employment of Whites rather than Coloureds because of 
the cost of providing separate facilities. However, the phenomenon 
of separate workplaces is apparently so widely transgressed today, 
with workmen of different races even working at the same workbench, 
that it is probably not a great barrier anymore. 
In its investigation of the.Durban industry, the earlier 
industrial tribunal found that "it is obvious that the White artisans 
in this area do everything they can to prevent any infiltration of 
C 1 t • 'I ( .J l ) • o oured ar isans'. The fact that White artisans were still 
well represented in most of the trades in Natal was ascribed by 
the tribunal to the fact that White artisans refused to do the same 
work alongside Coloured people. In evidence, members of the Durban 
MBA pointed out that the majority of their members in fact applied 
job reservation themselves by giving preference to Whites if 
available.< 32 ) Some stated explicitly that they in no circumstances 
engaged Coloureds or Indians as artisans, arguing 
"Besides, employers would not just dare to employ 
Coloured artisans on the same work as Whites, be-
cause the latter would simply down tools. Under 
such circumstances, it was therefore not necessary 
that reservation be applied .•• " ( .2 3 ) 
The constitution of the Durban MBA also provided that only master 
builders ~ho employed White artisans exclusively could become 
members, but the tribunal found that the rule was not strictly 
applied because many White members at the time were already having 
to employ Coloured people as artisans. 
A representative of the Amalgamated Society of Wood-
workers, which had an all-White membership in Natal at the ti~e 
(only its Cape br~nches were multi-racial) stated that many White 
artisans in Durban would rather down tools than work with Coloured 
(34 ) 
artisans on the same job. He was also aware of occasions on 
which there had been friction between White and Coloured artisans 
on the job. 
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There is also evidence of tacit agreements (or 'self-
imposed job reservation') to exclude Coloured and Indian workers 
from specific trades. In evidence heard by the earlier industrial 
tribunal in Cape Town, the South African Operative Masons' Society 
(founded in 1896 by White masons) stated that it had always been 
its policy ~gt to admit Coloured people as apprentices or as 
artisans.( ) Another employer stated that it was unnecessary to 
reserve the trade of electrical wiring for Whites because re~ervation 
was already applied in practice. He stated that this followed 
naturally from the fact that 95 percent of employers in the trade 
were White.< 36 ) In Durban, Indians were excluded from the pl0mbing 
trades by similar tacit agreements. 
The introduction of the Apprenticeship Act with minimum 
wages for apprentices also acted as a brake on the employment of 
Coloureds as apprentices. In the opinion of the Cape Coloured 
Commission (of 1938) 
"the Act al lows no discrimination in wages betv1een 
Europeans and Cape Coloureds, so that, apart from 
any evasion of the law, the Cape Coloured is un-
able to discount his inferior education, the pre-
judice against him, or the preference for European 
labour, by accepting lower remuneration during 
apprenticeship. Reference has been made to conditions 
prior to the promulgationof the Act. ~here was an · 
almost complete absence of government control over 
the conditions of employment not only of apprentices 
but of all other classes of labour. No government 
regulation of wages existed. Emplovers in the majority 
of cases could and did pay different rates for all 
classes of work. Juvenile labour could be employed 
without let or hindrance. In the opinion of the Com-
mission the termination of these conditions has played 
a large part in restricting the employment of Coloured 
youths". (37 ) 
At the time of the Commission, there was apparently also 
a tendency among European employers to differentiate in wages be-
tween Europeans and Cape Coloureds : 
''··· we find. that a common attitude among them is that 
the disabilities attaching to their colour force them, 
though they be in principle in favour of 'equal pay 
for equal work' to accept lower wage rates and to 
undercut both in unskilled and skilled work''· ( 38) 
The material and analysis presented in this section 
suggest that in the past there have been three barriers to the fuller 
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utilisation of Coloured labour in the Western Cape building in-
dustry. Firstly, legal barriers have prevented Coloured workers 
from practicing in reserved trades. Besides, they are dissuaded 
from becoming apprenticed in these trades because they may not be 
granted an exemption to practice their trade in an urban area on 
quali fica ti on. 
The second set of barriers are those associated with the 
passing of the Apprenticeship Act. The factors counting against the 
Coloured people in their attempt~ to become apprenticed were their 
poor education, the attitude of apprenticeship committees and com-
pulsory minimum wages for apprentices.· 
The third barrier is the attitude of employers. Given a 
hypothetical situation where a Coloured person and a White apply 
for a job, both of equal education and assuming no legal barriers, 
the employer may consistently choose a White to fill the post. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that if the occupation has 
a minimum wage, employers cannot discount the so-called 'risk' of 
employing Coloured labour. 
8.4 An Assessment of Current Trends in the Utilisation of 
Coloured Labour. 
8.4.1 The Adjustment Process. 
Before discussing changes that have come about in the 
utilisation of labour, one crucial assw1~tion we have made in this 
regard must be stated and justified. It is that shortages of White 
labour trigger changes in the utilisation of Coloured labour in 
the industry at the artisan level. This is strongly suggested by 
events in the industry in the Western Cape over the past 30 years. 
The earlier industrial tribunal found that there had 
been a rapid increase in the employment of Coloured people as 
artisans in the Cape and Natal in the period beginning with World 
War Two.< 39 ) As a result of mobilisation and the postwar building 
boom, there was a general shortage of skilled White artisans -
"in Natal and the Cape Province quite a number of 
Coloured artisans as well as so-called artisans were 
available and where a shortage of White artisans ex-
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isted, Coloured persons were gradually employed but 
in ever-increasing numbers. The result was that after 
the War Coloureds and Asiatics especially were estab-
lished so firmly in certain trades that they became a 
serious menace to White artisans in certain respects''· (40 ) 
One piece of evidence strongly suggesting that this has 
been the case is the higher proportion of Coloured artisans in the 
rural building industry. The explanation for this would seem to 
lie in the fact that as White artisans have migrated from the rural 
to the urban building industry, their place has had to be filled 
by Coloured artisans. This was in fact the reason why job reser-
vation Determination No. 6 did not reserve building work in rural 
areas for White artisans. The industrial tribunal investigating 
Determination No# 13 found that in 1960 64,2 percent of all artisans 
in the Cape Province were Coloured whilst this proportion was 80,3 
. th 1 f t· . ( 41 ) Th. . f l h percent in e rura areas o he province. is gives ur: er 
support to the hypothesis that Coloured artisan mobility has been 
more rapid where White sho~tages are greater. 
8.4.2 The Impact of Determination No. 13. 
We may begin by looking at the impact of job reservation 
Determination No. 13 on the rdcial composition of the artisan labour 
force in reserved trades in the Western Cape. Table 48 shows the 
racial composition of the artisan labour force in the reserved 
trades in November 1959 and 1972. In three of these trades the 
• 1 racia-1.. composition of the labour force changed in favour of Co1c,,:red 
artisans. 
Table 48 
Joinery 
Woodmachining 
Shop fitting 
Letter cutting & 
stone decorating 
Electrical Wiring 
Racial Composition of Artisans in Reserved 
Building Trades in the Western Cape, 1959-
19 72 (%) • 
1959 -----------
White 
80% 
80 
95 
97 
80 
Coloured 
20% 
20 
5 
3 
20 
White 
30% 
31 
82 
100 
78 
1972 
Colou:red 
70% 
69 
18 
22 
Source:l. BIFSA, Memorandum for the information of the Industrial 
Tribunal etca, p.68 and Annexure G~ 
2. Table 4 7. 
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We know from our study of Determination No. 13 in Section 
8.3.1 that the increasing number of Coloured people in reserved 
trades may be due to one of two changes (or in fact both). The first 
is a possibility that Coloured apprentices in reserved trades have 
been exempted on qualification to work in urban areas. This exemp-
tion is granted by the Department of Labour. The second is that 
many of these Coloureds are contravening job reservation regulations. 
Whilst the second force is operative, let us rather look at the change 
in official policy. During the currency of job reservation Deter-
mination No. 13 in the Western Cape, not a single application for 
exemption of a Coloured apprentice wishing to continue employment 
in a reserved trade after qualifying has been refused by the Depart-
( 42 ) . s . . th. . ment of Labour. According to the BIF A submissions, is is 
because of the easily established fact that no suitable White arti-
sans have been available and that essential production would be 
severely hampered if the newly-qualified artisan was to be discharged 
1 ( 43 ) . . t d from emp oyment. Apparently all exemptions have been gran e 
after consultation with the only local White trade union - the 
Western Province Building and Allied Trades' Union. 
These exemptions have clearly encouraged Coloureds to 
become apprenticed in reserveC trades. We would expect the number 
of Coloureds indentured in reserved trades to have increased as 
a result of the Department of Labour's policy. This contention is 
borne out in Table 49 which shows the number of apprenticeship 
contracts registered in these trades from 1963 to 1973 (shown as 
the total from 13th May in one year to 12th May in the following 
year) • 
.
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Table 49 shows that in the numerically important trades of wood-
machinery, electrical wiring Qnd joinery, Coloureds have entered 
so rapidly that they completely dominate Whites at the apprentice-
ship level today. In the future, the racial composition of the 
artisan labour force in all these trades should become increasingly 
Coloured. 
Only in shopfitting has the recruitment of White appren-
tices consistently exceeded that of Coloureds (Table 49). The Cape 
Town MBA has stated that this is not because of job reservation but 
because those employers who train shopfitting apprentices h~ve not 
had the necessary factory facilities to accomodate Coloured workers 
(this would seem to contradict an earlier assertion that there is 
shopfloor integration in the Western Cape). However, the statement 
added that the situation was changing rc.pidly. ( 44 ) The same sit-
uation applies to woodmachinists. 
The statistics in this subsection suggest the conclusion 
that Coloureds are rapidl~ beginning to dominate all the building 
trades in the Western Cape. This can. be seen from both Tables 48 
and 49. It also suggests that job reservation Determination No. 13 
has only had minor impact on the process of adjustment in the West~ 
ern Cape. 
8.4.3 Apprenticeship Committees. 
The s~cond area of concern is the Apprenticeship Act, 
and the restrictions imposed by it as discussed in Section 8.3.2o 
More particularly we are interested in looking at the current im-
pact of the barrier imposed by the minimum education requirements, 
and secondly, discrimination practised by apprenticeship committees. 
By all accounts, the rising standard of education of 
Coloured men in the recent past, combined with the rather low level 
of education required for entry into building trades, has ensured 
a sufficient supply of potential Coloured apprentices of the right 
level of education in the Western Cape. In its submissions to the 
industrial tribunal investigating Determination No. 28, the Cape 
Town branch of the Electrical Contractors' Association (which deals 
with the training of electrical wiremen) stated : 
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"It is indeed pertinent to point out that the 
educational level of the Coloured youths offering 
their services is normally higher than that of 
White youths available to us due to more congenial 
careers elsewhere for the better educated White 
youths". ( 45) 
• 
Thus it appears that Whites with the education needed to become 
apprenticed have found superior careers in other sectors with those 
same educational qualifications, alternatives not available to 
similarly qualified Coloured people. 
An important conclusion follows from this. Firstly, 
apprenticeship committees to some extent follow a policy of racial 
discrimination in that they attempt to admit White apprentices who 
do not have the required educational qualifications, whilst they 
seldom made this allowance for Coloured apprentices in the past 
(see Section 7.2). This follows logically from the efforts of some 
employers to keep trades White as long as possible. As the Cape 
Town branch of the Electrical Contractors' Association has said 
''···due to the shortages of White labour the appren-
ticeship committee makes every endeavour to accomodate 
white youths of even below the minimum educational 
standard ••• " ( 46 ) 
An analysis of the educational standards of the 1 134 app~entices 
under contract in Durban at the end of 1972 revealed that all but 
5 of the 1 015 Coloured and Asian apprentices had attained the 
minimum educational qualification of Stc'lo 7 required for entry 
into the industry without exemption, but the applications for ex-
emption from the minimum educational qualification had to be ob-· 
tained from 54 (or 45 percent) of the 119 White apprentices at the 
. ( 4 7) 
time. 
We noted in the previous section that apprenticeship 
committees could exercise their power in such a way as to refuse 
apprenticeship contracts to Coloured people. The present director 
of the Cape Town MBA was quite categorical that racial discrimin-
ation had never been practiced by the building apprenticeship 
committee (of which he is a member). He said that in the eight 
years that he had been on the committee there had never once been 
reference to the race of a prospective apprentice. The committee 
only had two considerations before approve an apprenticeship con-
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tract : whether the firm applying had enough artisans to train the 
apprentice and the educational qualifications of the apprentice. 
This answer would seem to imply that Coloureds have been 
free from restrictions in their entry into the trades in the West-
ern Cape, i.e. that their entry was not conditional upon a shortage 
of White artisans. This, however, has clearly not been, and is not 
the case. A close look at Table 49 seems to indicate that Coloured 
apprentices have only increased their share of all apprentices in 
a given trade where the number of Whites has declined - in short, 
their entry would appear to be a carefully controlled process. If 
the apprenticeship committee does not control the entry of appren-
tices, then who does ? 
The research conducted with firms du~ing the course of 
this study revealed that the important source of discrimination was 
not the apprenticeship committee but the employer, such that the 
racial composition of the apprenticeship labour force is determined 
at the level of the firm and merely confirmed by the committee. The 
workings of the recruitment system fpr apprentices in firms con-
sulted in the Cape Peninsula is broadly as follows : employers 
generally advertise for White apprentices (or adverti~e for appren-
tices without specifying race) in trades still controlled by Whites. 
The employer will not consider Coloured applicants if he receives 
enough offers from Whites. As labour market conditions change and 
he finds he cannot get suitable Whites, he may advertise for 
Coloured apprentLces in the particular trade, go round to Coloured 
schools, or if the advert was non-racial, start accepting the 
Coloureds that apply. Coloured people will only get into trades 
when no more Whites are available, with the system of employer 
screening ensuring informally that no Whites want to become appren-
ticed. 
Reference may be made here to a study undertaken by the 
Institute of Social Development at the University of the Western 
Cape. ( 48 ) The study investigated offers of jobs through newspaper 
advertisements, more particularly whether the race of the applicant 
(White or Coloured) was specified in the advert (the jobs covered 
were in all occupations and all industries). It was found that 
about two-thirds of the advertisements did not specify the applicants' 
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required race, whilst about one-third stated they wanted Whites 
only. Of those stating no ra.cial bias, the survey in fact found 
that only 53 percent realJ.y had no racial bias whilst 38 percent of 
the offers were in fact for White applicants and 9 percent wanted 
Coloured applicants - this means that roughly 35 percent (i.e. 
53 percent of 66 percent) of all the advertisements were not race-
specific. This last point may imply, that employers want to see 
how many Whites they can get first before changing their hiring 
policy. This same argument also applied to those employers who 
preferred the job to be filled by a White applicant. 
It is only after suitable apprentices are chosen that 
the apprenticeship committee confirms the appointment and enters 
into a contract. The apprenticeship committee is probably aware at 
this stage that White apprentices are not available and would 
therefore not veto an apprenticeship contract in a reserved trade 
or even one in which 'self-imposed job reservation' agreements 
exist between employers. 
This analysis of hiring practices provides a concrete 
explanation of the phenomenon referred to above, i.e. despite the 
absence of specific institutions, such as apprentices~ip committees, 
blocking the advancement of Coloured people into certain occupations, 
Coloured workers generally only enter an occupation when employers 
are unable to obtain Whites. The analysis also suggests that self-
imposed job res~~vation agreements in certain trades (see Section 
8.3.3) have been altered radically to ease the shortage of White 
artisans. 
The director of the MBA also said that the industry had 
never had the problem faced by the motor industry in the past, that 
is, where the apprenticeship committee could only approve an 
apprenticeship contract if the establishment had a Coloured artisan. 
In the Western Cape building industry it has been stated that there 
are no known cases of White artisans in reserved trades refusing to 
. (48a ) indenture Coloureds. 
8.4.4 Weakening Resistance from White Labour. 
The entry of Coloured workers into White-dominated trades 
in the 1960's raises the larger question of resistance from White 
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labour. From all available evi.dence, it appears that this entrance 
has not been met by any determined resistance from White workers. 
The secretary of the Western Province Building and Allied Trades' 
Union (the only all~White building union in Cape Town) said that 
he was consulted by the Department of Labour on every occasion 
before an exemption from Determination No. 13 was granted, but that 
he has never been under pressure from his members to refuse an 
exemption, neither has he ever done so. What isolated groups of 
White workers (e.g. joiners at a factory) have demanded in many 
cases are separate working facilities. This would seem to reflect 
the status fears of Whites in certain trades of working alongside 
Coloured artisans. Where the absence of separate factory facilities 
has held up the employment of Coloured people, employers are grad-
ually stepping in to provide these facilities. 
Further strong evidence of decreasing resistance from 
White building artisans to the entry of Coloureds comes from 
Durban. While the position in Durban is not strictiy within the 
frame of reference, the writer felt that the changes that have 
taken place are too rapid to ignore. We recall from Section 8.3.3 
that a decade ago (when the first industrial tribunal made its 
reporc) it was an area where there was great resis"tance by Whites 
to the entry of Coloureds and Indians. This notwithstanding, th~re 
has been a remarkab.le decrease in the proportion of Whites in the 
artisan labour force. According to the fiist industrial tribunal 
report, the percentage of White, Colour"'d and Asian artisans in 
the Durban/Pinetown/Inanda industry in 1959 was 75,3 percent, 
. ( 49 ) 9,5 percent and 15,2 percent respectively. In December 1972 
these percentages were 41,2 percent, 33,4 pArcent and 25,4 percent 
respectively (absolute figures in 1972 were 2587,2094 and 1585).< 5o) 
Table 50 shows the racial composition of the artisan 
labour force by trade in the Durban/Pinetown/Inanda area in 1959. 
It can be seen that Coloured people and Indians were only working 
in the wet trades. Since there was no job reservation at the time, 
this was due to informal restrictions, e.g. self-imposed job 
reservation. 
" 
, 
'i 
'Table 50 
Asphalt worker 
Bricklayer 
Carpenter 
Floor layer 
Glazier 
Joiner 
Wood machinist 
2 74. 
Racial Comoosition of Artisans in the 
D1::.i:'ban 1 Pinetovm ---a.r:iCf. Inanda Areas in 
19':)9 ('j,). 
R a c e 
Whites Coloureds 
100 
61 9 
87 3 
100 
100 
100 
92 
-Stone mason & stone cutter 77 
Painter 46 38 
Plasterer 80 11 
Plumber 100 
Varnisher 100 
Rigger 100 
Metal worker 71 13 
Shop fitter 100 
'Tiler 100 
Unclassified 100 
Indians 
30 
10 
8 
23 
16 
9 
16 
Source Adapted from the Report by the Industrial Tribunal 
22/1/1962, p.14. 
Table 51 shows the racial composition of the artisan 
labour force in various trades in all the industrial council areas 
of Natal in June 1973 (although the area is not the same as that in 
Table 50, it is a very close approximation to the composition in 
the Durban/Pinetown/Inanda area). In some trades, e.g. plumbing, 
there has been a remarkable increase in the number of Coloured and 
Indian artisans. It is interesting that Whites dominate at the 
foreman level, i.e. they _always seem to be one step ahead of Col-
oured and Indian artisans. 
Table 51 
275. 
RaciaJ. Composition 0f Artisans * 
In ailTh'e---rrlcFu:.:.; trial Co u nc i 1 
Areas in Natal i~ 1973 -(%). 
R a c e 
---
·Whites Coloureds Indians 
Asphalting 45,7 ol 28,6 % 25,7 /0 
Bricklaying 22,4 35,3 42,3 
Glazing 23,2 28,6 48,2 
Joinery 48,0 33,5 18,5 
Painting 16,1 52,9 31,0 
...... 
Plastering 20,6 47,8 31,6 
Plumbing 62,6 27,3 10,1 
Shop, Office & Bank 
fitting 77,6 16,4 6,0 
General foreman 90,1 6,7 3,2 
Foreman 80,0 14,4 5,6 
All artisans (incl. 
those in trades not 
specified above) 45,6 33,2 31,2 
* Based on a survey of l 026 employers. 
Source : Report and Recommendation by the Industrial 
Tribunal 31/10/1974. 
% 
Table 52 shows the change beLween 1959-1972 in the racial 
composition of artisans in reserved trades in Durban, Pinetown and 
Inanda. 
Table 52 
2 76. 
H~ci?-1 Composi tio~~.f A_£tisans in 
Reserved Trades 1959 - 1972. 
1959 1972 
Carpentry 
Joinery 
Woodmachining 
Plastering 
Plumbing 
Shopfitting 
'Total 
w 
877 
180 
95 
362 
207 
21 
1742 
C - Coloured, 
c 
30 
50 
80 
A 
105 
8 
38 
151 
T 
1012 
180 
103 
450 
207 
21 
1973 
A - Asian, 
w c 
970 574 
183 9 
89 12 
251 293 
263 55 
37 4 
1793 947 
'l' - Total. W ;,_ White, 
Source : BIFSA, Memorandum for the Information of the 
Industrial Tribunal, etc., p.57. 
A 
300 
32 
30 
84 
12 
8 
466 
.T 
1844 
224 
1 ') , 
-'- __ 1 -L 
628 
330 
49 
3206 
----
Further figures show that Coloured and Asian apprentices dominate 
in the reserved trades - in 1972 there were 359 Coloureds and288 
Indians as opposed to 106 White apprentices in these trades.(51 ) 
The rapid entry of Coloureds and Indians in Dutban is 
interesting not only because of the high proportion of Whites in 
the industry initially, but also because the White Building Workers' 
Union, the militant Whites - only union, operates in the area. The 
presence of the union could have been a potential cause of disrup-
tion. It may for instance have refused to allow its members to train 
. ./ 
Coloured apprentices, yet it has not done soo According to the 
Industrial Council for the Building Industry, Durban, the White 
Building Workers' Union included 13,6 percent of all artisans in 
the area in 1973 (the comparative figure for the other two unions, 
. ( 52 ) 
the AUBTW and A.SW, was 70,6 percent). Roughly 40 percent of 
. . w . . . th ~ . ( 5 3 ) all unionised hite artisans in e area beiong to the union. 
There is evidence that informal control will still exist 
by employers and unions, of the racial composition of apprentices. 
In June 1973 the following resolution was passed by the Durban 
industrial council : 
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"That in the event of the Minister of Labour with-
drawing, in respect of the Council's area of juris-
diction, the provisions of Work Reservation Deter-
mination No. 13 .••. the parties represented on the 
Council hereby undertake and without prejudice to the 
rights of all parties concerned with future wage 
negotiations ••• to regulate by means of a gentlemen's 
agreement the intake of apprentices to be determined 
from time to time". ( 54) 
8.4.5 Wage Discrimination on the Part of Employers. 
A further aspect of possible discrimination relates to 
the pay of White and Coloured artisans in the building industry in 
the Western Cape and Durban. What data is available is shown below 
Table 53 ~verage Earnings Cincludinq overtime) 
of Artisans in 1962. (Rands per week). 
Carpenter/Joiner Bricklayer/ Plumber 
Plasterer 
w c w c w c 
Durban 43,40 39,41 41,99 40,84 40,95 41,16 
Cape Town 40,55 35,77 37,59 34,07 38,75 34,86 
c as a% 
of w eci.rnings 
in Cape T_own 100,0 88,2 100,0 90,6 100,0 89,9 
W - White, C - Coloured. 
Source : Department of Statistics, Report No. 01-22-02. 
Table 54 : Av~rage Earnings (including overtime) 
of Artisans in 19'/2. (Rands per week). 
Durban 
Cape Town 
Col.earnings 
a.s a % of White 
earnings in 
Cape Town 
W - White, 
Carpenter/Joiner 
w c 
84,45 81,94 
69,14 58,74 
100,0 84,9 
C - Coloured. 
Plasterer Plumber 
w c w r '--
83,68 80,33 83,98 75,92 
65,26 57,69 74,91 60,93 
100,0 88,4 100,0 81,3 
Source Department of Statistics, Report No. 01-20-01,pp.49-70. 
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Tables 53 and 54 show that differentials did not narrow in the ten 
years from 1962 to J.972 and may even have widened slightly. Compared 
to some of the differentials in commerce and industry as shown in 
Table 55 (below), these are quite slight. In fact they probably 
overestimate discriminatory pay for equal work because many of -the 
Whites in the trades today are leading hands (i.e. the senior among 
a group of artisans in a given trade on one site) thus doing slightly 
more responsible work and earning highel." pay. 
The phenomenon of pay discrimination is probably attrib-
utable in part to sheer prejudice on the part of employers against 
Coloured artisans. If the labour market is competitive, the ex-
planation for the higher wages of Whites must lie in the fact that 
the demand for Whites is greater (relative to the supply) than the 
demand for Coloured people. ( 55 ) This must be due to one of two 
conditions: either the Whites are actually more productive, or em-
ployers have been misguided and believe, although incorrectly, that 
Whites are more productive than Coloured people (thus the marginal 
revenue product schedule of the Whites will lie to ~he right of · 
that of Coloured people). 
It is doubtful whether there is any discernible differ-
ence in the efficiency of the average White and Coloured artisan 
today. By all accounts, the second stage in the entry 0£ Coloured 
artisans to the industry has been characterised by the superior 
educational qualifications of Coloured apprentices. The two groups 
also serve exactly fhe same appren tices1.ip. 
The policy implication of this argument is that if the 
economic status (i.e. the wage) of Coloured labour is to be im-
proved, the basic market conditions (supply and demand) for Coloured 
labour must be changed, not just the price (i.e. raising Coloured 
wages to the White level for equal work.) 
If differences in supply are not considered, the way to 
eliminate or narrow the wage differential between the two groups is 
to increase the demand for Coloured labour relative to White labour. 
These changes mean, in essence, that in the eyes of employers, 
Coloured employees must become "indistinguishable from Whites, which· 
~. 
in the final analysis may be impossible. 
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If there is a short-run negative employment response 
to an increase in the wage of Coloured labour, it would appear 
that since there will be fewer Coloured people employed, there 
will be less opportunity for employers to "learn" that Coloured 
labour is as productive as White; there will be fewer opportunities 
for Colo0red people to demonstrate their capabilities, or more 
important, to receive on-the-job training. Therefore the imposition 
of equal pay for equal work may not hav~ a desirable outcome. 
The dominance of the Coloured people in the artisan ranks 
of the Western Cape building industry would have come about even 
if a stringent rate-for~the-job policy had been followed! because 
the shortage of Whites has compelled the industry to look for 
other sources of labour. Shortages of White labour must put upward 
pressure on the wage rate of Coloured labour in the same occupation 
since demand conditions in this segment of the labour market are 
changing. It is nonetheless probably true to say that wage dis-
crimination may, in fact, ease the entry of Coloured labour into 
previously closed areas. 
Table 55 shows monthly average cash wages of Whites and 
Coloureds in various occupations. These figures are d~awn from the 
Cape Town industrial sector wage survey (1975). Many of these 
occupations are clearly ones where no legal minimum wage exists.and 
thus employers have more freedom to set wages. It would appear that 
employers disco~~t fairly heavily the employment of Coloured staff 
in these occupations (which may be because many of these jobs have 
only recently been opened to Coloured workers). 
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Table 55 Monthlv Average Ca s !2_ _ !12~ 
i.Q_ C~r.:=_- Town in Mav 1975. 
Job category w c c as % of 
w 
Bookkeeper R 344 R 200 F 58,1 % 
Costing clerk 345 M 259 M 70' 3 
285 F 200 F 70, 1 
Cashier 346 M 286 M 82,6 
258 F .175 F 67' 8 
Work study officer 560 M 340 M 60,7 
Wage clerks 308 M 251 M 81,4 
2 73 F 169 F 61 9 
. ' 
Punch card operator 261 F 172 F 65,9 
Lab. assistant 225 F 143 F 63,5 
Quality controller 582 M 340 M 58,4 
Assistant buyer 452 M 340 M 75,2 
Driver salesman (basic) 270 M 226 M 83,7 
Design & detail draughts~nen 482 M 357 M 74,0 
Assistant general foremen 
(clothing) "4 75 M 265 M 55,7 
Copy typist 236 F 160 F 67,7 
Telex operator 23S 153 65,1 
W - White, C - Coloured. 
Source : W.E., Thomas, The Dynamics of Coloured Labour and 
Employment, p.15. 
8.4.6 Utilisation of Coloured Labour in Supervisory 
Positions. 
One final issue which may be dealt with - in view of 
the fact that the recent take-over by Coloured artisans of the 
reserved trades is almost complete - is the further scope for 
advancement of Coloured people in the Western Cape building indus-
try. Coloured artisans have yet to become predominant in the 
supervisory jobs of foreman, generq.l foreman and leading hand 
(Table 56). 
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Table 56 Racial_ Composition _of_ Supervisory 
Jobs in the Western Province Building 
I~1dustry, 19 ... 71-1973. ,. 
2:)/6/1971 29/6/1973 
w c A T w c 
Leading hand 12 118 5 135 12 136 
8,9% 87' 4% 3,7% 100% 7,8% 88,3% 
Foreman 109 129 7 245 119 157 
44,5% 52,7% 2,8% 100% 41, 7% 55,1% 
General foreman 136 65 201 150 70 
67' 7% 32 '3% 100% 68, 1% 31,9% 
* Based on a sample of 812 employers. 
W - White, C - Coloured, A - Asian. 
Source : ·Report and Recommendation by the Industrial 
Tribunal 31/10/1974, p.44. 
A 
6 
3,9% 
9 
3,2% 
T 
154 
100% 
285 
100% 
220 
100% 
Table 56 indicates two things clearly • Firstly, there is still 
much scope for Coloured promotion into the categories of foreman 
and general foreman. Since the absolute figures in the ·table are 
only those of a sample survey, they underestimate the total number 
of jobs at this level. The three categories in the table generally 
constitute abou~ 10 percent of all blue-collar jobs from artisans 
upwards. Hence there were about 1 400 such jobs in the Cape Penin-
sula in 1972. 
Secondly, the table gives further e1ridence of the phen-
omenon discussed above, i.e. even in the absence of specific job 
controls, Coloured people generally follo~ Whites into occupations, 
this generally only when employers begin to experience difficulties 
in the recruitment of Whites. It should be noted that Coloured 
people have all but taken over the lower-level supervisory function 
of leading hand whereas they are less significant at the level qf 
foreman and general foreman. 
What is also significant in this regard is the fact 
that employers have responded to this movement into supervisory 
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posts by providing training courses for potential Coloured recruits 
to these jobs. There are two such courses in existence, both of 
which have been provided for Whites only for some time and only 
recently opened to Coloured people. They have both been sponsored 
by the National Development Fund for the Building Industry. 
The first is a training course leading to exams for the 
National Certificate for General Foremen in the Building Industry, 
a one year part-time (two hours per week) course. The three subjects 
taught are : Site Organisation and Control, Site Administration and 
Personnel Supervision and Welfare. Presumably it is only open to 
l .f. d t• ( 56 ) qua i ie ar isans. 
The course has been run by the Cape College for Advanced 
Technical Education for some years but in recent times the college 
has seldom received more than one White applicant annually. Due to 
the demand from Coloured people for these facilities, BIFSA arranged 
for the course to be started in 1973 at the Peninsula College for 
Advanced Technical Education in Bellville South. Apparently the 
first enrolment was 45 and according to the director of the Cape 
Town MBA it has never dropped below 20 or 30. 
The second and more advanced course is that leading to 
the National Diploma for Construction Supervisors. Intro~uced at 
the beginning of 1965, it is a three year sandwich course with five 
fourteen-week periods at a technical college (on the block release 
syst~m). The balance of the period is s~2nt doing practical train-
ing with an employer. It would appear that the course concentrates 
on the advanced technical aspects of building and prepares can-
didates for site mana9ement. The entrance quo.lification is either 
Senior Certificate or the NTC III.< 57 > The course has been running 
at the Cape College for Advanced Technical Education for roughly 
10 years, and there have apparently never been problems with the 
recruitment of White candidates. However, about three years ago 
the Cape Town MBA received enquiries from Coloured people wishing 
to do the course - a large construction company in Cape Town made 
a similar request on behalf of six of its Coloured employees at 
about the same time. They requested that the MBA petition the Cape 
College for Advanced Technical Education'to admit these Coloured 
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applicants, but permission was refused. TI1e MBA has, accordingly, 
recently arranged with the Peninsula College for Advanced Technical 
Education to run a parallel course beginning in 1977. 
Finally, brief mention should be made of the role of 
the Coloured people in the semiskilled grades in the industry. 
Coloured workers today have entirely mo 11ed out of the unskilled and 
semiskilled driver categories (crane drivers, dumper drivers, etc.) 
Apparently soon after the War, higher~level tasks in this category 
(e.g. crane drivers) were almost entirely dominated by Coloured 
men, but today all such work is done by African contract labour. 
H·owever in 1967 the parties on. the industrial council negotiated 
the int-reduction of operative (semiskilled) work to relieve artisans 
of certain repetitive work they were doing. Se~iskilled work was 
created in the following trades : bricklaying/plastering, joinery/ 
woodmachining/shop, office and bank fitting, piumbing, painting 
. ( 58 ) 
and glazing, and monumental and stonemasonry. Govt. Gazette 
Notice No. Rl297 in July.1968 provided that exemption would be 
granted for four years to the extent that Coloured persons regis-
tered with the industrial council might perform any work defined 
as 'operative' except work in connection with shop, cffice and 
bank fitting.( 59 ) Today the operative grades are ~anned exclus-
ively by Coloured men. The creation of this work has meant a place 
in the industry for Coloured youths with Std. 4 or Std. 5 edu-
cation, who are unable to be apprenticed. There were approximately 
800 such operat;ves in the industry in 1976. 
8.5 Conclusions 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from Section 
8. One is that the racial composition of the building artisan 
labour force has changed markedly in favour of Coloureds and Asiill1S 
in the past few years. This will continue if the proportion of 
Whites in the apprentice labour force continues to decline. A study 
of the Western Cape and Natal highlights the changes that are 
occurring in this regard. 
Furthermore the changes in both areas have come about 
whilst job reservation Determination No. 13 was still in force. The 
evidence presented suggests that these statutory barriers have not 
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in any way held up the progress of Coloured artisans. This is 
largely because a shortage of White artisans has forced the De-
partment of Labour to be flexible in its approach to exemptions. 
The second conclusion that became evident is that th~ 
upward mobility of Coloureds into particular job stratas in the 
Western Cape only becomes rapid once employers experience diffi-
culty in recruiting Whites for these posts. At the apprenticeship 
level, employers generally only begin recruiting Coloureds when 
they experience difficulty in finding Whites. At the artisan level, 
the Department of Labour has granted exemptions to Coloured artisans 
to practice in reserved trades when the unions have reported no 
White unemployment in these trades. A similar pattern exists in 
respect of foremen and general foremen. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of the 
Theron Commission.( 60) It has pointed to the existence of a 'labour 
preference system' in the Coloured labour market.(Gl) They ~rgue 
that employers generally give preference, when hiring, to Whit~ 
workers followed by Coloured and Asian workers and finally African 
workers. It is typical of this type of hiring system that the wuges 
of t~c race for which demand is greater than supply (in any job 
category) will rise to the point where it becomes economi~ally 
necessary to substitute cheaper labour. In Section 8.4.5 this form 
of labour preference at the artisan level was seen to be a cause of 
differential earnings for White and Coloured labour. 
A final conclusion is that the entry of Coloured workers 
to closed trades has generally been delayed by the practice of 
admitting White workers under exemption from the educational 
qualification of the Apprenticeship Act. This process was seen to 
operate in the Witwatersrand building industry as well. 
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What remains is to restate and inter-relate the obser-
vations made concerning the process of change :.Ln the labour struc-
ture of the Witwatersrand and Western Cape building industries and 
to emerge with a reJ.evant and practical set of explanatory tools. 
The emphasis in this study has been on the process of 
adjustment to labour market stresses in one industry only. This 
emphasis seems justified by the conclusions that have been reached 
and the insights gained. Moreover, the time period chosen for study, 
i.e. from 1960 onwards, has been one in which some cf the most 
important changes in the industry's labour structure have occurred. 
In section 9.1 the different patterns of occupational 
advancement experienced by Coloured and African workers - as rev-
ealed by the empirical findings - have been summcrised and contras-
ted. In section 9.2 certain policy prescriptions - concerning 
official bodies, employers and employees - are mooted, in the light 
of the process of adjustment found to exist. In view of similar ad-
justments currently taking place in other inJustries, this section 
seems well justified. From this, effective practical policy might 
emerge. In concluding section 9, a few shortcomings of this study 
are mentioned, with an indication of th~ scope for fur~1er research. 
9.1 Patterns of Adiustment ~~~--~~~·-------"~~~~ 
In the study it was indicated that the employment 
opportunities for African workers (at the semiskilled level) and 
Coloured workers (at the artisan level) in the Witwatersrand build-
ing industry - and by implication in the whole of the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State - have increased sharply since 1975. Although the 
pace of African advancement has been determined by White workers 
responding to changing market forces, Africans will now benefit 
from the de jure recognition of their employment on ~ore skilled 
work. The empiricist may, however, question whether the performance 
of skilled work for so long at unregulated rates of pay may tempt 
employers to ignore these improvements as far as remuneration is 
concernedo 
This lag in adjustment was shown to have other undes-
irable consequences. In response to attempts to comply with official 
colour bars such as job reservation Determination No. 6, the wages· 
of White artisans reflected conditions in the White labour marke~t 
in the economy. It also involved BIFSA in a costly and time-consuming 
recruitment programme" 'This appeared to be a necessa.ry strategy be-
fore meaningful barc_:p=1ining with the trade unions could begin .. It 
can thus be concluded that the registered trade unions did respond 
to market forces but with a lag. 
One important explanation of the wage increases that 
occurred during this period was the strong employer preference for 
White labour. This was also shown to be a barrier to the entry of 
Coloured artisans. It appears that employers only lower hiring 
standards and recruit workers from other groups when the demand 
for artisans exceeds the supply of White artisans. Any other strat-
egy would clearly be counter-productive in terms .of getting the 
registered unions to the negotiating table. 
It is tempting in this regard to argue that the speed 
with which capital-intensive industrialised building systems have 
been introduced has been because of rigidities at the industrial 
council level. This factor should be borne in mind sinse the tenor 
of employment policy at present should be one of encouraging labour-
intensive methods of production as one means of coping with the 
recession in the building industry. 
'I'hus +..:he de facto pattern of adjustment in the labour 
market would appear to come closer to Reder's theory of labour 
market adjustment than the neoclassical theory, the la.tter em-
phasising profit-maximisation and freedom to substitute factors o:f 
production. This freedom to substitute non-artisan for artisan 
labour was not observed in the study, e.g. in the cas~ of the re-
dundancy agreements applicable to White workers. 
The major characteristics of the de jure labour market 
adjustment process in the Witwatersrand building industry from 1966 
onwards may be briefly restated. Fi~stly, it appears that the ea~ly 
fragmentation agreements had little impact on easing the labour 
market shortages at the time. Nonetheless, the acceptance of these 
labour rationalisation schemes did lead to large wage and fringe 
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benefit increases for the registered trade unions. The prevailing 
practice in the industry at the time - that of extensive wage 
evasion in respect of Africans doing skilled work ·- was cited as 
one reason for the reluctance of employers to adhere to rates of 
pay for newly-reclassified skilled work. This is an important arg-
ument against the perpetuation of official job colour bars that fail 
to stand the test of time. 
Secondly, it appears that the Department of Labour has 
been more lenient in its attitude towards the adjustment process. 
A comparison of the recommendations of the first and ~econd indus-
trial tribunals investigating the Witwatersrand building industry 
reveals that the tribunal investigating Determination No. 28 was 
less cautious in its approach than the previous one was. It appears 
that the promulgation of Determination No. 28 was the first time that 
the Department of Labour had challE:nged the wishes of a White trade 
union so directly. Furthermore, the ease with which exemptions were 
granted from Determination No. 6 - both in respect of the decision 
in 1971 regarding Coloureds and Black crane and lorry drivers - is 
also important. 
The evidence prese~ted in the study strongly suggests 
the following conclusion, i.e. that the function of legislation and 
policy pronouncements in conferring a virtual r~ght of veto on 
registered unions has had undesirable effects on the building indus-
try. The registered unions thus have an extra degree of freedom at 
reclassification agx:eements which has been used to widen the minir.1um 
wage gap with non-artisan grades. This is in contrast to the con-
stancy of the gap from 1962 - 1972. These minimum wage increases 
also reflect attempts to protect union members 1 earnings against 
the entry of Black workers. It was precisely this fear of wage 
deflation which led to the BBV opposing the entry of Coloured arti-· 
sans i~Tt:?._ the trades, in :favour of an adjustable ratio system. 
The impact of the shifting coJ.our bar on income differ-
entials in the industry was difficult to gauge because of inadequate 
statisticsn 'The tr.ends that did emerge suggest that the narrowing 
of the wage gap has been frustrated by the White artisan wage in-
flation in the period 1962 - 1972, for example, in the case of 
drivers' artd hoist operators' average earninas vis-a-vis those 
of artisans, as discussed in section 7. 
Two comments are in order regarding recent data (ref- . 
erred to in section 7) showing that Black earnings in construction 
has been rising faster than White earnings since mid-1972. Firstly, 
the study has suggested the power of the registe£ed unions in 
pushing up wages be·yond that suggested by marginal principles Cioe·. 
the intersection of the supply and MRP curves) without causing sig-
nificant unemployment. In the case of Black workers, this constraint 
was seen to be much more effective because of the threat of unem-
ployment and the productivity improvement following from rudimentary 
training. Furthermore, if this wage-employment trade-off is sig-
nificant, then it would not be practical to suggest that Black 
semiskilled workers be paid minimum (inflated) rates approaching 
those of White artisans. 
Tentative evidence suggests that White artisans in the 
Transvaal will henceforth more into higher p~oductivity-higher 
earni.ngs jobs where a new job reservation threshold vis-a-vis 
Coloureds and Africans wi 11 be applied~ It appears that this will 
be an enduring feature of any future adjustments made to the colour 
bar in the building industry. 
With regard to non-artisan wages in the industry, it 
has been shown that there has been a rapid improvement since the 
late 1960's. Furt~ermore, substantial wage improvements have 
occurred as a result of skill acquisition by African i'.'orkers .. ThE,se 
improvements have been manifested both in high levels of' wage drift 
and the introduction of a comprehensive frin9e benefit pattern. 'The 
rules regarding eligibility for, e.g. pension fund payments, reflect 
the desire of the industry to reduce la.bou:c turnover a.nd training 
costs~ 
An important factor in non-artisan productivity improve-
ment in the building industry was shown to be the institution of 
rudimentary training schemes~ The la.rgest firms in the ind us try 
generally have done far more privately in this regard than the 
medium-sized and smaller contractor. 
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The adjustment to White artisan labour shortages on 
the Witwatersrand has been through job dilution, whilst this study 
has shown that in the building industry in the Western Cape and 
Natal these shortages are being manifested in the very rapid entry 
of Coloured workers a.t the artisan and fo.cema.n le'vel. This is 
occurring simultaneously with the broad-based entry in the Western 
Cape of Coloured artisans into other hitherto-closed trades. 
It would appear that Coloured artisans will dominate 
the artisan ranks entirely in the two coastal provinces before a 
process of job fragmentation reduces employment opportunitie~ at 
the artisan level as is happening in the Transvaal. The dampening 
effect on artisan wages as a result of the entry of Coloured artisans 
in the Western Cape, will probably delay the need for an introduction 
of semiskilled African labour, for example throu~h industrialised 
building systemso The predictions made by this study about the em-
ployment opportunities of Coloured artisans in the Witwatersrand 
building industry were particularly equivocal since the dynamics of 
adjustment in this area will bring about a relative decline in the 
number of artisans required, whilst Whites will have preference at 
the supervisory level. 
A significant point in the Western Cape study was that 
adjustments in the industry's labour pattern were in fact more 
responsive and adaptable to labour market stresses, depending as 
they appeared to on the individual employer's judgement about labour 
market conditions, e.g. the cc.se of Coloured apprentices in a par-
ticular trade. This means that job reservation was administered 
flexibly, the criteria for exemption simply being whether there 
was White unemployment or not, or in the context of apprenticeship 
recruitment, whether a White apprentice could be obtained. 
The study highlighted the different attitudes of White 
workers in the W"3stern Cape - as opposed to those in the Transvaal 
to the entry of Black workers. In the former area (including 
Durban) ,'·White artisans seemingly played a neutral role in Black 
job advancement in recent yearso 
Despite the absence of far-reaching statutory barriers 
I 
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to the entry of Coloured building artisans in the Western Cape, 
a significant point in the Western Cape study was the reinforce-
ment of an observation made in the Transvaal, i.e. that of strong 
employer preference for White labour. This was seen to be an im-
portant informal barrier to the fuller utilisation of Coloured 
labour in the industry u· The study also linked this phenomenon to 
the pay discrimination shown to exist between White and Coloured 
artisans. 
Other informal barriers - which according to the Theron 
Commission are the most important ones facing Coloured laboui to-
day, inter alia,: minimum wage requirements and appr2nticesnip 
committees, were also pointed to. The different pattern of entry 
of Coloured - as opposed to African - labour suggests that the 
tools of analysis used in the latter case are indpplicable - or 
at least out of context with - the character of the labour force 
under study. 
9.2 Scooe for Policy Intervention 
There is scope for policy intervention at three levels 
(1) the official level,i.e. government policy, (2) at ~ndustrial 
council level and the Department of Labour, (3) pri1.rate employers. 
Although several extremely important suggestions can be made as to 
appropriate changes at the official level - t11e redrafting of certain 
Acts, e.g. the I~1ustrial Conciliation Act, a~d the reversal of 
certain tenets of policy e.g. in respect of the training of Africans 
as apprentices - this area will not be pursued. This is despite 
the fact that the study has shown these policies to be open to 
serious criticisms. 
Attention was drawn in section 9.1 to the lags in de 
jure adjustment to labour market stresses in the Witwatersrand 
building 1industry. Even if official policy is to remain that job 
reclassification takes place with management's consent from the 
registered trade unions, it could still be argued that the lags 
between de facto and de jure adjust'rnent cannot be justified, i.e. 
it is suggested here that the administrative reaction to market 
forces be speeded up. As has been shown, this lag has had important 
consequences for the wage gap. 
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In this regard, it could be suggested that an agency 
such as the industri2l council institute a job evaluation study 
in~luding all grades in the industry. This could have an important 
educative effect on the registered unions vis-a-vis the alignment 
of their minimum wages with those in the non-artisan grades. In 
time, the unions may -·as suggested by Lloyd Reynolds(l) - become 
more apologetic about defending out-of-line rates. 
There is scope for industrial council action on other 
issues as well, e.go changing non-artisan overtime such that 
overtime payments begin after 40 and not 44 'ordinary' hours, and 
the increase of fringe benefit payments to certain minimum levels. 
This study has suggested that there is scope for more 
creative management of the entire process of ad~ustment, especially 
that with regard to African workers. For instance, the information 
from the Western Cape showed employers' decisions to be quite 
reliable in·their hiring practices as regards the appropriate pace 
of change in the labour maiket. This could be the basis upon which 
trained Bantu Building Workers could-eventually be admitted to the 
skilled trades in the h1i twatersrand building ind us try. One is further 
tempted to ask why an operative grade !:artisan ratio system was 
not instituted in 1966 when the first reclassification agreement 
was negotiated in the industry. 
9.3 Scope for Further Research 
The benefits of in-depth study of one industry have 
been referred to in section 1. The conclusions reached in this 
study would seem to justify this contention. A suggestion is made 
here that similar studies of other industries be undertaken; 
however, one series problem is that industrial councils do not 
collect the type 6£ information which is extremely important to 
the empiricist studying occupation mobility. 
There remains much scope for research at the level of 
the firm. Topics touched on in this.study but requiring far mor~ 
detailed research include : (1) the causes of wage drift in Black 
grades, (2) what causes racial wage differentials in similar jobs 
to be perpetuated and n?t eradicated by the market, (3) the pay-
productivity link. Again at the level of the firm, there is scope 
for research on employer decision-making regarding decisions to 
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change hiring standards and admit excluded workers. 
At the industry level, there is scope for investigation 
of the criteria used for wage-setting by industrial councils. Given 
the crucial role that this study has shown the registered union& 
to have played in African job advancement, there is clearly scope 
for research into union atti~udes towards African job advancement, 
and the various means by which these attitudes may be made more 
accommodating, i.e. creative policy intervention. 
FOOTNOTES : SECTION 9 
( 1) See van der Horst, S .. T., "Equal Pay for Equal Work", 
Vol.22 No. 2 1954. 
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